

Country Briefing – The People's Republic of China

Political Briefing

Introduction

China is now the largest local actor in the Southern and Eastern Pacific, holding strong economic ties with many countries in Asia. From the Century of Humiliation, we have successfully developed our economy and enhanced our capabilities on all fronts. We are no longer a rising player on the world stage but are now firmly established! As Taiwan heads towards another DPP administration, the risk of worsening ties, a further drift from a Chinese identity, and the ever-loomng shadow of an independent Taiwan grows.

Strategic Objectives

We have long desired to become the regional leader of the Pacific as part of our journey to the highest echelon of the international stage after the Century of Humiliation. As part of this ambition, we must bring Taiwan more closely into the fold and eventual reunify with them, closing the last wound of the Civil War. Demonstrating our ability to do so, the all-important stability of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will be assured and any lingering questions or doubts about the legitimacy of the CCP will be destroyed forever.

National Strategy

Our strategy of engagement with Taiwan has shifted somewhat over the last five years. Previously, the strategy was to demonstrate the economic benefits of cross-strait engagement and push for stronger cultural and business ties. This was intended to keep the Taiwanese identity as a Chinese identity, create ties that could be leveraged, and show the benefits of reunification. However, after the election of Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 and the growing repression in Hong Kong since 2018-2019, the effectiveness of this approach began to diminish.

In comparison to the previous carrot approach, the current approach is now both carrot and stick. Business and cultural ties are promoted, but also constant reminders that the island is under military threat have become the norm, and that displeasing us will lead to our wrath. To actually coerce the Taiwanese people into choosing the right leader we have a great number of abilities at our disposal. Economic coercion and information warfare can be coupled with diplomacy and military coercion.

On the information front there is a constant back and forth between our governments trying to influence public opinion overtly and covertly. There are a (small) number of those on Taiwan who believe in our reunification, and the KMT itself prefers to lower tensions in the strait. Our cyber capabilities steal intellectual property, exert political influence, and carry out espionage.

Economically our business ties to the island are large and a sizable part of the Taiwanese economy relies upon us for its continued existence. We have also been pushing towards eroding the Taiwanese semiconductor edge by investing in our own plants though we currently lag many years behind. Our investment through the Belt and Road Initiative around the world has won us some influence throughout the developing world. Importantly we have embedded our monetary roots into the core of the world economy, meaning our economic leverage is a now a tremendous weapon. Any country that intends on getting in our way can be reminded how much they stand to lose if we feel like severing economic ties.

Diplomatically, temporary suspensions of cross strait ties such as halting communication, meetings, and at the more extreme end suspending travel by stopping the

issuing of visas are all possible options. Work continues to further isolate Taiwan from other countries around the world and its allies' countries, with only 12 members of the UN recognizing Taiwan. Alongside this we have expanded our influence in international institutions and can always leverage our Security Council veto.

We have developed our military capabilities at a rapid pace, in line with President Xi's desire for China to be a "world-class military power". Alongside advances in missiles, we now field the largest navy in the world, and the largest air force in the Pacific. In addition, we continually introduce cutting-edge technology as with our DF-17 hypersonic missiles, cutting-edge electronic warfare systems, and J-20 5th generation fighters. However, the PLA exhibits many weaknesses: a low-quality officer corps, limited nuclear stockpiles, a lack of jointness, and limited amphibious lift to name but a few. At the extreme military end, our buildup could allow us to seize one of the outlying islands. Still, we should not overstretch and expose ourselves, and should avoid war if at all possible.

Our policy has always been that the most effective solution comes from blending our tools together. Failure to keep Taiwan from another DPP presidency will likely mean that a peaceful reunification will slip further and further from grasp. Perhaps this may be a watershed moment, the point of no return. We must avoid a DPP presidency.

Special Orders

Special Order: Nuclear Readiness

Any movements up or down the Nuclear Readiness levels must be relayed to your Team Control. Changing your Nuclear Readiness is a public act and will be known by all other Countries. You are currently at Nuclear Readiness level of Garrison.

Readiness	Description	Readiness Level
Nuclear Readiness: Go	Nuclear war is imminent or has already begun	Maximum readiness. Immediate response.
Nuclear Readiness: Ready	Next step to nuclear war	Missiles fueled, ready for immediate launch if needed.
Nuclear Readiness: Prepared	Increase in force readiness above that required for normal readiness	Warheads mated to missiles and bombs
Nuclear Readiness: Dispersed	Increased intelligence watch and strengthened security measures	Above usual readiness, troops dispersed from garrison.
Nuclear Readiness: Garrison	Lowest state of readiness	Normal readiness

Mobilization

The President may issue mobilization orders for the following categories to be mobilized.

People's Armed Police – Mobilization of the People's Armed Police units so that they can be deployed for the suppression of protests and/or for rear area security for critical infrastructure or for use in helping to hold captured Taiwanese territory.

Mobilization of Commercial Sealift – Appropriation of commercial roll-on roll-off (RORO) ships, car ferries, and other sea vessels to provide additional sealift to support amphibious operations. Currently an extremely select mobilization of commercial sea lift has been carried out for ROROs with specific reinforced ramps to support amphibious assaults.

Mobilization of Commercial Aircraft – Appropriation of commercial airplanes both cargo and passenger to provide further airlift capabilities for air operations and logistical support.