

Country Briefing - The Republic of China

Political Briefing

Introduction

Since 1949 the Republic of China (ROC) often known as Taiwan has been in a constant struggle against the People's Republic of China (PRC). Our population, GDP, and military capabilities are now far behind that of a resurgent PRC. Only 12 minor UN members recognize us instead of the PRC. Officially we do not claim to be an independent country, rather a continuation of the ROC, claiming the whole Chinese mainland. Unofficially however we have long seen the writing on the wall and have formed a unique Taiwanese identity.

Despite the establishment of more favorable relations after the end of the Cold War with Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping has been aggressively arguing for the return of Taiwan to the PRC. We have long suffered daily intrusions into our air defense identification zone and coercive economic and diplomacy offensives from across the strait. Our upcoming elections have only made this coercion worse, and now Beijing is bare faced in its attempts to influence our elections.

Strategic Objectives

There has been and will only ever be one goal: Taiwan is to remain a free and independent nation. We shall take all necessary measures to secure Taiwan and its people from Beijing. We must wholly oppose Chinese attempts to meddle in Taiwanese politics and avoid China taking military action. *China cannot be allowed to dictate the politics of our country.*

Politics

There are two main groups in Taiwanese politics, the Blues (The KMT et. al.), and the Greens (the DPP et. al.). The Blues are generally more conservative and favored by older voters, with a view towards preserving the status quo or improving cross strait ties. The Greens are favored by younger and more liberal voters and skew more towards promoting a distinct Taiwanese identity at odds with Beijing's wishes. There are a number of other smaller parties that tend to focus on individual social issues.

National Strategy

Economically Taiwan is vulnerable, importing a great deal of its energy and food from the world. In exchange our most well-known export is semiconductors, in which we lead the world. Being an island nation, we are at great risk if we were to be cut off. Thankfully however we have had tacit US backing to deter China from action, which is now growing further as more and more countries realize the threat that China poses.

The US-Taiwanese relationship is based on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The treaty allows the U.S to supply arms to Taiwan and is our major source for non-indigenous defense equipment. It is important to note that while it seems exceptionally likely the United States will come to our defense, there is no mandatory guarantee made by the U.S to defend Taiwan and such a decision remains at their discretion. Taiwan furthermore has an extensive relationship with Japan, which is seen as a major economic and cultural partner as well as a potential defense guarantor. This has been underscored by Japan signaling a willingness to come to our defense, backed up by increasing defense commitments.

Despite this all action shall be taken with great care to avoid an all-out invasion and occupation of Taiwan or our outlying islands. While the likelihood of such an attack being successful against Taiwan is remote, the outlying islands are much more vulnerable.

More insidious than direct action however is Chinese influence over our voters. Chinese attempts are nothing new, but they have taken on an ever-increasing fervor in the run up to the election, combining military aggression with articles and influence campaigns. We continue to counter these by scrambling fighters to intercept their flights and run messaging campaigns of our own, but the Chinese buildup is new, and it is uncertain how this will affect their ability to influence the population. Under no terms should China be allowed to dictate or influence our politics.

Special Orders

Mobilization

The President, or the Minister of National Defense with approval from the President may issue mobilization orders for the following categories of reservists to be called up.

A-Level Reservists – Reservists to fill in gaps in already manned infantry brigades allowing 9 well equipped brigades to be fully readied for combat.

B-Level Reservists – Reservists who are active duty personnel currently in detached duty in the professional military education system allowing for 2 infantry brigades to be readied for combat.

C-Level Reservists – Reservists from local areas who will be mobilized to defend their hometowns in small units. These troops are made of older and less well-trained reservists and will fight as light infantry providing large numbers of “speedbumps” for Chinese forces as they attempt to move. They cannot be moved long distances as they have no organic transport. Total mobilization will be 22 brigades worth of soldiers.

D-Level Reservists – Reservists from soldiers of the mobilization structure, e.g., military police and administrative units. If they are called up, mobilization of previously unmobilized other units (C-Level especially) will be slower. The total number of units that could be formed is unknown, but 2-3 brigades of infantry is expected.

Aircraft Dispersal

The President, or the Minister of National Defense without prior approval from the President may order the dispersal of the Air Force to operate from highways. Doing so will dramatically increase the survivability of the Air Force but will substantially lessen the sortie rate and planes will be able to carry less fuel, missiles, and bombs.