

And the Kitchen Sink...

The Support Deck Module for Jaws of the Dragon



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Jaws of the Dragon – Support Deck Module v6

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The point of the support deck module is twofold:

- 1) To include a great number of minor intangibles not covered by the other rules and modules.
 - a. Covering off areas not otherwise engaged with in this game.
 - b. Improving player options in the planning process by creating a larger decision space (but with low cognitive demands).
- 2) To provide a lot of chrome and interesting tidbits both for:
 - a. Player enjoyment and engagement.
 - b. Narrative deepening.
 - c. Representativeness.

It is recommended that the support deck module be used at the same time as the Will to Fight module.

Rules

Cards

Each turn¹ the Control will bring around the support deck. Each team draws a number of cards from the support deck (return to the deck any that are country specific if the team is not that country and draw again). Teams may not have more than double the number of cards they draw a turn or 4 cards (whichever is higher).² Teams cannot trade cards between each other.³

# of Cards	1 Cards	2 Cards	3 Cards	4 Cards
Country	Australia Canada France Philippines UK	Japan	US	China Taiwan

The effects of these cards are given on the cards themselves. Teams will hand them over to Control to use them.

(Country) Only Cards

Country only cards may only be held on to and played by the designated country. BLUEFOR indicates anyone on the “Blue” Team, or the good guys (e.g. not China).

Single Use (X) Cards

Cards with an X in the bottom right-hand corner are removed from play after they have been used. If they are drawn but they are not usable by the country they are not considered to have been used and are shuffled back into the deck.

Discards

There are a handful of effects in the game (in various version of the game that is) that cause a team to discard support cards.

- Cards are discarded at random.
- If the team has no card to discard, they instead draw 1 less from the deck next turn.

¹ Usually this is 1 turn = 1 day, but even at 1 turn = 1 week, the numbers staying the same should be just fine.

² This is just to encourage sufficient use of cards to keep cards in the deck.

³ This could be occasionally allowed, subject to Control approval.

Card Setups

If certain countries are not being played or are assumed not to enter into the war, some or all of their cards as appropriate may be removed. Cognitive Superiority cards can be added or given to countries as desired.⁴

The following cards start with their players

- 1 x Air Surge (China Only)
- 1 Set x Engineer Group (Taiwanese Only)
 - 52nd Engineer Group (10th Army), 53rd Engineer Group (6th Army), 54th Engineer Group (8th Army)
- 3 x Local Knowledge (Taiwan Only)
- 2 x PHL-191 Strikes (China Only)

Base Scenario	Stalled Invasion Scenario
Generic Cards	Generic Cards
1 x Airfield Decoys	
1 x Air Surge (US Only)	
1 x Carrier UNREP	
1 x Civilian Fishing Fleet ISR (Philippines Only)	
9 x Commercial ISR (comprised of: 4 x No Restrictions, 2 x BLUEFOR Only, 1 x US Only, 1 x European Only, 1 x China Only)	
2 x Contingency Planning	
1 x Counterintelligence Success	
3 x EMCON [†]	
1 x EW Success	
2 x Intelligence Success	
1 x Japan Coast Guard CSAR	
1 x Long Range CSAR (Japan Only)	No Changes.
3 x Maritime Militia Intelligence (China Only)	
3 x MILDEC (Place decoy w/ unit) [†]	
1 x MILDEC (50% chance of 1 column shift)	
1 x MILDEC (Select enemy unit, it may not move)	
2 x OPSEC (Shift unit 1 hex from current location)	
3 x OPSEC (If unit would be detected, it's not)	
1 x OSINT	
2 x Preplanning	
1 x PSYOP	
1 x SIGMAN	
1 x SOF on Taiwan (US Only)	
1 x Tactical Decoys	
1 x Targeted Intelligence Collection	
Cards Based on Days	Cards Based on Days
See Below	1 x MDTF Support (US Only)*
	2 x Old Equipment Stockpile (Taiwan Only)*
	1 x Reserve F-18 Reactivation (Australia Only)*
	1 x J-7 Reactivation (China Only)*

⁴ Typically (depending on game length) I give the team that has done the most research on the game/done the reading for class/done the most wargaming a single Cognitive Superiority card as a bonus for improving their own Cognitive Superiority.

Cards Based on Actions	Cards Based on Actions
See Below	1 x Civilian Informers (China/Taiwan Only) 1 x DJI Mass Production (China Only) 1 x Insurgents Card (Taiwan Only)* 1 x Group Army Engineers (China Only)* 1 x PAP (China Only)* 1 x SOF on Taiwan (US Only)

[†] One or two more of these cards can be added without really affecting the deck

Some cards enter on specific days or conditions.⁵ Hand them to the players at this time:

Cards Based on Days
-- Day 7 --
1 x Civilian Dug Fortifications (Taiwan Only)
-- Day 14 --
1 x Old Equipment Stockpile (Taiwan Only)
-- Day 30 --
1 x Old Equipment Stockpile (Taiwan Only)
1 x Reserve F-18 Reactivation (Australia Only)
1 x J-7 Reactivation (China Only)
1 x DJI Mass Production (China Only)
-- Day 45 --
1 x Old Equipment Stockpile (Taiwan Only)
1 x Suicide USV (Taiwan Only)
1 x Volunteers (Taiwan Only)
-- Day 60 --
1 x Boneyard Reactivation (US Only)
1 x Old Equipment Stockpile (Taiwan Only)
-- Day 90 --
1 x Boneyard Reactivation (US Only)
1 x Old Equipment Stockpile (Taiwan Only)

Cards Based on Actions
-- Taiwan Invaded--
1 x Civilian Informers (China/Taiwan Only)
-- Invasion of Taiwan D+7 --
1 x Insurgents Card (Taiwan Only)
-- Per Major Taiwanese Population Center Captured --
1 x Insurgents Card (Taiwan Only)
-- Per Group Army Engineer Brigade Sent to Taiwan --
1 x Group Army Engineers (China Only)
-- Per PAP Contingent Sent to Taiwan --
1 x PAP (China Only)
-- Per MDTF in Theater --
1 x MDTF Support (US Only)
-- War D+14 --
1 x US Coast Guard CSAR

⁵ Note that a lot of these represent not the initial action (e.g. making the decision to mobilize and train volunteers, or reactive old airframes), but the point at which that decision becomes consequential, and the result of the action can be allocated to support the war effort.

Card List

This section details a list of all the cards and the rationales for their inclusion. A [X] indicates that the card is a single use card.

- 1 x Airfield Decoys – When an air unit would take damage from missiles or air strikes, or a ground unit would take damage discard this card to ignore the damage.⁶
- 1 x Air Surge (US Only) – All aircraft may conduct missions into adjacent areas.⁷
- 1 x Air Surge (China Only) [X] – All aircraft may conduct missions into the Taiwan air sector if adjacent.⁸
- 2 x Boneyard Reactivation (US Only) [X] – Remove 1 damage on a 4th Gen aircraft squadron.⁹
- 1 x Carrier UNREP (US Only) – Fully replenish a carrier's onboard aircraft munitions.¹⁰
- 1 x Civilian Dug Fortifications (Taiwan Only) – Use supply to fortify a unit.
- 1 x Civilian Informers (China/Taiwan Only) – Detect a random enemy ground unit.¹¹
- 1 x Civilian Fishing Fleet ISR (Philippines Only) – Increase ISR rolls from the Philippines by 1 this turn.¹²
- 1 Sheet x Cognitive Superiority [X] – Re-roll 1 die.¹³
- 1 Set x Commercial ISR – 25% chance to detect each ground unit in a hex¹⁴
 - 4 x Generic
 - 2 x BLUFOR
 - 1 x China
 - 1 x US
 - 1 x European only
- 2 x Contingency Planning – Negate any one support card.¹⁵

⁶ Decoys can be physical or in the EM spectrum. See pieces like *Tu-95 Decoys Are Being Painted on Russian Air Base's Apron*, Sep 30, 2023 <https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/tu-95-decoys-are-being-painted-on-russian-air-bases-apron>; *Preparing to Win the First Fight of the Next War*, Feb 23, 2024 Maj. Gen. Curt Taylor, <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/Preparing-to-win-the-first-fight-of-the-next-war>; and *Destroy me quickly. How Ukrainian fake HIMARS, guns and tanks fight with Russian Kalibr and Iskander missiles*, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/03/11/7445807/>, online can be found numerous examples of physical decoys, my personal favorite being an inflatable decoy hanger: <https://www.dvidshub.net/image/7835036/prototype-portable-camouflage-concealment-and-deception-hanger>.

⁷ The US is really good at massed airpower. This card represents the ability to conduct a massive surge in sorties for a brief duration of time.

⁸ This card represents chnise preplanning to fly massive first day sorties over Taiwan to hold and maintain air superiority and conduct strikes. The card is single use as this represents heavy effort that is not repeatable.

⁹ This represents both reactivating airframes (in the longer term), but also being able to use aircraft in the boneyards for spares to support US operations, and potentially to use them as decoys. Boneyard F-16's have been used for spares for Ukraine F-16s *Pulled From U.S. Boneyard Are Being Delivered To Ukraine For Spare Parts*, Thomas Newdick and Howard Altman, May 1, 2025, <https://www.twz.com/air/f-16s-pulled-from-u-s-boneyard-are-being-delivered-to-ukraine-for-spare-parts>.

¹⁰ Lacking a specific naval logistic system, I included this card to allow for the rearming of US carriers.

¹¹ This represents the use of civilian informants on the ground to pass information as occurred in the opening of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in 2022. For example see <https://teletype.in/@tysknip/HostomelEN>, specifically see question "How would you assess the level of assistance of the local population to the military?"

¹² Discussion has been had about the ability of the Chinese Maritime Militia operating off of fishing boats to provide maritime ISR. As the Philippines has a very large fishing fleet and is rather anti-China, I see no reason why they could not attempt to do the same in reverse.

¹³ This is perhaps the most "game-y" of the cards, but I 1) wanted to include a re-roll card that players can use at a critical juncture (it's single use, so they should consider carefully!), 2) want to represent the fact that some commanders are better than others, but do this in an additive manner (e.g. "our commander gets a re-roll!") as opposed to a negative manner ("our commander gets a column shift against his attacks?") that might cause backlash.

¹⁴ The rise of commercial satellite imagery (and a spate of other remote sensing techniques) for intelligence use has been noted in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia may well be using this for targeting and battle damage assessment (<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2024/03/american-satellites-russia-ukraine-war/677775/>). The rough breakdown of the number of cards is based on having a full sheet of 9, with the country specific cards based on additional capability that are national or in the West/China.

¹⁵ This represents having already planned to negate or deal with the problems caused by this threat, therefore effectively nullifying it.

- 1 x Counterintelligence Success – Negate one MILDEC, OPSEC, Decoys, PSYOP, EMCON, or SIGMAN card¹⁶
- 1 x DJI Mass Production (China Only) – 50% chance to detect each ground unit in a selected frontline hex.¹⁷
- 3 x EMCON – Place 1 decoy with a Surface Naval Unit.¹⁸
- 1 Set x Engineer Group (Taiwanese Only) – Use supply to fortify a unit.¹⁹
 - 52nd Engineer Group (10th Army), 53rd Engineer Group (6th Army), 54th Engineer Group (8th Army)
- 1 x EW Success – 1 column shift on any ground unit fight, or 1 SEAD mission automatically succeeds.²⁰
- 1 Set x Group Army Engineers (China Only) – Use supply to fortify a unit or allow a brigade to conduct a wet gap crossing.²¹
- 1 x Insurgents (Taiwan Only) – Attrit an enemy unit by one or destroy 1 Chinese supply.²²
- 2 x Intelligence Success – Detect and track 1 random enemy unit.²³
- 1 x Japan Coast Guard CSAR – Remove 1 damage on any Squadron based in Japan.²⁴
- 3 x Local Knowledge (Taiwan Only) [X] – 1 column shift on any ground unit fight.²⁵

¹⁶ This represents successful counterintelligence efforts defeating enemy attempts as deception or attempts to hide information.

¹⁷ This represents the ability of China to use DJI's massive production capability to their own ends, as well as make the necessary hardware/software modifications on the production line (removing GPS broadcast for example). This is of course necessitated on having sufficient supplies to do this sort of production, but due to the shorter timeframe of this game and presumed Chinese stockpiling before the war as well as central Asian and potentially Russian workarounds, the Chinese are likely to be able to keep up production at least somewhat at a minimum.

¹⁸ Emissions Control (EMCON) limits the detectability of your forces. This is particularly important for ships, which when fully turned on radiate like a Christmas tree on a dark night and become much more detectable at range.

¹⁹ This represents corps level (termed "Army" to the Taiwanese system) engineer assets creating a complex system of fortifications for a brigade in a given area.

²⁰ I wished to include the effect of EW into the game given its relevance to modern warfare, and discussions on tactical (the level of warfare) EW in Ukraine. Success in the tactical EW domain tends to grant fleeting benefits as the other side adapts though not nearly as quickly as this card suggests (see *Fighting the War in Ukraine on the Electromagnetic Spectrum*, February 5th, 2025, The Economist, <https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2025/02/05/fighting-the-war-in-ukraine-on-the-electromagnetic-spectrum>), though in some tactical cases (anti-drone EW) 2 weeks is the standard EW development-to-counter development cycle, and sometimes this is as low as 48 hours (*Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces*, Justin Bronk and Jack Watling, RUSI Occasional Paper, 11 April 2024, <https://static.rusi.org/mass-precision-strike-final.pdf>, pg. 38, 47). The representation here is both parity driven by this is how I am forced to represent it in a card, and also that it represents the point at which that tactical advantage builds into something consequential (e.g. tactical EW is occurring constantly, but this was the marshaling of a decisive advantage at a decisive point to achieve a desired effect.) For example see the Russian suppression of Ukrainian air defense at the start of the war - *The Arms of the Future*, Jack Watling, 2023, ISBN 978-1-3503-5295-7, <https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/arms-of-the-future-9781350352988/>, pg. 38. Or it represents the use of a specifically designed EW capability against the enemy (*The Arms of the Future*, pg. 40). I accept that this is a very imperfect model of EW.

²¹ This represents corps level ("Group Army" to the Chinese system) engineer assets creating a system of fortifications for a brigade in a given area, or using engineering assets to conduct a wet gap crossing. This is a card (e.g. the reason why it takes time to draw the card) as opposed to an organic capability as I suspect that the full brigade wouldn't be deployed end-mass at the start of an operations (and/or) would take losses crossing/in combat and a lot of planning and work is required to construct fortifications, and a lot of planning/shaping. is required to attempt a wet-gap crossing

²² Stay behinds or insurgents would likely grow organically or be planned by the Taiwanese government. This represents their two major effects on Taiwan itself: 1) attriting enemy forces through destruction of material or personnel (or forcing troops to be committed to rear-area security), or 2) destruction of enemy supplies and things that move supply (e.g. trucks in this case). I do not represent attacks on operational or strategic redeployment (e.g. rail lines, bridges) as Taiwan is a small country and this has less effect than it might in other theaters (and blowing up bridges is hard, especially as many Taiwanese ones are hardened). I do not represent attacks on high value assets (SAM batteries, etc.) as these are pop up targets, consequently whether or not they would be attacked is random depending on if the insurgents could hit the target when it showed up, and this card is fixed in nature (e.g. attrit or remove supply) and represent attacks against (relatively) static targets, or pop up targets that come with high regularity through an area (movements of supply trucks, troops, etc.). Functionally insurgent attacks against high-value assets are too random to be included in this card, before a discussion of how effective these attacks would be and if (due to difficulty in coordinating them) they would have any effect other than attriting enemy high-value assets (e.g. destroying a SAM battery when no strike mission is planned for the next 12 hours doesn't help the future strike mission as the SAM attrition will be replaced by the time the strike is in).

²³ This represents good luck and/or skill by intelligence units (perhaps "Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity" – Seneca) or more cynically, failures by the enemy to allow for the finding of a enemy unit.

²⁴ This card represents using coast guard ships for long range CSAR to pick up downed pilots.

²⁵ Local knowledge of the area can help significantly when fighting, though it becomes less effective over time as the battlefield becomes more known to both sides and the battlefield itself changes as a result of fighting.

- 1 x Long Range CSAR (Japan Only) – Remove 1 damage on any Squadron based in Japan.²⁶
- 3 x Maritime Militia Intelligence (China Only) – add 1 to ISR rolls in a selected hex within the First Island Chain.²⁷
- 3 x MDTF Support – US only, 1 column shift on any US ground unit fight.²⁸
- 3 x MILDEC – Place 1 decoy with any unit.²⁹
- 1 x MILDEC – 50% chance of 1 column shift on any ground unit attack.³⁰
- 1 x MILDEC – Select 1 enemy unit, it may not move this turn.³¹
- 5 x Old Equipment Stockpile (Taiwan only) [X] – Remove 1 attrition from a ground unit.³²
- 2 x OPSEC – Shift a unit 1 hex from its current location.³³
- 3 x OPSEC – Play when a unit would be detected, the unit is not detected.³⁴
- 1 x OSINT – Detect and track 1 random enemy unit.³⁵
- 1 x PAP (China Only) – Use this card to cancel one Insurgent Card or remove 1 attrition from any ground unit³⁶
- 2 x PHL-191 Strikes (China Only) – Attrit an enemy unit on Taiwan, or reduce Taiwanese IADS by 1 for 1 Strike.³⁷

²⁶ Japan with its ShinMaywa US-2 flying boats is the only country with long-range CSAR capability in the Pacific. This will be invaluable for helping retrieve highly trained pilots who are difficult to replace.

²⁷ *China Maritime Report No. 46: China's Fishermen Spies: Intelligence Specialists in the Maritime Militia*, Ryan D. Martinson, April 23, 2025, <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/46/>, pg. 11-12 especially. 3 cards are done as there is one for each of the theater commands, the +1 is sized based on reported low chances of usefulness (pg. 20-21).

²⁸ Besides the missiles of the MDTF, a MDTF has a great number of support capabilities it can bring to bear to assist friendly units. This card represents those capabilities (plus the ability of the HQ to integrate other additional supporting assets), mostly the HQ and I2CEWS battalion (see <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11797.pdf> for a brief overview of MDTF's and the ORBAT on pg. 1). The ability of the MDTF to act dispersed to support other assets has been tested as seen here: https://www.army.mil/article/277487/3d_mdtf_demonstrates_ability_to_operate_in_the_indo_pacific

²⁹ Military Deception (MILDEC) is a range of measures intended to deceive the enemy as to your position, forces, and intent. While MILDEC has a range of intended outcomes here I only represent the deception element itself, to allow humans to make the critical mistakes that MILDEC attempts to force the enemy into (see *Functions of MILDEC*, in *Joint Publication 3-13.4, Military Deception*, https://jfsc.ndu.edu/portals/72/documents/jc2ios/additional_reading/1c3-jp_3-13-4_mildec.pdf, pg. viii)

³⁰ This represents the chance of using deception to achieve tactical surprise over the enemy (operational surprise is covered by the regular rules and is much more deadly than 1 column shift...). Note that placing this in the hands of one side actively to play as a card may be out of line with given data, see *War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat*, Christopher A. Lawrence, Potomac Books, 2017, pg. 128-131. However I think this analysis and data (WW2, limited data) obscures the importance of actively deceiving the enemy in modern combat (e.g. a more transparent battlefield gives (or perhaps forces) more agency to the deceiver to deceive as the enemy is less likely to have low information on you), and also the fact that end effects modeling here is probably a better presentation as placing a "you are surprised" card in the hands of the defender (and making them play it on themselves) which less accurate to how deception works and feels less bad.

³¹ This represents the use of deception to misdirect and confuse enemy forces, functionally pinning them in place via indecision or making them think that they need to hold the force there.

³² This card represents breaking old equipment out of storage or refurbishing old equipment to go back into use.

³³ This effect represents the ability to move forces without them being detected by the enemy due to good operational security.

³⁴ This represents the successful employment of OPSEC to deny information to the adversary.

³⁵ While much has been chronicled about the rise of OSINT in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I include it less than I would for a European game as it would be less effective in a war in the Pacific as 1) much of the combat would occur at sea or in the air, and 2) communication with Taiwan will likely not be as easy if China opts to destroy some or all of the undersea Internet cables (this is an interesting discussion and the thing I wrote my MA thesis on).

³⁶ This represents the use of People Armed Police for rear area security duties, which can both prevent attacks (allowing better regeneration of combat power) on the rear area and/or free up other combat troops for frontline duty, or as the mobile contingents are trained and equipped as light infantry, deploying them as troops. See *China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform*, China Strategic Perspectives 14, Joel Wuthnow, April 2019, <https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%2014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf?ver=2019-04-16-121756-937> and also *Waging War without Disruption: China's People's Armed Police in a Future Conflict*, Jake Rinaldi, April 24, 2025, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict/>

³⁷ See *China Maritime Report No. 32: The PCH191 Modular Long-Range Rocket Launcher: Reshaping the PLA Army's Role in a Cross-Strait Campaign*, Joshua Arostegui, November 2023, <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=cmsi-maritime-reports> and also *Striking Distance*, Kapil Kajal, *James Defence Weekly*, 7 June 2023. It also represents to some degree extended range 155mm tube and 122 MRL fire that can reach the western plains of Taiwan (*Air Defense Options for Taiwan, An Assessment of Relative Costs and Operational Benefits*, Lostumbo et. al., RAND, 2016, pg. 119-120)

- 2 x Preplanning – Move a unit 1 extra hex this turn.³⁸
- 1 x PSYOP – Psychological Operation, Shift a unit 1 hex from its current location or place 1 decoy with any unit.³⁹
- 1 x Reserve F-18 Reactivation (Australia Only) [X] – Remove 1 damage on an aircraft squadron.⁴⁰
- 1 x Reserve J-7 Reactivation (China Only) – Remove 1 damage on an aircraft squadron.⁴¹
- 1 x SIGMAN – Play when a ground unit would be detected, the unit is not detected.⁴²
- 1 Each x SOF on Taiwan – Immediately regenerate one SOF team
 - One (US Only) card and one (Non-Taiwan BLUEFOR Only) card⁴³
- 1 x Suicide USV (Taiwan Only) – 10% chance to damage one naval unit within 1 hex of Taiwan.⁴⁴
- 1 x Tactical Decoys – When a ground unit would take damage from missiles or air strikes discard this card to ignore the damage.⁴⁵
- 1 x Targeted Intelligence Collection – Select one unit, on 4+ detect it.⁴⁶
- 2 x Volunteers (Taiwan Only) – Remove 1 attrition on an infantry unit.⁴⁷
- 1 x US Coast Guard CSAR – Remove 1 damage on any Squadron.⁴⁸

³⁸ This represents the higher responsiveness of units that have planning already done for certain contingencies and actions and can implement those plans.

³⁹ This effect represents the ability to move forces without them being detected by the enemy due to good operational security or being able to confuse the enemy as to the nature of your forces.

⁴⁰ Australia as of April 2023 has 46 mothballed F/A-18 in storage, which could be reactivated, and has qualified pilots to fly them. <https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/australias-mothballed-f-a-18-hornets-should-be-given-to-ukraine> (2023)

⁴¹ China has a lot of modernized J-7's that have just recently been retired that could likely be reactivated in wartime. This card represents them either deploying reactivated aircraft into combat or using them to cover transfers of more advanced aircraft from other areas of China to the East.

⁴² With modern day encrypted communications, a lot of signals work becomes traffic analysis. Thus, limiting the number, duration, and locations of emissions helps to degrade enemy attempts to detect and track a unit.

⁴³ This card represents the increased responsiveness of having SOF forces already in the area. Unless the US chooses to withdraw its SOF forces on Taiwan before an invasion it would have forces already based on Taiwan. For the BLUEFOR card one can assume that other countries would place SOF forces of their own as part of a training program in the runup to the war or quickly insert SOF onto Taiwan and therefore have some SOF forces on the island.

⁴⁴ In Ukraine we have seen the effectiveness (and relative ineffectiveness) of these suicide USV's. They seem (as ships go) relatively easy to produce (some are based on jet skis it seems - <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/05/europe/ukraine-drone-jet-skis-russian-warship-intl/index.html>, and some even less sophisticated things have been tried <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/04/sea-drone-found-in-black-sea-is-american-boat-with-massive-soviet-warhead/>). Taiwan has already begun to look at the production of USV's after their success in Ukraine, and during wartime this would likely be accelerated (<https://www.taiwanews.com.tw/news/5111115>).

⁴⁵ Decoys can be physical or in the EM spectrum. For examples see: *Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo-Ukrainian War*, Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, February 15th, 2025, <https://static.rusi.org/tactical-developments-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war-february-2205.pdf>, pg. 9 and 12, at the battalion level in Ukraine see description in *Ukrainian Abwehrschlacht: Defense in Depth in Modern Warfare, Dispatches from the Frontline and Lessons Learned*, Secretary of Defense Rock, Mar 12, 2025, <https://secretaryofdefenseroock.substack.com/p/ukrainian-abwehrschlacht-defense?r=37617r>. See also *Preparing to Win the First Fight of the Next War*, Feb 23, 2024 Maj. Gen. Curt Taylor, <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/Preparing-to-win-the-first-fight-of-the-next-war>; and *Destroy me quickly. How Ukrainian fake HIMARS, guns and tanks fight with Russian Kalibr and Iskander missiles*, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/03/11/7445807/>, online can be found numerous examples of physical decoys, my personal favorite being an inflatable decoy hanger: <https://www.dvidshub.net/image/7835036/prototype-portable-camouflage-concealment-and-deception-hanger>.

⁴⁶ This represents focused intelligence collection in support of operations to answer key questions. The 4+ gives a good chance, but prevents players from abusing it to be able to automatically find enemy high value targets.

⁴⁷ Wartime would likely lead to an initial surge in the first few months of volunteers. After training them, they would be replacements for units.

⁴⁸ This card represents using coast guard ships for long range CSAR to pick up downed pilots.