



Remember...

**Only You
Can Give Up**

Only You Can Give Up

Jaws of the Dragon – Will to Fight/Morale Moduleⁱ

Introduction

This module is intended less to be a precise model of a highly nebulous concept of morale or will to fight, and more intended to 1) be a look at the broad view of things that can affect will to fight and 2) ensure that this critical component of will and morale can be represented in the game.

This module was originally designed for the stalled invasion scenario with the following countries being played: Taiwan, China, US, Japan, Philippines, Australia, UK, France, and Canada. If not playing the stalled invasion scenario, remove unnecessary cards. If changing the number of teams drawing cards, consider that adding more Blue teams will bias the chance of a Blue team drawing a BLUEFOR card. Thus, the more Blue countries you add, the easier it is for Blue to keep their Will/Morale High, and easier to push China's down.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Rules.....	2
Effects of Will to Fight and Morale	5
Appendix I – Apathy and Sanctions Cards Explanation.....	17
Appendix II – Non-Rigid Information Warfare Rules	18
Endnotes.....	19

Rules

Cards

Each turn¹ each country draws a number of cards (see table below) from the Information Domain deck, returning to the deck cards any that are country specific (if the team is not that country) and drawing again until they have the appropriate number of cards. There is no limit to the number of cards a team can have, but teams should not hoard cards, and if they do Control can take cards away from them.² Teams cannot trade cards between each other.³

# of Cards ⁱⁱ	1 Card		2 Cards	3 Cards
Country	Canada France UK	Australia* Philippines	Japan US	Taiwan China

*Australia can be put into the two cards category, but is not for purposes of balance.

The effects of these cards on the tracking sheet are given on the cards themselves. All cards have at least some of the following information:



Some cards instead of having an effect on the trackers as their card effect provide Die Roll Modifiers (DRM's) to other cards. As cards can be played in any order, they can thusly be used to increase the chances of another card (that targets a tracker) being successful.

¹ Usually this is 1 turn = 1 day, but even at 1 turn = 1 week, the numbers staying the same should be just fine.

² I don't except this to actually be important, but it's here to prevent issues. Functionally there is a hard limit on the number of possible campaigns that a country can launch or maintain capability to launch, and this models it.

³ This could be occasionally allowed, subject to Control approval. Some of the enablers could realistically be traded (representing one country using knowledge/tools to help another), but this just keeps it simple.

Movement on the Sheets

Card play will move trackers on the sheet as described above, typically its easiest to adjudicate at the end of a turn or as players play cards. At the end of the turn, control should also run though the Will to Fight/Morale Effectors Sheet (see right) and any cards that were played to adjust the trackers on the sheet.

Sheet(s)ⁱⁱⁱ

Control has a main sheet on which they keep track. Morale, Will to Fight, and Public Opinion are the three types of trackers. All 3 Taiwanese trackers are considered Will to Fight trackers, but the Military Morale tracker is also a Morale tracker.

Optionally in larger games to help teams keep track of the Morale/Will to Fight, each team can have a sheet with National Will or Morale, World Public Opinion, and a varying third tracker (typically the other tracker of most importance to the country, often that of an ally). These sheets merely reflect the main control sheet.

Will to Fight (WtoF)/Morale Effectors Sheet v4.0 ⁱ			
Taiwan Will to Fight		Effect	
Outlying Island Captured		-2 All	
Territory Gained / Major City Recaptured		+1 All	
Territory Lost / Major City Lost		-1 All	
US Carrier Lost		-1 Military/Civilian	
Taiwanese Naval (N) Ground (G) unit destroyed		-1 Military (N) / -2 All (G)	
World Public Opinion is at Highest		+1 to Politician	
PLA Morale is at Lowest		+1 Military/Politician	
US Deploys large ground unit to Taiwan (once per unit)		+2 All	
Politicians' Morale is at Highest (H) or Lowest (L)		+1 (H) / -1 (L) Civilian	
US Declares Entry into the War ⁱⁱ		+5 All	
Other Country Enters into the War ⁱⁱ		+2 All	
*If US refuses entry, apply this as a negative modifier instead.			
PLA Morale		Effect	
Territory Gained/Major City Captured		+1	
Captured Territory Lost		-1	
Carrier Lost		-1	
US Carrier Sunk		+1	
Taiwanese Politician WtoF at Lowest		+1	
Taiwanese Military WtoF at Lowest		+1	
Japanese Will to Fight at Lowest		+1	
Filipino Will to Fight at Lowest		+1	
Strikes on Mainland Chinese City		+1	
Japanese Will to Fight		Effect	
US Carrier Sunk		+1	
Japanese non-aircraft unit destroyed		-1	
Strikes on Mainland Japan		+1	
Twn. Politicians' WtoF at Lowest		-1	
Filipino Will to Fight at Lowest		-1	
UN/World Public Opinion at Highest		+1	
World Public Opinion ⁱⁱ		Effect	
US Carrier Sunk		+1	
Chinese Carrier Sunk		-1	
1 st Nation to conduct a major attack in Space		-2	
UK/French/Canadian/Australian Morale		Effect	
France/UK Carrier Lost		-3	
(Australia) Per Turn		+1	
US Carrier Lost		-1	
Chinese Carrier Sunk		+1	
Strikes on Mainland (Kinetic)		+1	
Taiwanese Politicians' WtoF at Lowest		-1	
US Morale is at Highest (H) or Lowest (L)		+1 (H) / -1 (L)	
UN/World Public Opinion at Highest		+1	
Per non-aircraft unit destroyed		-1	
Philippines Will to Fight		Effect	
US Carrier Lost		-1	
Filipino unit destroyed		-1	
Strikes on the Philippines		+1	
US Morale at Lowest		-1	
Less than 3 US units in Country ⁱⁱ		-1	
More than 6 US units in Country ⁱⁱ		+1	
*Per day while at war with China			
US Morale		Effect	
Per Turn		+1	
Carrier Lost		-1	
Chinese Carrier Sunk		+1	
Strikes on Hawaii/CONUS		+1	
Taiwanese Politicians' WtoF at Lowest		-1	
Japanese WtoF at Lowest		-1	
Filipino WtoF at Lowest		-1	
Any Track		Effect	
Effector		+1 or -1	
Effect		discretion (or even +2/-2)	

Taiwanese Will to Fight									
Taiwanese Politicians									
★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Military Morale									
★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
The Taiwanese People									
★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
PLA Morale									
★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
US Morale									
★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Japanese Will to Fight									
★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Filipino Will to Fight									
★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
UN Leaning/World Public Opinion									
★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★

French Will to Fight									
French Will to Fight									
★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
US Morale									
★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
UN Leaning/World Public Opinion									
★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★

The French Individual Team Sheet

The Main Control Sheet (a supplementary sheet is used if other countries played.)

Methods for a Large Game

If individual team sheets are being used, it is advisable to adjudicate and record on the Last Turn Change sheet, then move around to mark the changes on the master control sheet and then each individuals team sheets.

Will to Fight (WtoF)/Morale Last Turn Change			
Decrease	Will to Fight/Morale	Increase	
□ □ □ □ □	Taiwanese Politicians	□ □ □ □ □	
□ □ □ □ □	(Taiwanese) Military Morale	□ □ □ □ □	
□ □ □ □ □	The Taiwanese People	□ □ □ □ □	
□ □ □ □ □	PLA Morale	□ □ □ □ □	
□ □ □ □ □	US Morale	□ □ □ □ □	
□ □ □ □ □	Japanese Will to Fight	□ □ □ □ □	
□ □ □ □ □	Filipino Will to Fight	□ □ □ □ □	
□ □ □ □ □	UN Leaning/World Public Opinion	□ □ □ □ □	
□ □ □ □ □	Australian Will to Fight	□ □ □ □ □	
□ □ □ □ □	Canadian Will to Fight	□ □ □ □ □	
□ □ □ □ □	UK Will to Fight	□ □ □ □ □	
□ □ □ □ □	French Will to Fight	□ □ □ □ □	

Effectors Sheet and Destroyed Units Box

To help with keeping track of unit losses and their effect on morale it is advisable to keep a destroyed unit's box where destroyed units go into until their effect on morale is adjudicated, after which they are removed from the box. On the Will to Fight Effectors Sheet things that might be affected by destroyed units are marked with a ☠.

Optional Rigid Turn Sequence Change

If using the optional rigid turn sequence, change the sequence to the following by appending Will to Fight to the end of the Sequence:

Detection/Tracking ► Cyber/Space/SOF ► Salvo Missile Fire ► Air ► Sea ► Land ►
Will to Fight

Effects of Will to Fight and Morale

The trackers have few defined impact on the game, though the players should not know this, and should be led to believe the opposite. If applicable to a given situation the trackers can (and should be) be taken into account (though this mostly constrains political action).

Some rules are as follows:

- If Japanese will to fight is very low, the Diet will refuse to invoke an Article 9 existential crisis situation.
- if the Taiwanese Will to Fight tracks are at rock bottom for multiple turns *and* their frontline is collapsing during a ground invasion, they will surrender.
- **(Of Key Importance!)** If the World Public Opinion tracker reaches either end of the track, hand a card to the respective team and reset the track to the middle. If the tracker went to Pro-China give the US Team a “Apathy Grows” card. If the tracker went to Pro-Taiwan give the China team a “Sanctions Enforced” card. Neither of these have any inherent effect on gameplay, but should be factor into a discussion about the ability of either side to sustain the conflict in the long term at the end of the game. For a full discussion on these cards, see Appendix I



Some optional rules are as follows:

- If a nations Will to Fight or Morale tracker is 1 away from the bottom attrit 1 ground unit in active combat by 1. If it's at the bottom, attrit 2 different units by 1 instead.^{iv}
- If the Support Deck Module (*And the Kitechen Sink...*) is being used, each turn (or every other turn) the Taiwanese People's morale is at highest, the Taiwanese team gains a volunteer card.

Card List

The effects of these cards are given on the cards themselves. Teams will hand them over to Control to use them.

(Country) Only Cards

Country only cards may only be held on to and played by the designated country. BLUEFOR indicates anyone on the “Blue” Team, or the good guys (e.g. not China).

Single Use (X) Cards

Cards with an ✕ in the bottom right-hand corner are removed from play after they have been used. If they are drawn but they are not usable by the country, they are not considered to have been used and are shuffled back into the deck.

Other Cards

In addition to the effectors on the Will to Fight/Morale Effectors Sheet and the cards below, cards from the Cyber Module may affect the Will to Fight and Morale tracks. The effects of these cards are stated on the card and are not listed here.

Will, Morale, and Public Opinion Cards

Diplomatic Engagements

# of Cards	Card	Single Use?	Effect	Backfire	No Effect	Effective	DRM
2	Reassurance (BLUEFOR Only) ⁴		Increase any Will tracker by 1.	1	2-7	8+	+1 if targets national Tracker positive.
2	Reassurance (US Only) ⁵		Increase any Will tracker by 2.	1	2-5	6+	+1 if targets national Tracker positive.

Information Warfare⁶

# of Cards	Card	Single Use?	Effect	Backfire	No Effect	Effective	DRM
1	Influence Operations ⁷		Move any Will, Morale, or Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1	2-8	9+	

⁴ Reassurance cards represent countries making commitments to countries. As only blue-friendly nations are at risk of being threatened in this game, only Blue has reassurance cards.

⁵ The US has reassurance cards specific to it (and more impactful than general reassurance), due to its superpower status meaning its commitments carry more weight.

⁶ Information Warfare can have many effects, but in this case (targeted towards will to fight) is a combination of shaping the information environment to get the enemy to believe they are losing and attempting to create and widen divisions. For a discussion of divisions see *Can Taiwan Resist a Large-Scale Military Attack by China?*, Timothy R. Heath, Sale Lilly, Eugeniu Han, Jun 27, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1658-1.html, pg. 14-15

⁷ This represents the most generic level of strategic level influence operations. The card has no DRM's as this is a general “trying to influence the narrative” as opposed to more specific measures.

1	Influence Operations (BLUEFOR Only) ⁸		Move any Will, Morale, or Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1	2-8	9+	
1	StratCom ⁹		Move any Will, Morale, or Public Opinion tracker by 1.		1-9	10+	DRM +1 if World Public Opinion siding with you, +2 if at highest for you.
1	PSYOP		Reduce an enemy morale tracker by 1.	1	2-7	8+	DRM-1 if enemy morale above $\frac{1}{2}$ ¹⁰
1	Mass Text Messages ¹¹		Decrease any Morale tracker by 1. If at lowest, attrit 1 unit by 1.	1	2-8	9+	-2 if enemy morale above $\frac{1}{2}$, -4 if enemy morale at highest

Population Facing Engagement

# of Cards	Card	Single Use?	Effect	Backfire	No Effect	Effective	DRM
1	Rally Round the Flag ¹²		Increase any Will or Morale tracker by 1.		1-3	4+	
1	Nationalism ¹³		Increase any Morale tracker by 1.		1-4	5+	
1	5th Column (China Only) ¹⁴	Yes	Move a Taiwan Will tracker by 1.	1-5	6-9	10+	DRM +2 if Tracker below $\frac{1}{2}$, DRM +4 if Tracker at Lowest.

⁸ This card is include as due to the larger number of BLUEFOR countries, they will be able to conduct more operations.

⁹ Based on a discussion with an IO specialist about Strategic Communications, this can affect any of the tracks.

¹⁰ PSYOPS to attack the enemy's morale are less likely to succeed if enemy morale is higher.

¹¹ See examples from Ukraine: <https://www.thedailybeast.com/cyberattacks-hit-websites-and-psy-ops-sms-messages-targeting-ukrainians-ramp-up-as-russia-moves-into-ukraine/> OR <https://apnews.com/article/technology-europe-ukraine-only-on-ap-9a564a5f64e847d1a50938035ea64b8f>. My view of the effectiveness of these is that they are the same as leaflets, just a different modality. See the leaflet footnote for more information on the effectiveness.

¹² Wartime governments viewed as legitimate by their people benefit from a surge in popularity of the government in times of war when they come under attack.

¹³ Nationalism is a highly effective motivator for maintaining a nation's will to fight and morale in wartime.

¹⁴ While a minority of the population supports reunification (11.8%, <https://theconversation.com/taiwanese-election-may-determine-whether-beijing-opts-to-force-the-issue-of-reunification-217955>), that can produce enough collaborationists to be deleterious to morale/the war effort.

1	Useful Idiots (China only) ¹⁵		Move any Non-Taiwan Will tracker by 1.	1	2-8	9+	
1	Okinawan Anti-US Sentiment ¹⁶	Yes	Reduce Japanese Will to Fight by 1.	1-2	3-5	6+	DRM +1 if Japanese Will to Fight below ½.
1	Starvation (China only)*		Decrease the Taiwanese People tracker by 1.	1-4	5	6+	DRM +1 if Tracker below ½, DRM +2 if Tracker at Lowest.

*(Remove from the deck for non-stalled invasion scenarios, and/or introduce the card after 30 days of Taiwan being under blockade in other scenarios)¹⁷

Heroes¹⁸

# of Cards	Card	Single Use?	Effect	Backfire	No Effect	Effective	DRM
1	Hero		Move will/morale tracker by 1.		1-9	10+	
1	Ace		Move will/morale tracker by 1.		1-9	10+	

Unit-Based Cards

Units must be dedicated to these missions, which require one day.

# of Cards	Card	Units	Single Use?	Effect	Backfire	No Effect	Effective	DRM
1	Leafleting (China/Taiwan only) ¹⁹	Requires 1 squadron or 1		Decrease the Taiwanese/PLA Morale tracker	1	2-8	9+	-2 if enemy morale above ½, -4 if enemy

¹⁵ This represents tankies and other such individuals in the West that undermine war support.

¹⁶ This card represents the Chinese attempting to mobilize anti-US military sentiment on Okinawa to affect Japanese public opinion. This card is also included as many people are not aware of this and it is valuable to bring awareness to this fact as well as the fact it helps balance the game.

¹⁷ Starving people are not happy people. For a (mostly) up to date look at attempting to model how long Taiwan could hold out see <https://evandalejandro.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/jawsofthedragon taiwanairliftpaper.pdf>

¹⁸ These cards represent the use of extraordinary stories for propaganda use by countries. Hero and Ace are both included as it is a vestigial trait of when the two cards did slightly different things, and it means that you don't just have 2 Hero cards for slightly more narrative interest.

¹⁹ Despite seeming like an old method, leaflets have been used during the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (https://old.reddit.com/r/UkraineConflict/comments/162gtmw/ukraine_dropped_leaflets_in_russian_areas_to/ (Ukrainian leaflets), <https://tass.com/politics/1649903> (Russians using leaflets), <https://www.newsweek.com/pro-russia-militiamen-fire-leaflets-over-ukraine-urging-troops-surrender-1710648> (separatists using leaflets). Leafleting here affects Morale as per the discussion on the difficulty (and low effects) of targeting civilians from *Some Psychological Lessons From Leaflet Propaganda in World War II*, Martin F. Herz, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Autumn, 1949), pp. 471-486, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2745724>, though as per the same source the chance of propaganda backfiring is nonexistent. Functionally this card represents the point at which there is a particularly

		artillery supply		by 1. If at lowest, attrit 1 unit by 1.				morale at highest
1	Undersea Cable Cutting (China only) ²⁰	Requires 1 naval unit	Yes	Decrease any Taiwanese Will tracker by 1.		1-3	4+	
1	Propaganda Strike ²¹	Requires 1 Squadron		Move any tracker by 1.		1-6	7+	DRM +1 per extra squadron or munition used.
1	Hearts and Minds (China Only) ²²	Requires 1 ground unit on Taiwan		Decrease the Taiwanese People tracker by 1.	3	4-9	10+	DRM +1 per supply added to action.

World Public Opinion Cards

Economic Shocks Cards²³

# of Cards	Card	Single Use?	Effect	Backfire	No Effect	Effective	DRM
1	Economic Shocks (Energy)		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1-3	4-6	7+	+1 if WPO siding with you, +2 if at highest.

effective leafleting campaign. As per Herz, leaflets can be effective under specific conditions, and proved extremely effective in the Gulf War (see *Propaganda and psychological operations as tools of warfare during the Persian Gulf conflict, 1990–91*, Ellen Mallet, 1997, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557579708400151>, pages 291 and 292) though only against low-ranking targets (see Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for Congress, Ronald O'Rourke, Congressional Research Service, Jun 04, 2003, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA476239.pdf>, pg. 61-63). Noted in the sources is that they only really have effect when morale is already at a low level, so the attrition (e.g. people surrendering, or not fight as hard) only occurs when morale is very low.

²⁰ This is a bit of a simplification of an extremely complex topic (for a whole wargame on this topic see <https://evandalessandro.com/fiber-fighting/>) and is included both to raise the issue of undersea cable cutting in wartime, even though it is mildly unrealistic. This card is single use as once the cables are cut, they are difficult to repair in wartime (*The Strategic Value of Undersea Cables in War*, Evan D'Alessandro, Unpublished Masters Thesis, August 24, 2022).

²¹ This represents hitting targets of high symbolic value or ones that look good to domestic audiences. Ian Easton spends a little time discussing what this might look like from the Taiwanese perspective in his book (see *The Chinese Invasion Threat*, Ian Easton, 2017, pg. 200-201).

²² I am not wholly sure about the realism of this, but while distribution of aid and assistance might not necessarily make a hostile population love you, it decreases the chance that they will try to kill you, and can help sway people to collaborate.

²³ Economic Shocks cards represent the blaming of the other side for the serious economic consequences of a superpower war between the US and China as well as one side or the other cutting deals with countries for their support in exchange for help in reducing the effects.

1	Economic Shocks (Manufacturing)		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1	2-9	10+	+1 if WPO siding with you, +2 if at highest.
1	Economic Shocks (Semiconductors)		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1	2-9	10+	+1 if WPO siding with you, +2 if at highest.
1	Economic Shocks (Rare Earth Minerals)		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1	2-9	10+	+1 if WPO siding with you, +2 if at highest.
1	Economic Shocks (Supply Chains)		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1	2-9	10+	+1 if WPO siding with you, +2 if at highest.
1	Global Recession		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1-2	4-7	8+	+1 if WPO siding with you, +2 if at highest.

UN Cards

# of Cards	Card	Single Use?	Effect	Backfire	No Effect	Effective	DRM
1	International Institutional Control ²⁴		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1-2	3-7	8+	+1 if played with International Institutional Control
1	Appeal to History (China Only) ²⁵		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1	2-7	8+	+1 if played with International Institutional Control
1	Appeal to Values (BLUEFOR only) ²⁶		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1	2-9	10+	+1 if played with International Institutional Control
1	Appeal to Sovereignty ²⁷		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1	2-9	10+	+1 if played with International Institutional Control

²⁴ Control over international institutions allows certain governments to use the power, respectability, and recognition of an institution to further their own goals. China in recent years has attempted to increase its power in international institutions to further their goals.

²⁵ The West's history of colonialism can be exploited by those who oppose it to generate apathy towards ongoing conflicts (see Russia-Ukraine).

²⁶ Appeals to values are effective in motivating populaces and decisionmakers on occasion (see 2022-2023 Ukraine for example). This card is limited to BLUEFOR due to the fact that this sort of value appeal tends to only apply to countries that have strong democratic values.

²⁷ China's appeal to Taiwan being an internal (sovereign) matter has some traction, and the pro-Taiwan side can argue that China is intervening in the sovereign politics of Taiwan.

2	Economic Ties (China Only) ²⁸		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1-3	4-7	7+	
1	Western Hypocrisy (China Only) ²⁹		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.	1	2-6	7+	DRM +1 if WPO is in Chinese favor.

Bilateral/Multilateral Ties Cards

# of Cards	Card	Single Use?	Effect	Backfire	No Effect	Effective	DRM
1	Southeast Asian Ties (Canada Only)		Move World Public Opinion by 1. ³⁰		1-8	9+	+1 if WPO siding with you, +2 if at highest. -1 if WPO against, -2 if at lowest.
1	Russian Support (China Only)		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1. ³¹	1-2	3-9	10+	DRM +2 if played with African Elites Ties or Economic Shocks (Energy). +1 if any other Economic Shocks card. ³²
1	EU Support (France Only)		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1. ³³	1	2-8	9+	+1 if WPO siding with you, +2 if at highest. -1 if WPO at lowest.
1	Indian Support (US/Aus/Japan Only)		Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1. ³⁴		1-8	9+	+1 if WPO siding with you. -1 if WPO against, -2 if at lowest.

²⁸ China's economic ties can buy influence that it later cashes in on, or at least can induce other nations into apathy through economic concessions to them (as Russia has done during it's war with Ukraine). 2 of these cards are included both to balance the game, and as this is one of China's major leverage points in relationships with some countries.

²⁹ This card represents Chinese accusations of western inconstancy in international politics, arguing that it the West is cynically interested in opposing China, and it's support for Taiwan is not backed in ideal, and thus that both China and the West are on equal moral standing.

³⁰ This card represents the good ties Canada has with a number of southeast Asian nations.

³¹ This card represents the fact that China can draw on Russian messaging abilities in parts of the world that a Chinese message would not others reach/be effective in (Africa especially).

³² This represents leveraging Russian ties in Africa or energy diplomacy/sanctions evasion.

³³ France, as the most Indo-Pacific focused nation in the EU would likely play a unique role as a mediator in helping organize the EU/European nations to help in the war. Mostly however the card is also included so when the game is played with the support deck module, France has a unique card for itself.

³⁴ This represents engagement through the Quad to use anti-China sentiment in India to get India to help influence other actors usually beyond the reach of the West.

1	African Elites Ties (China)	Yes	Move World Public Opinion by 1. ³⁵	1	2-5	6+	+1 if WPO siding with you, +2 if at highest. -1 if WPO against, -2 if at lowest.
---	-----------------------------	-----	---	---	-----	----	--

Enabler Cards

Enabler cards, unlike the other cards, effect messaging campaigns by making them more or less efficient or likely to succeed.

Enablers

# of Cards	Card	Single Use?	Effect	Backfire	No Effect	Effective	DRM
1	Botnet ³⁶		+1 DRM for a card affecting World Public Opinion.	1	2-7	8+	
1	Censorship (China Only) ³⁷		Reduce another cards effect on PLA morale by 1.	1	2-6	7+	
1	Information Controls ³⁸		Reduce another cards effect by 1.	1-2	3-6	7+	
1	Embedded Reporters ³⁹		Own Will/Morale Tracker +1	1-5	6-9	10+	DRM +current Morale/Will to Fight
1	Media Coordination ⁴⁰		Any Will/Morale Tracker +1.	1-5	6-9	10+	DRM +current Morale/Will to Fight
1	Cultural Knowledge ⁴¹		DRM +1 on any card.				

³⁵ China has been effective in influencing African Elites for some time (though specifics can vary highly) and could likely draw on their support for messaging if required. This card is mostly drawn from views shaped by *The China in Africa Podcast*.

³⁶ Botnets can be effective in large volume targeted at a broad audience in support of a broad message. Thusly this card is confined to supporting effects on World Public Opinion.

³⁷ Chinese censorship can be very effective (though is not always effective) in removing or suppressing discussion of certain topics and views. It has a small chance to backfire as has occurred in real life.

³⁸ This represents governments releasing or not releasing information to create a desired effect. As this is more public than censorship, it has a higher risk of backlash if done incorrectly.

³⁹ This card represents allowing reporters to embedded with combat units and then publish their experience. This means that they will likely report on the vibe at the current unit which is strongly tied to the current level of morale the unit has, hence the heavy DRM for the current Morale/Will to Fight, and the high chance of a backfire if morale is low.

⁴⁰ This represents coordination between the government and national media to push a given message. If trust in the government is already low this has a high chance to backfire, but if trust is high, the message is likely to be accepted (hence DRM +current Morale/Will to Fight).

⁴¹ Cultural knowledge is critical to have the best effect in information operations. Having it can prevent a message from being dead on arrival (due to mistakes in messaging clearly marking it as a foreign attempt at interference).

1	Manipulated Media ⁴²		DRM -1 on any card.	1	2-7	8+	
1	Grassroots Movement ⁴³		DRM +2 on any card.				
1	1 x Carrot + Stick (US and China Only) ⁴⁴		DRM +1/-3 on any card affecting World Public Opinion.	1-2	3-6	7+	

Force Multipliers

These cards can be used to give a bonus to a team that has engaged in good planning and execution of an information plan or can be shuffled into the deck regularly (if shuffled in, use 1 of each card).

Media Strategy – Double the effect of another card affecting Will to Fight or World Public Opinion (max shift of 3).⁴⁵

Information Operations Effort – Double the effect of another card affecting Morale (max shift of 3).⁴⁶

Other Cards

Information Warfare Forces

# of Cards	Card	Single Use?	Effect	Country
2	Cyberspace Force (Information Warfare Units) ⁴⁷		DRM +2/-2 on any card.	China
2	Political Warfare Bureau ⁴⁸		DRM +3/-3 on domestic cards. DRM +2/-2 vs. China. DRM +1/-1 on international cards.	Taiwan

⁴² This represents the use of manipulated media or fake news to sow doubt about a particular message that is being pushed. Thus the card degrades other cards, but cannot have a positive benefit.

⁴³ This card represents the ability of online grassroots movement to create or push forward messaging on topics. As grassroots movements are made up of people who believe in the message, they adapt quicker (not needing to go through committees), use more natural communications channels and methods (like memes for examples) and are more authentic than governments (being made up of many real normal people). They thusly are highly effective at pushing messages. A well-known example in the context of war is NAFO, but in the pacific, the anti-authoritarian Milk Tea Alliance is another prime example.

⁴⁴ This card represents the ability to persuade, induce, entice, cajole, twist arms, or otherwise influence other nations that large powers like the US and China have. Given it is easier to tell someone to not do something than it is to get them to do it, a +1/-3 is assigned.

⁴⁵ This represents an information operations team using a well planed and executed strategy to use traditional forms of media to boost their operation. This could be overt work with media or could be via manipulation.

⁴⁶ This represents a specific information operation being prioritized and given full backing and all available help.

⁴⁷ China has a large number of IW forces available and places great importance on IW operations and thusly is given two +2/-2 cards.

⁴⁸ Taiwan has it's own political warfare bureau within the MND, and Taiwan as a whole has much experience with countering Chinese information warfare. These efforts will be most effective against

2	US Information Warfare Units ⁴⁹		DRM +2/-2 on any card.	US
1	Psychological Operations Center ⁵⁰		DRM +1/-1 on domestic or world public opinion cards	Philippines
1	Fleet Information Warfare		DRM +1/-1 on any card.	Japan
1	Joint Information Warfare Branch ⁵¹		DRM +1/-1 on any card.	Australia
1	77 th Brigade		DRM +1/-1 on domestic or world public opinion cards.	UK
1	French Information Warfare Units		DRM +1/-1 on domestic or world public opinion cards.	France
1	French Information Operations Forces		DRM +1/-1 on domestic or world public opinion cards.	Canada

Control Cards

These cards are for control to hand out/or shuffle into the deck as appropriate. They are not put into the deck at the start of the game and can be used by control to help shape the game, provide a reward for good planning or engagement with other countries, or create another problem for Taiwan to deal with.

Terror Attacks⁵²

China (the perpetual enemy) or internally where the home field advantage lies (where they have heavy real-world experience), with a heavy focus on domestic work. The Taiwanese will likely be less effective in the outside world (due to lower outside connectivity in wartime, less practice and Chinese counter-efforts), hence the difference in DRM's. This renders a very effective +3/-3 domestically, a +2/-2 for vs. China, and a more general +1/-1 for broader efforts. See *Countering United Front Work: Taiwan's Political Warfare System*, Mariah Thornton, March 2023,

<https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/2023-03-23-SU-TaiwanMThornton-WEB.pdf>

⁴⁹ The US has a large number of high-quality IW forces, and thusly is given two +2/-2 cards.

⁵⁰ It is unclear to me if the Philippines have a dedicated overall IW unit or coordination mechanism, but clearly they have some part of the military that works on it, for example the PsyOp Center in the Army's Civil Military Operations Regiment. <https://www.army.mil.ph/cmor/index.php/about/cmo-battalions/psychological-operations-center>. Given their smaller capability (which is mostly counterinsurgency focused as with most of the Philippines military) I would guess they have the ability to attempt to influence domestically and on world public opinion, but would find it difficult to mount offensive actions except on the broadest scale (e.g. in this game world public opinion). Thusly +1/-1 on selected actions (domestic and worldwide messaging)

⁵¹ Joint Information Warfare Branch was the Australian military's overall IW group. It seems to have been disestablished somewhere around 2024 (last evidence of it existing was 2023) and rolled up into something else, but I cannot find a clear answer. Lacking a better thing to use I call it the Joint Information Warfare Branch.

⁵² The lack of effect (or inverse effect) of terror bombing on morale is well known (it just angers people) (see *When is Strategic Bombing Effective? Domestic Legitimacy and Aerial Denial*, Aaron Belkin, Michael

Terror Attacks cards are resolved immediately when they are drawn, as opposed to being played by the players. These cards are based on the use of the Chinese Targeting Restrictions List (e.g. the level of collateral damage the Chinese are willing to accept).

- 1 x Terror Attacks (Targeting Restriction List Level 3 or 4) – Increase all Taiwan Will trackers by 1.
- 1 x Terror Attacks (Targeting Restriction List Level 5) – Increase all Taiwan Will trackers by 2.

Support Cards

These cards were designed to allow for rewards for interacting with other NPC countries. They are not shuffled into the deck, but rather directly handed to players.

- Vietnamese Support – Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.
- SE Asian Support – Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.
- International Support – Move the World Public Opinion tracker by 1.

Problem Cards

Designed for the stalled invasion scenario these are the sorts of things that might occur in Taiwan after it has been under blockade and strikes against critical national infrastructure have been conducted for an extended period. These were intended to present some hard problems, where the military might need to be involved, to the Taiwanese political leadership.

- Food Riots – Requires 1 Brigade to help resolve. Decrease the Taiwanese People tracker by 1 each day until resolved.
- Cholera Outbreak – Decrease the Taiwanese People tracker by 1 each week until action is taken to resolve.
- Civil Defense – Decrease the Taiwanese People tracker by 1 each week until action is taken to resolve.

Clark, Gulriz Gokcek, Robert Hinckley, Thomas Knecht & Eric Patterson (2002), Security Studies, 11:4, 51-88, <https://doi.org/10.1080/714005350>, pg. 53-54) and as such, the more destructive the Chinese choose to be the more it angers the Taiwanese. It also produces political backlash from others (see *Strategic Attack of National Electrical Systems*, Maj. Thomas E. Griffith, Jr. USAF, October 1994, https://media.defense.gov/2017/Dec/29/2001861964/-1/-1/0/T_GRIFFITH_STRATEGIC_ATTACK.PDF, pg. 42) which is accounted for not in these cards but in the Will to Fight/Morale Effectors Sheet. For more recent evidence see Ukraine: *For Russia, the cruelty is the point*, Lawrence Freedman, 18th July, 2024, <https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/ukraine/2024/07/russia-ukraine-hospital-strikes-civilians>

Appendix I – Apathy and Sanctions Cards Explanation

Apathy and GDP are set up as two “long term” determinates of a conflict here because:

1. The US while not wholly reliant upon its allies and the world, it benefits greatly from them and needs to keep them engaged.
 - a. Functionally China doesn't need to convince people that it is in the right, it only needs to convince people not to care to prevent itself from being international isolated, and to stop supporting the US in attempting to isolate China.
2. A lack of apathy is key to the US alliance system and global security that allows the US to devote it's focus to Asia in the event of a conflict, and enforcing sanctions to hurt China's economy is dependent on getting other nations buy in (e.g. apathy hurts sanctions creation and enforcement).^v

China's economy as a long-term center of gravity was picked, because while all sides in such a war would suffer serious economic effects China suffers disproportionality from economic effects for 3 reasons:

1. China has more exposed economy,^{vi}
2. It has less ability to mitigate its exposed nature:
 - a. It has less partners with which economically engage with via overland routes (as it is assumed in a war, sea routes would be blocked), which are also less efficient, though this could somewhat be mitigated as seen in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Note a sea blockade would be highly effective, with 95% of Chinas trade going by sea^{vii}
 - b. China seems like it expects it should be able to weather sanctions better than it previously thought it could,^{viii} which may lead to a failure to prepare adequality. Though mitigating against this it is expected that China would build up large stockpiles before going to war.^{ix}
3. It's social contract with its people is built on economic prosperity.

I understand that these are both highly imperfect proxies for ability to fight extend conflicts,^x but to try to get people to focus on long term thinking in the context of this sort of war they are

1. Easy to understand and intuitive (more or less) measures
2. They interrelate well with one another (e.g. US preventing apathy builds on isolation of China which helps improve sanctions enforcement).

Note projected losses from a war or blockade would massive:

Source	Bloomberg ^{xi}	Rohdium Group ^{xii}	RAND ^{xiii}
Source Year	2024	2022	2016
Scenario: Invasion of Taiwan + War between US and China	-40% Taiwanese GDP -16.7% Chinese GDP -6.7% US GDP -10.2% World GDP		-5 to 10% of US GDP -25 to 35% of Chinese GDP
Scenario: Blockade of Taiwan	-12.2% Taiwanese GDP -8.9% Chinese GDP -3.3% US GDP -5% World GDP	-2 Trillion dollars at a minimum (not including international responses or second-order effects)	

Appendix II – Non-Rigid Information Warfare Rules

Information Warfare Campaign

Each turn players may conduct Information Warfare Campaigns. These represent the combination of offensive or defensive information operations and media campaigns by overt and/or covert means.⁵³ For the most part nations will be able to effectively conduct one (maybe 2) campaign(s) at a time. The US, China, or Taiwan may have perhaps 1 more, but the more messaging is split, the less effective it is likely to be as the message becomes more and more diluted.

These are adjudicated by control and the effects will be shown on the master Control Sheet. To conduct a campaign, players brief the Control as to their message and intent with the campaign. They should consider:

- Who are you targeting with your messaging? How vulnerable are they to your message?
- What message you want to convey? What nuances are there that you can exploit?
- What messaging channels are you using (social media, official government or local government communications, leafleting, backchannels, etc.)?
- Ongoing events that might support your message or other reasons the campaign is likely to succeed.
- What might happen if you are discovered trying to push this message (is there a chance of backlash)?

More or less this adjudicated on the same lines that argumentation is considered for matrix games e.g. good argument adds to the DRM, headwinds lower it (do not use matrix game rules though, it takes too long...). When players are ordering an information campaign, for adjudication should consider:

- Do they have a clear target, is that target persuadable?
- Is the message clear?
- Is the way they are going to message + is the message itself likely to change minds?
- Are there ongoing things that will affect the message?
- If the campaign is found out will it be bad (e.g. a friendly nations using covert means to influence an allies population)⁵⁴

As a general rule control can then adjust trackers as appropriate. In most cases I do not expect there to be great movement from information campaigns rapidly, though perhaps over a couple of days it may have an effect, (perhaps roll each day, looking for a 8 on a d8 or so (plus any modifiers), use your judgment as to what is appropriate!). Most of the movement to come from the Will to Fight (WtoF)/Morale Effectors Sheet effects (see right).

⁵³ The exact mix of these being dependent on the type of campaign being conducted.

⁵⁴ *Pentagon ran secret anti-vax campaign to undermine China during pandemic*, Chris Bing and Joel Schectman, June 14, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-covid-propaganda/>

Endnotes

ⁱ This module's conception of Will to Fight is based heavily upon *Can Taiwan Resist a Large-Scale Military Attack by China?*, Timothy R. Heath, Sale Lilly, Eugeniu Han, Jun 27, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1658-1.html. An exact explanation of how the report and the game modeled the same thing proved to be much too time consuming to write given the different structure of the conceptual models, so as I am not being paid to do this, I will offer no deeper explanation of how the report informed this module. Please also note I have some disagreements with both the theoretical model (chapter 2), and some gripes with the scoring of the model in relation to Taiwan as presented in the report (chapter 3). The model of information warfare is substantially more colloquial, but as this topic is highly understudied (especially in the context of influence during warfighting) this is likely inevitable for the time being (see *Get Serious About the Science of Influence*, Douglas Bryant, Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, June 2024, pg. 18-23).

ⁱⁱ The number of cards here represents 1) those who do (Japan, US, Taiwan, China)/do not have a major focus in region (UK, Canada, France), and 2) those who have good capacity for actions in the information space in such a crisis/war (Taiwan and China especially, US, Japan) and those who lack large capacity for a sophisticated work at scale (Philippines, Australia).

ⁱⁱⁱ Note this does not cover all factors, but the ones I deem most important. The conflating of UN Leaning/World Public Opinion is debatable, but is a useful playable representation as suggested in some diplomatic literature (see *A Dictionary of Diplomacy* (2nd Ed.), G. R. Berridge and Alan James, 2003, ISBN 1 4039 15350, pg. 112-113, 280)

^{iv} Desertion or lowered combat effectiveness (or attrition via leaving comrades behind or allowing positions to be penetrated leading to captures due to surrender and poor morale) are commonly assumed to be the major outcomes of low morale there may be others (I take a view of a very minor increase in attrition as being the main effect). However, reduction in ability to coordinate units may possibly be another effect of low morale, see *Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine*, Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, RUSI Special Report, 19 May 2023, <https://static.rusi.org/403-SR-Russian-Tactics-web-final.pdf>, pg. 8

^v *Xi, Biden and the \$10 Trillion Cost of War Over Taiwan*, Jennifer Welch, Jenny Leonard, Maeva Cousin, Gerard DiPippo, and Tom Orlik, January 9, 2024, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2024-01-09/if-china-invades-taiwan-it-would-cost-world-economy-10-trillion>

^{vi} *War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable*, David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Cristina L. Garafola, Jul 28, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.html, pg. 41-50

^{vii} *War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable*, David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Cristina L. Garafola, Jul 28, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.html, pg. 43

^{viii} *China Is in Denial About the War in Ukraine*, Jude Blanchette, August 13, 2024, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/china-denial-about-war-ukraine-jude-blanchette>

^{ix} *The Chinese Invasion Threat*, Ian Easton, 2017, pg. 60, *Could economic indicators give an early warning of a war over Taiwan?*, The Economist, July 27, 2023 <https://www.economist.com/china/2023/07/27/could-economic-indicators-signal-chinas-intent-to-go-to-war>, also see *How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan*, John Culver, October 03, 2022, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/03/how-we-would-know-when-china-is-preparing-to-invade-taiwan-pub-88053>, and <https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2024/07/23/why-is-xi-jinping-building-secret-commodity-stockpiles>

^x The US could well fight on a war alone, and the inability of economic effects to work as a defeat mechanism is discussed well in *War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable*, David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Cristina L. Garafola, Jul 28, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.html, pg. 48

^{xi} *Xi, Biden and the \$10 Trillion Cost of War Over Taiwan*, Jennifer Welch, Jenny Leonard, Maeva Cousin, Gerard DiPippo, and Tom Orlik, January 9, 2024, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2024-01-09/if-china-invades-taiwan-it-would-cost-world-economy-10-trillion>

^{xii} *The Global Economic Disruptions from a Taiwan Conflict*, Charlie Vest, Agatha Kratz and Reva Goujon, December 14, 2022, <https://rhg.com/research/taiwan-economic-disruptions/>

^{xiii} *War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable*, David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Cristina L. Garafola, Jul 28, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.html, pg. 48