

# **Jaws of the Dragon Blockade Briefings**

v8.0

Evan D'Alessandro

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<https://evandalessandro.com/jaws-of-the-dragon/>

**Role Briefings for 74 Players + Press**

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# US [15 Pax]

All players receive their role briefing plus the following:

Role	Additional Role Briefings	Additional Briefings	
President of the United States of America			DNI COA Assessment
White House Press Secretary		US DoS Legal Manual	
Director of National Intelligence			DNI COA Assessment
US Secretary of State	US DoS Negotiation Positions Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	US DoS Legal Manual	DNI COA Assessment
Deputy Secretary of State	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	US DoS Legal Manual	
US Ambassador to China	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	US DoS Legal Manual	
Director, American Institute in Taiwan	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	US DoS Legal Manual	
US Ambassador to Japan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Legal Briefing Pack Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	US DoS Legal Manual	
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff		US DoS Legal Manual	DNI COA Assessment
Commander, INDOPACOM			DNI COA Assessment
Deputy Commander, INDOPACOM	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Legal Briefing Pack	US DoS Legal Manual	
Commander, J2 (Intelligence), INDOPACOM			DNI COA Assessment
Commander, United States Strategic Command	Nuclear Briefing		



# PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



You are 47<sup>th</sup> President of the United States, head of the executive branch and commander-in-chief of the military of the United States of America. You are the leader of the nation and the free world and are the final and utmost authority in the US.

As POTUS, your responsibilities are to:

- Lead the nation through this crisis!
- Oversee the conduct of the crisis and your subordinates.
- Ensure that you come out of this crisis looking good politically.

As the Commander-in-Chief, your responsibilities are to:

- Oversee the conduct of the military.
- Authorize any high impact cyberattacks.
- Order changes in the US's DEFCON.
- Decide upon the use and release of nuclear weapons.

## Special Order: DEFCON

Any movements up or down the DEFCON (Defense Condition) levels must be relayed to your Team Control. Changing DEFCON is a public act and will be known by all other countries. The US is currently at DEFCON 4.

Defense Condition	Description	Readiness Level
DEFCON 1	Nuclear war is imminent or has already begun.	Maximum readiness of all forces. Immediate response.
DEFCON 2	Next step to war or nuclear exchange.	Armed forces ready to deploy and engage in less than six hours.
DEFCON 3	Increase in force readiness above that required for normal readiness.	Nuclear bombers ready to take off in 15 minutes. Armed forces under active alert.
DEFCON 4	Increased intelligence watch and strengthened security measures.	Above normal readiness.
DEFCON 5	Lowest state of readiness.	Normal readiness.

You are allowed to leave your team table to meet other Heads of State (though messages to Xi Jinping are done by note only<sup>1</sup>).

<sup>1</sup> The US-China Hotline Rings Again, Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, November 16, 2023, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/16/the-u-s-china-hotline-rings-again/>



# WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY



## Background

You are the White House Press Secretary, the senior-most White House official whose job it is to act as the spokesperson for the President. You are responsible for collecting information about actions and events within the President's administration and issuing the Administration's reactions and statements to developments around the world, as well as managing the White House Press Corps.

## Role

As White House Press Secretary your responsibilities are to:

- Ensure that all people in the US government have the same story as to what is going on.
- Monitor press feeds to stay informed on the media environment.
- Draft and release statements on US positions and policy.
- Deal with requests for information from the press.
- Ensure that the President's decisions are politically popular (or at least spun as such).

You are allowed to leave your team table to talk to the Press or to draft joint statements or communiques with other nations as directed by the Secretary of State or President.



# DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE



## Background

As the Director of National Intelligence, you sit at the combined nexus of efforts of the military and governmental intelligence efforts of the United States. Your job is to take in all available intelligence and attempt to understand what the enemy will do next and why.

## Role

As Director you have three main activities:

1. To keep the President, government, and military informed of the situation.
2. To determine the strategic intent of the enemy.
3. To plan and conduct deception of the enemy as to your own strategic intent.

You do this by:

- Collecting and analyzing intelligence:
  - Talk with other players in your government and allied governments to get a picture of what is going on in their domains, both outside and inside the nation.
  - Collect information from the news and press statements.
  - With the INDOPACOM J2 (Intelligence), decide upon and submit Priority Intelligence Requests to your intelligence apparatus.
- Use that information to determine what the enemy is trying to do and what they will do in the future (determine the strategic intent of the enemy).
- Ask fellow players to take actions or convey information to your enemies to deceive the enemy as to the government's true intentions (plan and undertake active deception).

You also have the responsibility of preparing the President's Daily Brief, covering the current situation, and expected next moves by involved actors.

You may only leave your team table to talk to Foreign Intelligence Agencies: the Taiwanese National Security Bureau, the Japanese Defense Intelligence Headquarters, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, and the Philippines National Intelligence Coordinating Agency. You may also conduct direct talks with the Chinese Minister for State Security with State Department and Presidential approval.



# US SECRETARY OF STATE



## Background

You are the United States Secretary of State, the head of the Department of State tasked with directing and conducting the nation's diplomacy. You are the second highest ranking member of the Cabinet (after the Vice President) and 4th in the presidential line of succession (first amongst Cabinet secretaries). As the head of the State Department, you are the most senior diplomat in the US Government.

## Role

As the Secretary of State your responsibilities are to:

- Keep the American people safe and ensure that the US remains the status quo power in the Indo-Pacific.
- Support the President by organizing and conducting diplomacy with all nations and keep the President updated as to what is going on.
- Ensure that all actions taken by the US are justified as being in line with international law.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE



## Background

You are the United States Deputy Secretary of State, the principal deputy to the Secretary of State. You support the Secretary of State in overseeing the Department of State and in directing and conducting the nation's diplomatic efforts.

## Role

As the Deputy Secretary of State your responsibilities are to:

- Keep the American people safe and ensure that the US remains the status quo power in the Indo-Pacific.
- Support the Secretary of State in organizing and conducting diplomacy with all nations and keeping the Secretary of State updated as to what is going on.
- Ensure that all actions taken by the US are justified as being in line with international law.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# US AMBASSADOR TO CHINA



## Background

You are the Ambassador of the United States to the People's Republic of China (美利坚合众国驻华大使), a post of great importance due to China's power and role as instigator in this crisis. In your posting you are charged with overseeing diplomatic relations with the Chinese Government.

## Role

As Ambassador to China your responsibilities are to:

- Keep Taiwan free and independent!
- Support the Secretary of State by conducting diplomacy with the Chinese.
- Engage with Chinese diplomats, officers, and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be and what they are thinking.
- Ensure that all actions taken by the US are justified as being in line with international law.
- When not otherwise engaged support your other diplomatic colleagues in their activities.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# DIRECTOR, AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN



## Role

You are the Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, the unofficial US embassy in Taiwan, charged with overseeing diplomatic relations with the Taiwanese Government.

## American Institute in Taiwan

The American Institute in Taiwan (美國在台協會) is the de facto embassy of the United States of America in Taiwan. AIT is a wholly owned subsidiary of the federal government of the United States in Taiwan under Congressional oversight. The AIT was officially created as a US government-sponsored nonprofit, private corporation established under the auspices of the US government to serve its interests in Taiwan. It is modeled on the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association.

Primarily staffed by employees of the United States Department of State (though prior to amendment of the law 2002, DoS members had to "resign" first to work at the AIT) and local workers, the AIT provides consular services normally offered by United States diplomatic missions, with the Great Seal of the State Department hung at the main office in Taipei. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1979 required the United States to develop its own "One China policy" and subsequently to terminate official diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan). The AIT now serves to assist and protect US interests in Taiwan in a quasi-official manner, and also processes US visas and provides consular services to US expatriates. Following the swift passage of the 2018 Taiwan Travel Act by the United States, it now serves as a high-level representative bureau on behalf of United States in Taiwan. As of 2019 it now receives full protection from the United States Marine Corps as do all US embassies.

AIT has a small headquarters office in Arlington County, Virginia with its largest office located in Taipei, Taiwan, and a branch office in the southern port city of Kaohsiung.

## Responsibilities

As the ranking US diplomat in Taiwan your responsibilities are to:

- Protect the liberal rules-based international order and keep Taiwan free and independent!
- Liaise with the Taiwanese government to ensure that they do not collapse under Chinese pressure and to keep them in the loop and coordinate US actions with them.
- Ensure that all actions taken by the US are justified as being in line with international law.
- When not otherwise engaged support your other diplomatic colleagues in their activities.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# US AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN



## Background

You are the ambassador of the United States of America to Japan (日本駐在米合衆国大使), a post of great importance and prestige as Japan is the major US treaty ally in the region. In your posting you are charged with overseeing diplomatic relations with the Japanese Government.

## Role

As the US Ambassador to Japan your responsibilities are to:

- Keep Taiwan free and independent!
- Support the Secretary of State by conducting diplomacy with Japan.
  - Ensure that Japan backs US actions to present a unified front (and to ensure that Japan doesn't back out).
  - Assist the Japanese in managing their public opinion to support US actions (and minimize backlash about the need to increase forces in Okinawa).
- Ensure that all actions taken by the US are justified as being in line with international law.
- When not otherwise engaged support your other diplomatic colleagues in their activities.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF



## Background

You are the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As chairman you are the highest-ranking and most senior military officer in the United States Armed Forces and the principal military advisor to the President. You also assist the President in exercising command over US Armed Forces.

## Role

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff your responsibilities are to:

- Advise, assist, and keep the President abreast on all military affairs and ensure that the military strategy set by the President is carried out.
- Coordinate with INDOPACOM and allied militaries to plan and execute an overall military strategy.
- Oversee the conduct of the military forces of United States and ensure that they act legally and are perceived positively.

Note that you are legally prohibited from having direct operational control over military forces. Your job is solely to help inform the President by presenting qualified military advice and to liaise with US and allied forces.

## Special Order: DEFCON

On the orders of the President, or by your own authority, you may change the DEFCON. Any movements up or down the DEFCON (Defense Condition) levels must be relayed to Control. Changing DEFCON is a public act and will be known by all other countries. The US is currently at DEFCON 4.

Defense Condition	Description	Readiness Level
DEFCON 1	Nuclear war is imminent or has already begun.	Maximum readiness of all forces. Immediate response.
DEFCON 2	Next step to war or nuclear exchange.	Armed forces ready to deploy and engage in less than six hours.
DEFCON 3	Increase in force readiness above that required for normal readiness.	Nuclear bombers ready to take off in 15 minutes. Armed forces under active alert.
DEFCON 4	Increased intelligence watch and strengthened security measures.	Above normal readiness.
DEFCON 5	Lowest state of readiness.	Normal readiness.

You may leave the table to talk with any allied military team, except the Taiwanese. You may also talk directly with the Chinese Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The US-China Hotline Rings Again, Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, November 16, 2023, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/16/the-u-s-china-hotline-rings-again/>



# COMMANDER, INDOPACOM

*(Indo-Pacific Command)*



## Overview

You are the Commander of INDOPACOM, the oldest combatant command which oversees the Indo-Pacific and all US forces in the area. Your command is the largest combatant command with over 375,000 service members and an area that encompasses 52% of the Earth's surface, from the waters of the West Coast of the US to the east coast maritime borderline waters of India (66° longitude). Like all other previous Commanders (except one), you are a 4-star Admiral of the Navy.

## INDOPACOM

- *HQ:* Camp H. M. Smith in Hawaii
- *Service Component Commands:* US Army Pacific, US Marine Forces Pacific, US Pacific Fleet, US Pacific Air Forces, US Space Forces Indo-Pacific
- *Unified Commands:* US Forces Japan,<sup>3</sup> US Forces Korea (including Special Operations Command Korea), Special Operations Command Pacific
- Other direct reporting units and Task Forces

## Role

As the Commander of INDOPACOM your responsibilities are to:

- Advise and brief the President on military affairs in the region.
- Oversee all military forces of the United States in theater.
- Plan and execute operations.
- Coordinate with allied militaries to conduct and plan operations.

Under your command are the following:

- All ground, air, and naval units.
- All space assets.
- All cyber assets (though some are of such high impact or risk to civilians that they require approval from the President).
- All special forces.
- All other military forces and assets.

You may leave the table to talk only with the Taiwanese General Staff.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Note that US Forces Japan lacks the ability to do operational planning (e.g. it cannot direct and control forces in wartime). Thus all wartime control of forces is done from Hawaii at INDOPACOM headquarters.

<sup>4</sup> The Heng Shan Military Command Center has a link to INDOPACOM headquarters.  
<https://project2049.net/2014/10/07/taiwan-asias-secret-air-power/> (2017)



# DEPUTY COMMANDER, INDOPACOM

*(Indo-Pacific Command)*



## Overview

You are the Deputy Commander of INDOPACOM, the oldest combatant command which oversees the Indo-Pacific and all US forces in the area. INDOPACOM is the largest combatant command with over 375,000 service members and an area that encompasses 52% of the Earth's surface, from the waters of the West Coast of the US to the east coast maritime borderline waters of India (66° longitude).

## INDOPACOM

- *HQ*: Camp H. M. Smith in Hawaii
- *Service Component Commands*: US Army Pacific, US Marine Forces Pacific, US Pacific Fleet, US Pacific Air Forces, US Space Forces Indo-Pacific
- *Unified Commands*: US Forces Japan,<sup>5</sup> US Forces Korea (including Special Operations Command Korea), Special Operations Command Pacific
- Other direct reporting units and Task Forces

## Role

As the Deputy Commander of INDOPACOM your responsibilities are to:

- Support Commander, INDOPACOM in overseeing all military forces of the United States in theater.
- Support the planning and execution of operations.
- Coordinate with allied militaries to conduct and plan operations.

Under INDOPACOM's command are the following:

- All ground, air, and naval units.
- All space assets.
- All cyber assets (though some are of such high impact or risk to civilians that they require approval from the President).
- All special forces.
- All other military forces and assets.

You may leave the table to talk with any allied *military* team.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Note that US Forces Japan lacks the ability to do operational planning (e.g. it cannot direct and control forces in wartime). Thus all wartime control of forces is done from Hawaii at INDOPACOM headquarters.

<sup>6</sup> The Heng Shan Military Command Center has a link to INDOPACOM headquarters.

<https://project2049.net/2014/10/07/taiwan-asias-secret-air-power/> (2017)



# COMMANDER, J2 (INTELLIGENCE), INDOPACOM

*(Indo-Pacific Command)*



## Background

As the J2 (Intelligence) of INDOPACOM, you are the head of US Military Intelligence in the Indo-Pacific. Your job is to take in all available intelligence and attempt to understand what the enemy will do next and why.

## Role

You have three main activities:

1. To keep the Commander of INDOPACOM informed of the situation.
2. To determine the strategic and military intent of the enemy.
3. To plan and conduct deception of the enemy as to your own strategic intent.

You do this by:

- Collecting and analyzing intelligence:
  - Talk with other players in your government and allied governments to get a picture of what is going on in their domains, both outside and inside the nation.
  - Collect information from the news and press statements.
  - With the Director of National Intelligence, decide upon and submit Priority Intelligence Requests to your intelligence apparatus.
- Use that information to determine what the enemy is trying to do and what they will do in the future (determine the strategic intent of the enemy).
- Ask fellow players to take actions or convey information to your enemies to deceive the enemy as to the government's true intentions (plan and undertake active deception).

You may only leave your team table to talk with any allied *military* team,<sup>7</sup> and the Japanese Defense Intelligence Headquarters.

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<sup>7</sup> The Heng Shan Military Command Center has a link to INDOPACOM headquarters.  
<https://project2049.net/2014/10/07/taiwan-asias-secret-air-power/> (2017)



# COMMANDER, INFORMATION OPERATIONS JOINT TASK FORCE

*Special Operations Command Pacific (INDOPACOM)*



## Background

You are the Commander of the Information Operations Joint Task Force of Special Operations Command Pacific (under INDOPACOM). You are charged with the conduct of offensive and defensive information warfare missions to demoralize the enemy and confuse them as to our true intents to gain military advantage, and to ensure that US troops in the region are perceived in a positive light.

## Role

As the Director of the Information Operations Joint Task Force your responsibilities are to:

- Offensively
  - Conduct offensive Information Warfare against the enemy.
    - Confuse the enemy as to the location and plans of US Forces.
    - Paint Chinese actions in a negative light.
- Defensively
  - Expose any offensive information campaigns taken by the Chinese.
  - Ensure that the conduct of US Forces in the region is perceived positively.

You do this by:

- Monitor press feeds to stay informed on the media environment.
- Talking with other players in your government to get a picture of what is going on in their domains, both outside and inside the nation.
- Undertaking information campaigns.
- Engaging with domestic and foreign press to shape the narrative in a manner favorable to the US and unfavorable to China.
- Asking fellow players to take actions or convey information to your enemies to deceive the enemy as to the military's true intentions (plan and undertake active deception).

You are allowed to leave your team table to talk to the Press.



# COMMANDER, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

*STRATCOM*

Peace is our Profession...



## Background

You are the commander of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), overseeing the 150,000 personnel, 14 Ballistic Missile Submarines, 400 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, and 154 bombers that make up the United States nuclear deterrent.

## Role

As the commander of STRATCOM, your job is simple:

- Provide advice to the President on managing nuclear risk and escalation.
- Monitor adversaries' nuclear forces and attempt to assess their intent and force posture.
- Ensure the ability of the United States to destroy any nation in nuclear hellfire.
- Develop nuclear strike options for the President and Joint Chiefs of Staff
- If necessary, carry out the employment of nuclear weapons.

## Special Order: DEFCON

On the orders of the President or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DEFCON may be changed. Any movements up or down the DEFCON (Defense Condition) levels must be relayed to Control. Changing DEFCON is a public act and will be known by all other countries. The US is currently at DEFCON 4.

Defense Condition	Description	Readiness Level
DEFCON 1	Nuclear war is imminent or has already begun.	Maximum readiness of all forces. Immediate response.
DEFCON 2	Next step to war or nuclear exchange.	Armed forces ready to deploy and engage in less than six hours.
DEFCON 3	Increase in force readiness above that required for normal readiness.	Nuclear bombers ready to take off in 15 minutes. Armed forces under active alert.
DEFCON 4	Increased intelligence watch and strengthened security measures.	Above normal readiness.
DEFCON 5	Lowest state of readiness.	Normal readiness.

You are not allowed to leave your team table.



# COMMANDER, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

*TRANSCOM*



## **Background**

You are the commander of the United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), overseeing the air, land, and sea transportation assets (both military and commercial) and movements of the US Armed Forces.

## **TRANSCOM**

TRANSCOM is comprised of:

- Joint Enabling Capabilities Command – providing command and coordination ability.
- Air Mobility Command (Air Force) – providing airlift and tanking for airlift.
- Military Sealift Command (Navy) – providing sealift.
- Army's Surface Deployment Distribution Command (Army) – providing movement on land by rail or road.

## **Role**

As the commander of TRANSCOM, your job is simple:

- Move US forces and supplies into theater to deter, or if necessary, defeat Chinese aggression.

You are not allowed to leave your team table.



# China [16 Pax]

Role	Additional Role Briefings	Additional Briefings	
President of the People's Republic of China			CMC COA Assessment
Minister for State Security			
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China	MFA Negotiation Positions  Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	MFA Crisis Manual	
Executive Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	MFA Crisis Manual	
Director General, Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide  US DOS Legal Manual	MFA Crisis Manual	
Director General, Department of Asian Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Legal Briefing Pack  Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	MFA Crisis Manual	
Director General, The Department of European Affairs	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	MFA Crisis Manual	
Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide  US DOS Legal Manual  ROC MFA Briefing Pack	MFA Crisis Manual	
Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	MFA Crisis Manual	
Central Military Commission Vice Chairman		PLA Crisis Manual	CMC COA Assessment
Central Military Commission Vice Chairman		PLA Crisis Manual	CMC COA Assessment
Chief of Staff, CMC Joint Operations Command Center		PLA Crisis Manual	CMC COA Assessment
Director, CMC Political Work Department		PLA Crisis Manual	
Commander of the People's Armed Police	China Coast Guard ROE	PLA Crisis Manual	CMC COA Assessment
Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department of the CMC		PLA Crisis Manual	CMC COA Assessment
Nuclear Operations Cell, CMC Joint Operations Command Center	Nuclear Briefing	PLA Crisis Manual	CMC COA Assessment



# PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

*General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party  
Chairman of the Central Military Commission*



## Background

You are 7<sup>th</sup> President of the People's Republic of China, 10<sup>th</sup> General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and 13<sup>th</sup> Chairman of the Central Military Commission. You are the leader of all of the People's Republic of China and the ultimate authority within the nation.

## Role

As President and General Secretary, your responsibilities are to:

- Lead the nation through this crisis!
- Oversee the conduct of the crisis and your subordinates.
- Ensure that the nation, the party, and your position come out of this crisis without threats to the party and the nation, and with your position having grown in strength.

As the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, your responsibilities are to:

- Oversee the conduct of the military.
- Authorize any high impact cyberattacks.
- Order any changes to Nuclear Readiness
- Decide upon the use and release of nuclear weapons.

## Special Order: REDCON

On your orders or by the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the REDCON (Readiness Condition) may be changed. Any movements up or down the REDCON levels must be relayed to Control. Changing REDCON is a public act and will be known by all other Countries. The REDCON is currently DISPERSED.

Readiness Condition	Description	Readiness Level
<b>Go</b>	Nuclear war is imminent or has already begun.	Maximum readiness of all forces. Immediate response.
<b>Ready</b>	Next step to war or nuclear exchange.	Armed forces ready to deploy and engage in less than six hours.
<b>Prepared</b>	Increase in force readiness above that required for normal readiness.	Nuclear bombers ready to take off in 15 minutes. Armed forces under active alert.
<b>Dispersed</b>	Increased intelligence watch and strengthened security measures.	Above normal readiness.
<b>Garrison</b>	Lowest state of readiness.	Normal readiness.

You are allowed to leave your team table to meet other Heads of State, though messages must be done by note only.

# MINISTER FOR STATE SECURITY



## Ministry for State Security<sup>8</sup>

The Ministry of State Security (MSS) was previously often characterized by foreign observers as primarily an internal security agency – more FBI than CIA. This is true in some respects (e.g. its primary focus is domestic) but downplays extensive foreign intelligence work and the history behind that. When it was founded by merger in 1983 it took in counterintelligence and foreign intelligence officers from its merged components the Counter-intelligence Department of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the Central Investigation Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Still, the majority background of state security personnel in the 1980's were police and the MSS' use of front organizations and cover reflects its origins as a domestic agency that had to build China-based structures for working on foreign targets.<sup>9</sup>

“The responsibilities of the MSS cover state security and intelligence, including counterintelligence, political security, some domestic surveillance, and foreign intelligence work (both human intelligence and cyber-operations).”<sup>10</sup>

The MSS follows the general pattern of the rest of Chinese bureaucracy. The MSS exercises coordination and cadre authority (appointments, promotions, etc.) over counterparts at lower levels of the bureaucracy, but the bureaucracy is broken out into the provinces.<sup>11</sup> Every province of China has its own state security department that is a provincial government agency while also being part of the national state security system.<sup>12</sup> The vast majority of state security personnel are working in provincial agencies and thus likely carry out the majority of foreign intelligence operations. Most known examples of MSS operations in the West were carried out by provincial agencies.

There are 14 state security departments and bureaus. Some have different focuses, often specific to their conditions or size. For example, Yunnan has experience in cross-border operations in Southeast Asia. Some places have large expat communities, others might have pockets of technical expertise. Provincial state security often hires locally, so a province with top-ranked STEM universities will likely have a stronger cyber program. In total, the size of the MSS is possibly 800,000 personnel.<sup>13</sup>

As a covert intelligence apparatus, the state security system relies heavily on cover to carry out operations. Other organs of China's party-state are a natural source of this cover called “official cover.” There are known examples of officers hiding in United Front Work departments, overseas Chinese affairs offices (responsible for managing diaspora communities), and foreign affairs offices (local counterparts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). In some cases,

<sup>8</sup> Where not otherwise cited, this section comes from *China's State Security Departments and Nationwide System, Insights from Alex Joske*, by Mercy A. Kuo, November 09, 2023, <https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/chinas-state-security-departments-and-nationwide-system/>

<sup>9</sup> Up into the 90's, the MSS lacked access to slots in Chinese embassies. This is also why many known cases of MSS operations involve foreigners being invited to China and then cultivated and ultimately pitched to become assets of the MSS. The state security system's strong preference is to work on targets when they are in China.

<sup>10</sup> *Counter-Espionage and State Security: The Changing Role of China's Ministry of State Security*, Sheena Greitens, China Leadership Monitor, Issues 83, March 2025, <https://www.prclcenter.org/post/counter-espionage-and-state-security-the-changing-role-of-china-s-ministry-of-state-security>. pg. 2

<sup>11</sup> *Counter-Espionage and State Security: The Changing Role of China's Ministry of State Security*, pg. 6

<sup>12</sup> Military intelligence is structured similarly but divided by regional theater command rather than province.

<sup>13</sup> *Counter-Espionage and State Security: The Changing Role of China's Ministry of State Security*, Sheena Greitens, pg. 1

this cover is used by senior intelligence officers giving them direct involvement in the decision-making process of other agencies. This is consistent with the idea that the state security apparatus plays a greater role than previously appreciated in China's external affairs. The depth of this integration varies from province to province.

## Security (安全)

National security and state security are synonyms (both are translated as **国家安全**), meaning that the two English terms can be used interchangeably. State security refers to the consolidation of the CCP's ruling position and to its protection from domestic and foreign threats. *Threats to state security are existential threats.* State security covers political, homeland, military, economic, cultural, and information security, and social stability, any of which could threaten the CCP's continued rule of China. Any threats to state security are threats to Party rule and the individual's security cannot be safeguarded if the CCP is not secure. Furthermore, those who act in line with the interests of the PRC should enjoy safety.

An overarching threat in peacetime is the ideological infiltration of "Western hostile forces", including foreign NGOs and international media. In wartime or crisis other threats become more imperative.

## Role

As the Minister for State Security, you are to:

- Support Xi in all matters.
- Ensure the safety and stability of the Chinese Communist Party.
- Coordinate MSS orchestrated cyber activities.<sup>14</sup>

As Minister you have one key priority and 3 main activities:

### *Key Priority*

1. Ensure the social stability of the Chinese Nation and the safety of the Chinese Communist Party.

### *Activities*

1. To keep the President informed of the situation.
2. To determine the strategic intent of the enemy.
3. To plan and conduct deception of the enemy as to your own strategic intent.

To do this:

- Collecting and analyzing intelligence:
  - Talk with other players in your government to get a picture of what is going on in their domains, both outside and inside the nation.
  - Collect information from the news and press statements.
  - With the Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department of the CMC, decide upon and submit Priority Intelligence Requests to your intelligence apparatus.
- Use that information to determine what the enemy is trying to do and what they will do in the future (determine the strategic intent of the enemy).
- Ask fellow players to take actions or convey information to your enemies to deceive the enemy as to the government's true intentions (plan and undertake active deception).

You are not allowed to leave your team table, except to talk to Chinese Press.

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<sup>14</sup> The MSS has a record of conducting cyber operations and is now likely a more sophisticated actor (at least in relation to civilian targets) than the PLA. *Counter-Espionage and State Security: The Changing Role of China's Ministry of State Security*, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, China Leadership Monitor, Issues 83, March 2025, <https://www.prcleader.org/post/counter-espionage-and-state-security-the-changing-role-of-china-s-ministry-of-state-security>, pg. 6-7

# MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA



## Background

You are Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, heading the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and tasked with directing and conducting the nation's diplomacy.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is one of the country's most important Cabinet posts. Officially, the minister is nominated by the premier of the State Council, who is then approved by the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee and appointed by the president. In actuality these are rubber stamps, and you are appointed directly by President.

You are also a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and a state councilor. The Minister is technically the second-highest ranking diplomat in China after the director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, though currently both posts are held concurrently.

## The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

You oversee the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. The Ministry has the largest diplomatic network in the world, with 274 diplomatic posts,<sup>15</sup> while the ministry itself is headquartered in Chaoyang District, Beijing, the country's primary diplomatic quarter.

The MFA's primary functions include formulating foreign policy, administering the nation's diplomatic missions, representing Chinese interests at the United Nations, negotiating foreign treaties and agreements, and advising the State Council on foreign affairs. The Ministry is subordinate to the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, which decides on policymaking and is led by General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (Xi). Foreign policies concerning the Republic of China fall under the jurisdiction of the Taiwan Affairs Office.

The ministry consists of 29 individual offices, including departments responsible for specific regions, policy areas, as well as administration of the Ministry itself. Each office is headed by a director-general with at least two deputy directors-general. The MFA is made up of ~5,000 personnel. From its outset, the ministry has required that its diplomats operate in pairs, although enforcement of the rule has varied over time. Inside embassies and consulates, CCP branch organizations monitor the behavior of diplomats.

Ministry personnel are typically graduates of well-regarded Beijing and Shanghai universities, mostly Peking University, Tsinghua University, China Foreign Affairs University, and Beijing Foreign Studies University. For postings overseas the individuals must be 23 or older. Political loyalty remains the ministry's most important criterion in selecting recruits.

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<sup>15</sup> 173 embassies, 91 consulates, 8 permanent missions and 2 other representations.

## Role

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Support President Xi by conducting diplomacy with all nations.
  - Most importantly Taiwan must be split diplomatically from the US, and the US from its allies.
- Justify all Chinese actions as being consistent with international law.
- Engage with foreign diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their nation's next move will be.
- When necessary, conduct information warfare to confuse adversaries to our true intentions, and shape their perceptions in a manner favorable to China.

You are allowed to leave your table.

# EXECUTIVE VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS



## Background

You are Executive Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, supporting the Minister of Foreign Affairs. You support the Minister of Foreign Affairs in overseeing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and direct and conduct the nation's diplomatic efforts.

As the Executive Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Support President Xi and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in conducting diplomacy with all nations.
  - Most importantly Taiwan must be split diplomatically from the US, and the US from its allies.
- Justify all Chinese actions as being consistent with international law.
- Engage with foreign diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.
- When necessary, conduct information warfare to confuse adversaries to our true intentions, and shape their perceptions in a manner favorable to China.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# DIRECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF NORTH AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN AFFAIRS

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*



## Background

You are the Director General of the Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. In this position you are charged with overseeing the conduct of all diplomacy for both regions.

## Role

As the Director General of The Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Support the Minister of Foreign Affairs by conducting diplomacy with relevant nations (Australia, the US, and Canada).
  - Most importantly Taiwan must be split diplomatically from the US, and the US from its allies.
- Engage with foreign diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.
- When necessary, conduct information warfare to confuse adversaries to our true intentions, and shape their perceptions in a manner favorable to China.
- Justify all Chinese actions as being consistent with international law.
- When not otherwise engaged support your diplomatic colleagues in their activities.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# DIRECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*



## Background

You are the Director General of the Department of Asian Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. In this position you are charged with overseeing the conduct of all diplomacy for Asia.<sup>16</sup>

## Role

As the Director General, Department of Asian Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Support the Minister of Foreign Affairs by conducting diplomacy with relevant nations (the Philippines, Japan).
  - Importantly split Japan from the US and ensure that the Philippines does not move to support the US (especially by allowing US forces to be based in the Philippines).
- Justify all Chinese actions as being consistent with international law.
- Engage with foreign diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.
- When necessary, conduct information warfare to confuse adversaries to our true intentions, and shape their perceptions in a manner favorable to China.
- When not otherwise engaged support your diplomatic colleagues in their activities.

You are allowed to leave your team table.

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<sup>16</sup> Though note that the Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs oversees diplomatic affairs in Oceania.



# DIRECTOR GENERAL, THE DEPARTMENT OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*



## **Background**

You are the Director General of the Department of European Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. In this position you are charged with overseeing the conduct of all diplomacy for Europe.

## **Role**

As the Director General, Department of European Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Support the Minister of Foreign Affairs by conducting diplomacy with relevant nations (the UK, France).
  - Importantly split the UK and France off from the US and keep them from supporting US military operations.
- Justify all Chinese actions as being consistent with international law.
- Engage with foreign diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.
- When necessary, conduct information warfare to confuse adversaries to our true intentions, and shape their perceptions in a manner favorable to China.
- When not otherwise engaged support your diplomatic colleagues in their activities.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# DIRECTOR OF THE TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE

*State Council of the People's Republic of China*



## Background

You are the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, charged with overseeing all official (and unofficial) economic and diplomatic Chinese Government interactions with Taiwan, and charged with the planning and execution of policy in regard to Taiwan.

## The Taiwan Affairs Office

The Taiwan Affairs Office works under two names based on the situation, as it is under the authority of two distinct bodies (the State Council and CPC Central Committee). The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council is used for economic engagements (Taiwanese businessmen investing in mainland China and Taiwanese workers working in mainland China), while Taiwan Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee is used for political engagement with Taiwan (political talks, negotiations, (un)official visits, etc.).

## Role

As the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office your responsibilities are to:

- Be the primary negotiator between Taiwan and China.
  - Conduct diplomatic warfare to split Taiwan from the rest of their supporters, and (if necessary) conduct information warfare to confuse them of our true intentions.
- Engage with Taiwanese diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.
- When necessary, conduct information warfare to confuse adversaries to our true intentions, and shape their perceptions in a manner favorable to China.
- Justify all Chinese actions as being consistent with international law.
- When not otherwise engaged support your diplomatic colleagues in their activities.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# SPOKESPERSON OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA



## Background

You are the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, the senior-most Ministry of Foreign Affairs official whose job it is to act as the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and as the most foreign-facing Ministry, China as a whole). You are responsible for collecting information about actions and events within China and issuing the administration's reactions and statements to developments around the world, as well as managing foreign press and working with the domestic press.

## Role

As Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Ensure that all in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Government have the story about what China is doing straight.
- Draft and release statements on the Government's (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) positions and policy.<sup>17</sup>
- Monitor press feeds to stay informed on the media environment.
- Deal with requests for information from the foreign press, and work with the domestic press to shape the narrative.
- Justify all Chinese actions as being consistent with international law.

You are allowed to leave your team table to talk to the Press or to draft joint statements or communiques with other nations as directed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs or President.

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<sup>17</sup> It is not unknown to slightly mistranslate or twist the words when translating communiques or other official agreements into Chinese to make it seem like the other side agrees with your position to either strength your position, portray a bigger win than what it was, or to make an agreement easier to sell to the populace.



# CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION VICE CHAIRMAN



## Background

You are the senior Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) (the Chairman being held by the President/General Secretary, and thus not a post involved in day-to-day affairs). As is typical for CMC Vice Chairs, you are a general from the People's Liberation Army Ground Force. As the senior Vice Chairman, you are the highest military official in China (after the President/General Secretary).

## Role

As the most senior of the two Vice-Chairmen of the Central Military Commission, your responsibilities are to:

- (Of the Most Importance) Defend the People's Republic of China. This means in practice:
  - Support Xi in all matters.
  - Ensure the safety and stability of the Chinese Communist Party.
- Work with the President to establish a strategy for the crisis and advise, assist, and keep the President abreast on all ongoing military operations and ensure that the military strategy set by the President is carried out.
- Operationalize (plan and conduct) military operations with the help of the other members of the CMC.
  - If required, destroy enemy forces by conducting joint informationized warfare to defeat the enemy. In some combination:
    - Planning and execution of a Joint Firepower Strike against Taiwanese forces.
    - Planning and execution of a Joint Island Landing Campaign against outlying Taiwanese Islands or mainland Taiwan.
    - Planning and execution of a counter-intervention strategy against US forces.

Under your direct authority are:

- All ground, air, naval, and special forces units of the PLA Ground Force, PLA Air Force, PLA Navy, and PLA Navy Marine Corps.
- All missile assets of the PLA Rocket Force.
- All units of the People's Armed Police (PAP) and the China Coast Guard (under the PAP).
- All space assets of the Military Aerospace Force.
- All cyber assets of the Cyberspace Force (though some assets you should likely consult with the President on, and other cyber assets are held by the Ministry for State Security).
- All other military forces.

- All nuclear assets of all military forces.

You are allowed to leave your table to talk to the American Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the permission of the President.<sup>18</sup>

## Mobilization

The President (typically acting on your advice) may issue mobilization orders for the following categories to be mobilized:

*People's Armed Police* – Mobilization of the People's Armed Police units so that they can be deployed for the suppression of protests and/or for rear area security for critical infrastructure or for use in helping to hold captured Taiwanese territory if required.

*Mobilization of Commercial Sea Lift* – Appropriation of commercial roll-on roll-off ships, car ferries, and other sea vessels to provide additional sea lift to support amphibious operations.

*Mobilization of Commercial Aircraft* – Appropriation of commercial airplanes, both cargo and passenger, to provide further airlift capabilities for air operations and logistical support.

## Special Order: REDCON

On your orders or by the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the REDCON (Readiness Condition) may be changed. Any movements up or down the REDCON levels must be relayed to Control. Changing REDCON is a public act and will be known by all other Countries. The REDCON is currently DISPERSED.

Readiness Condition	Description	Readiness Level
<b>Go</b>	Nuclear war is imminent or has already begun.	Maximum readiness of all forces. Immediate response.
<b>Ready</b>	Next step to war or nuclear exchange.	Armed forces ready to deploy and engage in less than six hours.
<b>Prepared</b>	Increase in force readiness above that required for normal readiness.	Nuclear bombers ready to take off in 15 minutes. Armed forces under active alert.
<b>Dispersed</b>	Increased intelligence watch and strengthened security measures.	Above normal readiness.
<b>Garrison</b>	Lowest state of readiness.	Normal readiness.

<sup>18</sup> The US-China Hotline Rings Again, Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, November 16, 2023, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/16/the-u-s-china-hotline-rings-again/>

# CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION VICE CHAIRMAN



## Background

You are the deputy Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) (the Chairman being held by the President/General Secretary, and thus not a post involved in day-to-day affairs). As is typical for CMC Vice Chairs, you are a general from the People's Liberation Army Ground Force. As the deputy Vice Chairman, you are the second highest military official in China (after the President/General Secretary and the Senior Vice Chairman).

## Role

As one of the two Vice-Chairmen of the Central Military Commission your responsibilities are to:

- Defend the People's Republic of China via ensuring the safety and stability of the Chinese Communist Party.
- Work with the President to establish a strategy for the crisis and advise, assist, and keep the President abreast on all ongoing military operations and ensure that the military strategy set by the President is carried out.
- Operationalize (plan and conduct) military operations with the help of the other members of the CMC.
  - If required, destroy enemy forces by conducting joint informationized warfare to defeat the enemy. In some combination:
    - Planning and execution of a Joint Firepower Strike against Taiwanese forces.
    - Planning and execution of a Joint Island Landing Campaign against outlying Taiwanese Islands or mainland Taiwan.
    - Planning and execution of a counter-intervention strategy against US forces.

Under your direct authority are:

- All ground, air, naval, and special forces units of the PLA Ground Force, PLA Air Force, PLA Navy, and PLA Navy Marine Corps.
- All missile assets of the PLA Rocket Force.
- All units of the People's Armed Police (PAP) and the China Coast Guard (under the PAP).
- All space assets of the Military Aerospace Force.
- All cyber assets of the Cyberspace Force (though some assets you should likely consult with the President on, and other cyber assets are held by the Ministry for State Security).
- All other military forces.
- All nuclear assets of all military forces.

You are allowed to leave your table to talk to the American Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the permission of the President.<sup>19</sup>

## Mobilization

The President (typically acting on your advice) may issue mobilization orders for the following categories to be mobilized

;

*People's Armed Police* – Mobilization of the People's Armed Police units so that they can be deployed for the suppression of protests and/or for rear area security for critical infrastructure or for use in helping to hold captured Taiwanese territory if required.

*Mobilization of Commercial Sea Lift* – Appropriation of commercial roll-on roll-off ships, car ferries, and other sea vessels to provide additional sea lift to support amphibious operations.

*Mobilization of Commercial Aircraft* – Appropriation of commercial airplanes, both cargo and passenger, to provide further airlift capabilities for air operations and logistical support.

## Special Order: REDCON

On your orders or by the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the REDCON (Readiness Condition) may be changed. Any movements up or down the REDCON levels must be relayed to Control. Changing REDCON is a public act and will be known by all other Countries. The REDCON is currently DISPERSED.

Readiness Condition	Description	Readiness Level
Go	Nuclear war is imminent or has already begun.	Maximum readiness of all forces. Immediate response.
Ready	Next step to war or nuclear exchange.	Armed forces ready to deploy and engage in less than six hours.
Prepared	Increase in force readiness above that required for normal readiness.	Nuclear bombers ready to take off in 15 minutes. Armed forces under active alert.
Dispersed	Increased intelligence watch and strengthened security measures.	Above normal readiness.
Garrison	Lowest state of readiness.	Normal readiness.

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<sup>19</sup> The US-China Hotline Rings Again, Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, November 16, 2023, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/16/the-u-s-china-hotline-rings-again/>

# CHIEF OF STAFF, CMC JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND CENTER



## Background

You are the Commander of the Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Center (CMC JOCC), supporting the Vice Chairman in planning and coordinating for all forces under direct control of the Central Military Commission (the 4 branches plus the Military Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, Information Support Force, and Joint Logistics Support Force).

## Role

As Commander of the CMC JOCC your responsibilities are to:

- Defend the People's Republic of China via ensuring the safety and stability of the Chinese Communist Party.
- Assist the Vice Chairman in planning and implementing strategy for the crisis.
- Operationalize (plan and conduct) military operations with the help of the other members of the CMC.
  - If required, destroy enemy forces by conducting joint informationized warfare to defeat the enemy. In some combination:
    - Planning and execution of a Joint Firepower Strike against Taiwanese forces.
    - Planning and execution of a Joint Island Landing Campaign against outlying Taiwanese Islands or mainland Taiwan.
    - Planning and execution of a counter-intervention strategy against US forces.

Under the authority of the Central Military Commission direct authority are:

- All ground, air, naval, and special forces units of the PLA Ground Force, PLA Air Force, PLA Navy, and PLA Navy Marine Corps.
- All missile assets of the PLA Rocket Force.
- All units of the People's Armed Police (PAP) and the China Coast Guard (under the PAP).
- All space assets of the Military Aerospace Force.
- All cyber assets of the Cyberspace Force (though some assets the President should likely be consulted on, and other cyber assets are held by the Ministry for State Security).
- All other military forces.
- All nuclear assets of all military forces.

These can be delegated to others as you see fit.

You are not allowed to leave your table.



# DIRECTOR, CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION POLITICAL WORK DEPARTMENT



## Background

You are the Director of the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department. The Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission is charged with executing the following duties:

- Overseeing the ideological indoctrination, political loyalty, morale, personnel records, cultural activities, discipline, and military justice of the PLA.
- Publishing Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), the PLA's newspaper.
- Overseeing the system of political commissars assigned to each echelon in the PLA.

## The Military Political Work System

The “military political work” system (军队政治工作, jundui zhengzhi gongzuo) can be construed as having three parts:<sup>20</sup>

- *Party Functions* – Reaffirm the party’s absolute leadership over the military.
  - o Establishing and directing party organizations, conducting political values and ethics training for personnel, and enforcing party discipline.
- *Operational Functions* – supporting warfighting functions both offensively and defensively.
  - o Military public affairs, conducting and supporting information operations, and defending against adversary intelligence or psychological warfare operations directed against enemy forces through cooptation, coercion, and other activities aimed at degrading the enemy’s will to fight.
- *Administrative Functions* – all the boring stuff for day-to-day operations.
  - o Personnel management, officer selection and professional military education.

## Role

As the Director of the CMC Political Work Department your responsibilities are to:

- Defend the People’s Republic of China via ensuring the safety and stability of the Chinese Communist Party.
- Ensure the loyalty of the PLA to the CCP.
- Manage all information warfare activities, including briefing international press.
  - o Monitor press feeds to stay informed on the media environment.
  - o Draft and release statements on Chinese military positions and policy.
  - o Deal with requests for information from the press about the military.
- Publish Liberation Army Daily as you see fit.

<sup>20</sup> *Military Political Work at the CCP’s Centennial*, China Brief Volume: 21 Issue: 12, Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, June 18, 2021, <https://jamestown.org/program/military-political-work-at-the-ccps-centennial/>

You do this by:

- Talking with other players in your government to get a picture of what is going on in their domains, both outside and inside the nation.
- Undertaking information campaigns.
- Publishing statements and news releases and working with domestic and foreign press to shape the narrative.
- Asking fellow players to take actions or convey information to your enemies to deceive the enemy as to the Chinese military's true intentions (plan and undertake active deception).
- Asking fellow players to take actions or convey information to gain support for the Chinese military in the international sphere.

You are not allowed to leave your table, except to talk with Chinese News media or brief international media.

# COMMANDER OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMED POLICE



## The People's Armed Police

You are the Commander of the People's Armed Police (PAP), tasked with being the last line of defense for the safety, security, and stability of the nation. You report directly to the Central Military Commission.

Under your control are the forces of the PAP:

- The People's Armed Police Territorial Detachments (local units)
- The People's Armed Police Mobile Detachments (units that can deploy across China to deal with issues rapidly, trained as light infantry)
- The Chinese Coast Guard

The People's Armed Police have three missions:<sup>21</sup>

- Internal stability
- Wartime support
- Maritime rights protection

Wartime support and maritime rights protection are self-explanatory, but supporting internal stability is less straightforward. This primarily means two things: defense of social stability of the nation and maintenance of the social order (and consequently prevent threats to the CCP). Any protest against one issue can quickly turn into a protest against the state. Thus, there is little room for dissent of any kind.<sup>22</sup> “PLA doctrine does not make much differentiation between demonstrations and large-scale destructive riots. The methods prescribed are essentially high-intensity military tactics. It may be inferred that riot control in this context is referring to a large-scale insurrection or highly destructive riot. It should also be noted that all rioters are referred to as terrorists, independent of actual affiliation with a terrorist group or its motivations.”<sup>23</sup>

In most cases local security forces (Ministry for Public Security, Ministry for State Security) and local PAP forces should be able to deal with any issues, but in the unlikely event this is not the case the Mobile Detachments of the PAP will be called upon to reinforce local cadres.

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<sup>21</sup> *China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform*, China Strategic Perspectives 14, Joel Wuthnow, April 2019, <https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%2014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf?ver=2019-04-16-121756-937>, pg. 21, and *Waging War without Disruption: China's People's Armed Police in a Future Conflict*, Jake Rinaldi, April 24, 2025, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict/>

<sup>22</sup> Though economic protesters can be treated more lightly and anti-Western protests may be politically advantageous to your superiors.

<sup>23</sup> *ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics*, August 2021, [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR\\_pubs/DR\\_a/ARN34236-ATP\\_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf](https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34236-ATP_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf), Chapter 9-15

## Role

As the Commander of the People's Armed Police, your responsibilities are to:

- Ensure the security of the Party above all!
- Ensure the success of the Customs Inspection Zone via the China Coast Guard.
- Coordinate with the People's Liberation Army and Ministry of Public Security's National Immigration Administration over the Customs Inspection Zone.
- Along with the PLA, develop plans for the occupation of Taiwan and/or its outlying islands.

You are not allowed to leave your table except to talk to the Taiwanese Coast Guard (Ministry of the Interior).

# INTELLIGENCE BUREAU OF THE JOINT STAFF DEPARTMENT OF THE CMC



## Background

As the Head of the Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC), you are the head of Chinese Military Intelligence. Your job is to take in all available military intelligence and attempt to understand what the enemy will do next and why.

## Role

You have three main activities:

1. To keep the Vice-Chairmen of the CMC informed of the situation.
2. To determine the strategic and military intent of the enemy.
3. To plan and conduct deception of the enemy as to your own strategic intent.

You do this by:

- Collecting and analyzing intelligence:
  - Talk with other players in your government to get a picture of what is going on in their domains, both outside and inside the nation.
  - Collect information from the news and press statements.
  - With the Minister for State Security, decide upon and submit Priority Intelligence Requests to your intelligence apparatus.
- Use that information to determine what the enemy is trying to do and what they will do in the future (determine the strategic intent of the enemy).
- Ask fellow players to take actions or convey information to your enemies to deceive the enemy as to the government's true intentions (plan and undertake active deception).

You are not allowed to leave your team table.



# NUCLEAR OPERATIONS CELL, CMC JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND CENTER



## Background

You are the Commander, Nuclear Operations Cell, CMC Joint Operations Command Center, overseeing the ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and bombers that make up the People's Republic of China's nuclear deterrent.

## Role

As the commander of the Nuclear Operations Cell, your job is simple:

- Provide advice to the President and Chairmen on managing nuclear risk and escalation.
- Monitor adversaries' nuclear forces and attempt to assess their intent and force posture.
- Ensure the ability of the People's Republic of China to destroy any nation in nuclear hellfire.
- Develop nuclear strike options for the President and Central Military Commission.
- If necessary, carry out the employment of nuclear weapons.

## Special Order: REDCON

On the orders of the President, or on the orders of the Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission the REDCON may be changed. Any movements up or down the REDCON (Readiness Condition) levels must be relayed to Control. Changing REDCON is a public act and will be known by all other Countries. The PRC is currently at REDCON 4.

Readiness Condition	Description	Readiness Level
<b>Go</b>	Nuclear war is imminent or has already begun.	Maximum readiness of all forces. Immediate response.
<b>Ready</b>	Next step to war or nuclear exchange.	Armed forces ready to deploy and engage in less than six hours.
<b>Prepared</b>	Increase in force readiness above that required for normal readiness.	Nuclear bombers ready to take off in 15 minutes. Armed forces under active alert.
<b>Dispersed</b>	Increased intelligence watch and strengthened security measures.	Above normal readiness.
<b>Garrison</b>	Lowest state of readiness.	Normal readiness.

You are not allowed to leave your team table.




# Taiwan [17 Pax]

All players receive their role briefing plus the following:

<b>Role</b>	<b>Additional Role Briefings</b>	<b>Additional Briefings</b>			
President of the Republic of China			MFA Negotiation Positions	Taiwanese Mobilization Briefing	NSB COA Assessment
Vice President of the Republic of China			MFA Negotiation Positions	Taiwanese Mobilization Briefing	NSB COA Assessment
Secretary-General to the President					
Spokesperson for the Presidential Office		ROC MFA Briefing Pack			
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	ROC MFA Briefing Pack	MFA Negotiation Positions		NSB COA Assessment
Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	ROC MFA Briefing Pack			
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	ROC MFA Briefing Pack			
Director General, Department of North American Affairs	US Department of State Briefing Pack  Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	ROC MFA Briefing Pack			
Director General, East Asia and Pacific Mission	MFA of Japan Legal Briefing Pack  Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	ROC MFA Briefing Pack			
Minister of National Defense		ROC MFA Briefing Pack	MFA Negotiation Positions	Taiwanese Mobilization Briefing	NSB COA Assessment
Chief of the General Staff		ROC MFA Briefing Pack	MFA Negotiation Positions	Taiwanese Mobilization Briefing	NSB COA Assessment
Executive Vice Chief of the General Staff				Taiwanese Mobilization Briefing	NSB COA Assessment
Vice Chief of the General Staff				Taiwanese Mobilization Briefing	NSB COA Assessment

Vice Chief of the General Staff				Taiwanese Mobilization Briefing	NSB COA Assessment
Director, Political Warfare Bureau					NSB COA Assessment
Minister of the Interior	MoI Briefing Pack				
Director-General, National Security Bureau					NSB COA Assessment

# PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA



## Background

You are 8<sup>th</sup> President of the Republic of China (alternatively the President of Taiwan), head of the executive branch and commander-in-chief of the Republic of China Armed Forces. You are the leader of the nation and are the final and utmost authority in Taiwan.

## Role

As President, your responsibilities are to:

- Lead the nation through this crisis and keep Taiwan free and independent!
- Oversee the conduct of the crisis and your subordinates.
- Conduct diplomacy with allies and partners to rally them to the cause.
- Ensure that you come out of this crisis looking good politically.

As the Commander-in-Chief, your responsibilities are to:

- Oversee the conduct of the military.
- Authorize any high impact cyberattacks.

## Special Order: National Readiness System<sup>24</sup>

On your orders or by the order of the Minister of National Defense, or the Chief of the General Staff, the *Alert State* of the Taiwanese Armed Forces may be changed. On your orders Emergency Readiness may be ordered.

Any movements up or down the National Readiness System and Alert levels must be relayed to Control. Changing the state of National Readiness System is a public act and will be known by all other Countries. The National Readiness System is currently at Emergency Readiness.


Readiness/Alert State		Readiness Level
Normal Readiness	Normal Alert	Peacetime operations, routine training activities and other tasks conducted.
	Focused Alert	Selected units on alert, increased ISR activities.
	Enhanced Alert	All major units on alert, cancellation of leave, more vigilant security around critical facilities
Emergency Readiness		All units at combat readiness, President may (with Legislative Yuan approval) declare martial law or issue an Emergency Order.

As long as communications are functioning, you are allowed to leave your team table to meet other Heads of State. You are always allowed to leave your table to talk to Xi Jinping.

<sup>24</sup> *Preparing for the Nightmare: Readiness and Ad hoc Coalition Operations in the Taiwan Strait*, Mark Stokes, Yang Kuang-shun, and Eric Lee, September 1, 2020, [https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Preparing-for-the-Nightmare\\_Readiness-and-Ad-hoc-Coalition-Operations-in-the-Taiwan-Strait\\_Stokes\\_Yang\\_Lee\\_P2049\\_200901.pdf](https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Preparing-for-the-Nightmare_Readiness-and-Ad-hoc-Coalition-Operations-in-the-Taiwan-Strait_Stokes_Yang_Lee_P2049_200901.pdf), pg. 5-6



# VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA



## Background

You are the Vice President of the Republic of China, holder of the second-highest constitutional office of the government in Taiwan (after the president) and first in the presidential line of succession.

## Role

As the Vice President of the Republic of China your responsibilities are to:

- Keep Taiwan free and independent at all costs!
- Support the president in overseeing the conduct of the nation during the crisis.
- Help conduct diplomacy with all allies and partners.
- Be prepared to take over the presidency if the President is killed, incapacitated, or captured.
- Ensure that the President's decisions are politically popular (or at least spun as such).

As long as communications are functioning, you are allowed to leave your table. You are always allowed to leave your table to talk to Xi Jinping.



# SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT



## Background

You are the Secretary-General to the President in charge of the affairs of the Office of the President and direct and supervise all staff in the Office. You are functionally the highest-ranking aide, confident, and enforcer for the President.

## Role

As the Secretary-General to the President your responsibilities are to:


- Support the President in carrying out their duties by keeping the team organized by keeping track of the team's activities and organizing the flow of information to the President.
- Ensure that actions ordered by the President are carried out.
- Maintain the political popularity of the President by ensuring actions are popular with the people (or at least softened if unpopular actions must be taken).
- Covertly plan for a Government in Exile in the eventuality it is needed.

Functionally, your job is to be the eyes and ears (and sometimes the hand) of the president to ensure what they need done, is done, and what they need to know, they know.

As long as communications are functioning, you are allowed to leave the team table with the Permission of the President. You are not otherwise allowed to leave your table.



# SPOKESPERSON FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE



## Background

You are the Spokesperson for the Presidential Office, the senior-most official whose job it is to act as the spokesperson for the President. You are responsible for collecting information about actions and events within the Taiwanese government and issuing the administration's reactions and statements to developments around the world, as well as managing the press.

## Role

As Spokesperson your responsibilities are to:

- Ensure that all people in the Taiwanese government have the same story as to what is going on.
- Ensure that Taiwan's narrative is being pushed and Taiwan is seen as sympathetic so that allies will continue to support us.
- Ensure that all actions taken by Taiwan are justified as being in line with international law.
- Ensure that the President's decisions are politically popular (or at least spun as such).

You do this by:

- Monitor press feeds to stay informed on the media environment.
- Draft and release statements on Taiwanese positions and policy.
- Deal with requests for information from the press.
- Advising the President and Vice-President on how to spin the narrative.

You are allowed to leave your team table to talk to the Press or to draft joint statements or communiques with other nations as directed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs or President.



# MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China*



## Background

You are the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (外交部, Gōa-kau-pō), tasked with directing and conducting the nation's diplomacy. Through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you oversee both Taiwan's official and unofficial diplomatic relations.

## The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversees relations with 11 UN member states and the Holy See as well as a greater number of unofficial relations in addition. This is comprised in total of 110 diplomatic missions of Taiwan, composed of 13 embassies, a consulate-general, 95 semi-official representative offices, and a permanent mission to the World Trade Organization. Engagement with China is done through non-government offices in Hong Kong and Macau.

## Role

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Keep Taiwan free and independent!
- Support the President by conducting diplomacy with all nations and keep the President updated as to what is going on.
  - Liaise with our allies (most importantly the US) to keep them in the loop and coordinate actions with them.
  - Engage with Chinese diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.
- Ensure that all actions taken by Taiwan are justified as being in line with international law.

As long as communications are functioning, you are allowed to leave your team table.



# VICE MINISTER, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China  
(Special Representative to the People's Republic of China)*



## Role

You are the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, supporting the Minister in overseeing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外交部, Gōa-kau-pō) and in directing and conducting the nation's Foreign Policy.

## The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversees relations with 11 UN member states and the Holy See as well as a greater number of unofficial relations in addition. This is comprised in total of 110 diplomatic missions of Taiwan, composed of 13 embassies, a consulate-general, 95 semi-official representative offices, and a permanent mission to the World Trade Organization. Engagement with China is done through non-government offices in Hong Kong and Macau.

## Role

As the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Keep Taiwan free and independent!
- Support the Minister of Foreign Affairs by conducting diplomacy with allies and partners.
- Ensure that all actions taken by Taiwan are justified as being in line with international law.
- When not otherwise engaged support your diplomatic colleagues in their activities.

As the Special Representative to the People's Republic of China your responsibilities are to:

- Be the primary negotiator between Taiwan and the PRC.
- Engage with Chinese diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.
- When necessary, conduct information warfare to confuse them to our true intentions.
- If necessary, conduct diplomatic warfare to steer the political leadership of China into taking actions and positions favorable to Taiwan.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China*



## Role

You are the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, supporting the Minister in overseeing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外交部, Gōa-kau-pō) and in directing and conducting the nation's Foreign Policy.

## The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversees relations with 11 UN member states and the Holy See as well as a greater number of unofficial relations in addition. This is comprised in total of 110 diplomatic missions of Taiwan, composed of 13 embassies, a consulate-general, 95 semi-official representative offices, and a permanent mission to the World Trade Organization. Engagement with China is done through non-government offices in Hong Kong and Macau.

## Role

As the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Keep Taiwan free and independent!
- Support the Minister of Foreign Affairs by conducting diplomacy with allies and partners.
- Ensure that all actions taken by Taiwan are justified as being in line with international law.
- When not otherwise engaged support your diplomatic colleagues in their activities.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# DIRECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China*



## Department of North American Affairs

The Department is made up of the following sections:

1. US Political Affairs Section
2. US State and Local Affairs Section
3. US Economic Affairs Section
4. US Academic Cooperation Section
5. Canadian Affairs Section
6. Global Cooperation and Training Framework Task Force

The Department deals with diplomacy with Canada and the United States of America.

## Role

As the Director General of the Department of North American Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Help negotiate with and coordinate with our Allies. We will not be able to stand alone if they abandon us.
  - Try to bring Canada onside, they are likely to be wary of involving themselves in a dispute of this magnitude especially if there is no approval by an international body (UNSC, UNGA, NATO, ASEAN, etc..).
  - Critically, ensure that the US supports us and will intervene militarily on our side if the crisis escalates.
- Liaise with our allies to keep them in the loop and coordinate our actions with them.
- Ensure that all actions taken by Taiwan are justified as being in line with international law.
- When not otherwise engaged support your diplomatic colleagues in their activities.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# DIRECTOR GENERAL, EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC MISSION

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China*



## Background

You are the Director General of the East Asia and Pacific Mission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China. You are tasked with overseeing the diplomatic efforts of Taiwan in the area, both de facto and de jure.

## Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

The Department is made up of the following sections:

1. Pacific Affairs Section
2. Korean Affairs and Special Projects Section
3. Japan Political Affairs Section
4. Japan General Affairs Section
5. Japan Cultural and Educational Affairs Section
6. Southeast Asian Affairs Section
7. Regional Architecture Section
8. Indo-Pacific Affairs Section

The Department deals with the following countries (played countries are underlined):

Commonwealth of Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Republic of Fiji, Republic of India, Republic of Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, New Zealand, Republic of Palau, Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand, Tuvalu, Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

## Role

As the Director General of the East Asia and Pacific Mission your responsibilities are to:

- Help negotiate with and coordinate with our Allies. We will not be able to stand alone if they abandon us.
  - Critically, ensure that Japan supports us, and that Australia and the Philippines stay onside.
- Liaise with our allies to keep them in the loop and coordinate our actions with them.
- Ensure that all actions taken by Taiwan are justified as being in line with international law.
- When not otherwise engaged support your other diplomatic colleagues in their activities.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE



## Background

You are the Minister of National Defense, overseeing all military forces of the Republic of China. In this role you function as the civilian side of the defense establishment, helping the military work with the political side of government.

## Role

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff your responsibilities are to:

- Advise, assist, and keep the President abreast on all military affairs and ensure that the military strategy set by the President is carried out.
- Liaise with the General Staff and allied militaries to plan and execute an overall military strategy.
- Oversee the conduct of the military forces of Taiwan.

## Special Order: National Readiness System<sup>25</sup>

On your orders or by the order of the President, or the Chief of the General Staff, the *Alert State* of the Taiwanese Armed Forces may be changed. Only on the orders of the President may Emergency or Normal Readiness may be ordered.

Any movements up or down the National Readiness System and Alert levels must be relayed to Control. Changing the state of National Readiness System is a public act and will be known by all other Countries. The National Readiness System is currently at Emergency Readiness.

Readiness/Alert State	Readiness Level
Normal Readiness	Normal Alert Peacetime operations, routine training activities and other tasks conducted.
	Focused Alert Selected units on alert, increased ISR activities.
	Enhanced Alert All major units on alert, cancellation of leave, more vigilant security around critical facilities
Emergency Readiness	All units at combat readiness, President may (with Legislative Yuan approval) declare martial law or issue an Emergency Order.

As long as communications are functioning you are allowed to leave your table to talk to other select Heads of the Military: the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chinese Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Australian Chief of the Defence Force.

<sup>25</sup> *Preparing for the Nightmare: Readiness and Ad hoc Coalition Operations in the Taiwan Strait*, Mark Stokes, Yang Kuang-shun, and Eric Lee, September 1, 2020, [https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Preparing-for-the-Nightmare\\_Readiness-and-Ad-hoc-Coalition-Operations-in-the-Taiwan-Strait\\_Stokes\\_Yang\\_Lee\\_P2049\\_200901.pdf](https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Preparing-for-the-Nightmare_Readiness-and-Ad-hoc-Coalition-Operations-in-the-Taiwan-Strait_Stokes_Yang_Lee_P2049_200901.pdf), pg. 5-6



# CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF



## Background

You are the Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of China Armed Forces, the highest-ranking military officer of Taiwan and overseer of 169,000 active personnel, and up to 2.5 million reservists. You oversee the General Staff, the joint command body of the military, overseeing all military affairs from training to disaster response, and all-out war.

## Role

As Chief of the General Staff, your responsibilities are to:

- Keep Taiwan free and independent!
- Advise and brief the President on military matters.
- Oversee all military forces of the Republic of China.
- Plan and execute an overall military strategy and operations.
- Coordinate with allied militaries to conduct and plan operations.

Under your command are the following:

- All ground (Army, Marines, Military Police), air, and naval units.
- All space assets.
- All cyber assets (though some are of such high impact or risk to civilians that they require approval from the President).
- All special forces.
- All other military forces.

## Special Order: National Readiness System<sup>26</sup>

Readiness/Alert State	Readiness Level
Normal Readiness	Normal Alert
	Focused Alert
	Enhanced Alert
Emergency Readiness	All units at combat readiness, President may (with Legislative Yuan approval) declare martial law or issue an Emergency Order.

<sup>26</sup> *Preparing for the Nightmare: Readiness and Ad hoc Coalition Operations in the Taiwan Strait*, Mark Stokes, Yang Kuang-shun, and Eric Lee, September 1, 2020, [https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Preparing-for-the-Nightmare\\_Readiness-and-Ad-hoc-Coalition-Operations-in-the-Taiwan-Strait\\_Stokes\\_Yang\\_Lee\\_P2049\\_200901.pdf](https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Preparing-for-the-Nightmare_Readiness-and-Ad-hoc-Coalition-Operations-in-the-Taiwan-Strait_Stokes_Yang_Lee_P2049_200901.pdf), pg. 5-6

On your orders or by the order of the President, or the Minister of the National Defence, the *Alert State* of the Taiwanese Armed Forces may be changed. Only on the orders of the President may Emergency or Normal Readiness may be ordered.

Any movements up or down the National Readiness System and Alert levels must be relayed to Control. Changing the state of National Readiness System is a public act and will be known by all other Countries. The National Readiness System is currently at Emergency Readiness.

You may leave your team table to talk to INDOPACOM only.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> The Heng Shan Military Command Center has a link to INDOPACOM headquarters. <https://project2049.net/2014/10/07/taiwan-asias-secret-air-power/> (2017)

# EXECUTIVE VICE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

(*Republic of China Air Force*)



## Background

You are the Executive Vice Chief of the General Staff, in charge of running the General Staff in the absence of the Chief of the General Staff. Within the General Staff you also represent the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) and advise on its capabilities and employment.

## Role

As Executive Vice Chief of the General Staff your responsibilities are to:

- Keep Taiwan free!
- Oversee the General Staff while the Chief of the General Staff is otherwise engaged.
- Support the Chief of the General Staff in creating and implementing military strategy.
- Advise on and control ROCAF forces as directed by the General Staff's planning.

## Special Order: National Readiness System<sup>28</sup>

On the orders of the President, the Minister of National Defense, or the Chief of the General Staff, the *Alert State* of the Taiwanese Armed Forces may be changed. Only on the orders of the President may Emergency or Normal Readiness may be ordered.

Any movements up or down the National Readiness System and Alert levels must be relayed to Control. Changing the state of National Readiness System is a public act and will be known by all other Countries. The National Readiness System is currently at Emergency Readiness.

Readiness/Alert State	Readiness Level
Normal Readiness	Normal Alert Peacetime operations, routine training activities and other tasks conducted.
	Focused Alert Selected units on alert, increased ISR activities.
	Enhanced Alert All major units on alert, cancellation of leave, more vigilant security around critical facilities
Emergency Readiness	All units at combat readiness, President may (with Legislative Yuan approval) declare martial law or issue an Emergency Order.

You may leave your team table to talk to INDOPACOM only.<sup>29</sup>


<sup>28</sup> *Preparing for the Nightmare: Readiness and Ad hoc Coalition Operations in the Taiwan Strait*, Mark Stokes, Yang Kuang-shun, and Eric Lee, September 1, 2020, [https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Preparing-for-the-Nightmare\\_Readiness-and-Ad-hoc-Coalition-Operations-in-the-Taiwan-Strait\\_Stokes\\_Yang\\_Lee\\_P2049\\_200901.pdf](https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Preparing-for-the-Nightmare_Readiness-and-Ad-hoc-Coalition-Operations-in-the-Taiwan-Strait_Stokes_Yang_Lee_P2049_200901.pdf), pg. 5-6

<sup>29</sup> The Heng Shan Military Command Center has a link to INDOPACOM headquarters.  
<https://project2049.net/2014/10/07/taiwan-asias-secret-air-power/> (2017)



# VICE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

*(Republic of China Navy)*



## Background

You are the Vice Chief of the General Staff, in charge of supporting the planning and conduct of military matters related to operations. Within the General Staff you also represent the Republic of China Navy (ROCN) and advise on its capabilities and employment.

## Role

As Vice Chief of the General Staff your responsibilities are to:

- Keep Taiwan free!
- Support the Chief of the General Staff in creating and implementing military strategy.
- Advise on and control ROCN forces as directed by the General Staff's planning.
- Liaise with the Interior Ministry who oversees the Coast Guard to plan and conduct operations.

You may leave your team table to talk to INDOPACOM only.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> The Heng Shan Military Command Center has a link to INDOPACOM headquarters. <https://project2049.net/2014/10/07/taiwan-asias-secret-air-power/> (2017)



# VICE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

*(Republic of China Army)*



## Background

You are the Vice Chief of the General Staff, in charge of supporting the planning and conduct of military matters related to operations. Within the General Staff you also represent the Republic of China Army (ROCA) and advise on its capabilities and employment.

## Role

As Vice Chief of the General Staff your responsibilities are to:

- Keep Taiwan free!
- Support the Chief of the General Staff in creating and implementing military strategy.
- Advise on and control ROCA forces as directed by the General Staff's planning.

You may leave your team table to talk to INDOPACOM only.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> The Heng Shan Military Command Center has a link to INDOPACOM headquarters. <https://project2049.net/2014/10/07/taiwan-asias-secret-air-power/> (2017)



# DIRECTOR, POLITICAL WARFARE BUREAU



## Background

You are the Director of the Political Warfare Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense, charged with offensive and defensive political warfare missions. You are responsible for waging political warfare on the enemy to demoralize and confuse them as to our true intents and conducting political education of our troops to ensure that they will stand resolutely against the enemy.

## Role

As the Director of the Political Warfare Bureau your responsibilities are to:

- Offensively
  - Conduct offensive Political Warfare against the enemy.<sup>32</sup>
- Defensively
  - Monitor press feeds to stay informed on the media environment.
  - Ensure that the conduct of Taiwanese Forces is perceived positively, and that Taiwanese Forces will do their duty resolutely.
  - Draft and release statements on Taiwanese military positions and policy.
  - Deal with requests for information from the press about the military.

You do this by:

- Talking with other players in your government to get a picture of what is going on in their domains, both outside and inside the nation.
- Undertaking information campaigns.
- Publishing statements and news releases and working with domestic and foreign press to shape the narrative.
- Asking fellow players to take actions or convey information to your enemies to deceive the enemy as to the Taiwanese military's true intentions (plan and undertake active deception).
- Asking fellow players to take actions or convey information to allies and partners to gain support for the Taiwanese military.

You are allowed to leave your team table to talk to the Press.

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<sup>32</sup> Information warfare and psychological operations.



# MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR



## Background

You are the Minister of the Interior, head of the Ministry of the Interior and tasked with home affairs and security.<sup>33</sup> During crises you are the main agency in charge of law enforcement and security, overseeing the National Airborne Service Corps, National Police Agency, and the National Fire Agency (who is in charge of disaster response). You also oversee the Coast Guard Administration.

## Role

As the Minister of the Interior, you are to:

- Keep Taiwan free!
- Oversee the activities of the Coast Guard Administration and liaise with the Navy to support such activities.
- Oversee response to any major civil defense incidents and evacuation of civilians (including from the outlying islands).
- Ensure that Taiwan is prepared for a worst-case scenario.

You are not allowed to leave your table except to talk to the China Coast Guard (People's Armed Police).

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<sup>33</sup> This means things such as overseeing land and zoning, construction and permitting, national emergency services, local administration systems, and law enforcement.



# DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU



## Role

As the Director-General of the National Security Bureau, you sit at the combined nexus of efforts of the military and governmental intelligence efforts. Your job is to take in all available intelligence and attempt to understand what the enemy will do next and why.

You have three main activities:

1. To keep the President, government, and military informed of the situation.
2. To determine the strategic intent of the enemy.
3. To plan and conduct deception of the enemy as to your own strategic intent.

You do this by:

- Collecting and analyzing intelligence:
  - Talk with other players in your government and allied governments to get a picture of what is going on in their domains, both outside and inside the nation.
  - Collect information from the news and press statements.
  - Decide upon and submit Priority Intelligence Requests to your intelligence apparatus.
- Use that information to determine what the enemy is trying to do and what they will do in the future (determine the strategic intent of the enemy).
- Ask fellow players to take actions or convey information to your enemies to deceive them (undertake active deception).

You may only leave your team table to talk to the US Director of National Intelligence or the INDOPACOM J2 (Intelligence).



# Japan [9 Pax]

All players receive their role briefing plus the following:

Role	Additional Role Briefings	Additional Briefings	
Prime Minister of Japan		Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Legal Briefing Pack	DIH COA Assessment
Spokesperson, Office of the Prime Minister of Japan		Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Legal Briefing Pack	
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Legal Briefing Pack	DIH COA Assessment
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Legal Briefing Pack	
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Legal Briefing Pack	
Commander, Joint Operations Command			DIH COA Assessment
Deputy Commander, Joint Operations Command		Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Legal Briefing Pack	DIH COA Assessment
Liaison, JSDF-US Forces		Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Legal Briefing Pack	DIH COA Assessment
Chief, Defense Intelligence Headquarters			DIH COA Assessment



# PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN



## Background

You are Prime Minister of Japan, heading the 103<sup>rd</sup> Cabinet, head of the executive branch and commander-in-chief of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF). Like every other Prime Minister post 1945, you are a member of the Liberal Democratic Party. You are the leader of the nation and are the final and utmost authority in Japan.

## Role

As Prime Minister your responsibilities are to:

- Lead the nation through this crisis!
- Provide strategic direction to your subordinates to navigate the current crisis.
- Conduct direct diplomacy with allies and partners (and potentially enemies).

As the Commander-in-Chief your responsibilities are to:

- Oversee the conduct of the military.
- Authorize any high impact cyberattacks.

You are allowed to leave your team table to meet other Heads of State (except Xi Jinping).



# SPOKESPERSON, OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN



## Background

You are the Spokesperson to the Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, the senior-most official whose job it is to act as the spokesperson for the Prime Minister. You are responsible for collecting information about actions and events within the Japanese government and issuing the administration's reactions and statements to developments around the world, as well as managing the press.

## Role

As Spokesperson your responsibilities are to:


- Ensure that all people in the Japanese government have the same, consistent story as to what is going on.
- Ensure that all actions taken by Japan are justified as being in line with international law and are justified to the populace as being self-defense.
- Monitor press feeds to stay informed on the media environment.
- Draft and release statements on Japanese positions and policy.
- Deal with requests for information from the press.
- Ensure the Prime Minister's decisions are politically popular (or at least spun as such) and shape public opinion as directed by the Prime Minister.

You are also to absolutely avoid ever outwardly disagreeing with your superior the Prime Minister in public.

You are allowed to leave your team table to talk to the Press or to draft joint statements or communiques with other nations as directed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Prime Minister.



# MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS



## Background

You are the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外務省, Gaimu-shō), tasked with directing and conducting the nation's diplomacy. You are (as is traditional) a political appointment and are a member of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister. By nature of your position, you also serve in the National Security Council.

## Role

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs your responsibilities are to:


- Keep the Japanese people safe and ensure that the status quo balance of power remains in the Pacific.
- Support the Prime Minister by conducting diplomacy with all nations and keep the Prime Minister updated as to what is going on.
  - Liaise with our allies (most importantly the US) to keep them in the loop and coordinate actions with them.
  - Engage with Chinese diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.
- Ensure that all actions taken by the Government can be justified to the population as falling under self-defense.
- Ensure that all actions taken by Japan are justified as being in line with international law.

You are also to avoid outwardly disagreeing with your superior the Prime Minister.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS



## Background

You are the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the principal deputy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. You support the Minister of Foreign Affairs in overseeing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外務省, Gaimu-shō) and in directing and conducting the nation's diplomatic efforts.

## Role

You are the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, as such your responsibilities are to:


- Keep Japan and the Japanese people safe.
- Support the Minister and liaise with our allies (most importantly the US) to keep them in the loop and coordinate actions with them.
- Ensure that all actions taken by Japan are justified as being in line with international law.
- Ensure that all actions taken by the Government can be justified to the population as falling under self-defense.
- Engage with Chinese diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.

You are also to avoid outwardly disagreeing with your superiors, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS



## Background

You are the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the principal deputy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. You support the Minister of Foreign Affairs in overseeing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外務省, Gaimu-shō) and in directing and conducting the nation's diplomatic efforts.

## Role

You are the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, as such your responsibilities are to:

- Keep Japan and the Japanese people safe.
- Support the Minister and liaise with our allies (most importantly the US) to keep them in the loop and coordinate actions with them.
- Ensure that all actions taken by Japan are justified as being in line with international law.
- Ensure that all actions taken by the Government can be justified to the population as falling under self-defense.
- Engage with Chinese diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.

You are also to avoid outwardly disagreeing with your superiors, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# COMMANDER, JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND



## Background

You are the Commander, Joint Operations Command in overall operational command of Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF). Joint Operations Command is the structure dedicated to controlling and directing the JSDF in wartime, and is tasked with planning and conducting operations, while day-to-day administrative affairs are left to the branches and the Joint Staff.

## Role

As Commander, Joint Operations Command your responsibilities are to:

- Protect the people and security of Japan.
- Protect the liberal rules-based international order by keeping Taiwan free and independent and pushing back against China.
- Advise and brief the Prime Minister on military affairs in the region.
- Coordinate your forces to deter the enemy, and if necessary, defeat the enemy on the ground, sea, and air.
- Engage with allies and partners (most importantly the US), but also the UK and Australia with whom we have reciprocal basing rights to support the defense of Japan.

You should also make sure that you:

- Ensure that all actions taken by Japan are justified as being in line with international law.
- Ensure that all actions taken by the military can be justified to the population as falling under self-defense.

You are also to avoid outwardly disagreeing with your superior, the Prime Minister.

Under your command are the following:

- All air, naval, and ground units.
- All cyber assets (though some may require authorization by the Prime Minister).
- The special forces of the JSDF.
- All other military assets.

These can be delegated to others as you see fit.

You may not leave your team table.



# DEPUTY COMMANDER, JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND



## Background

You are the Deputy Commander, Joint Operations Command helping support the operational command of Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF). The Joint Operations Command is the structure dedicated to controlling and directing the JSDF in wartime, and is tasked with planning and conducting operations, while day-to-day administrative affairs are left to the branches and the Joint Staff.

## Role

As Deputy Commander, Joint Operations Command your responsibilities are to:

- Protect the people and security of Japan.
- Protect the liberal rules-based international order by keeping Taiwan free and independent and pushing back against China.
- Support Commander, Joint Operations Command in managing the JSDF to deter the enemy, and if necessary, defeat the enemy on the ground, sea, and air.
- Engage with allies and partners (most importantly the US), but also the UK and Australia (with whom we have reciprocal basing rights) to plan and coordinate actions to support the defense of Japan.

You should also make sure that you:

- Ensure that all actions taken by Japan are justified as being in line with international law.
- Ensure that all actions taken by the military can be justified to the population as falling under self-defense.

You are also to avoid outwardly disagreeing with your superiors, Commander, Joint Operations Command, and the Prime Minister.

Under Joint Operations Command are the following forces:

- All air, naval, and ground units.
- All cyber assets (though some may require authorization by the Prime Minister).
- The special forces of the JSDF.
- All other military assets.

These can be delegated to others as you see fit.

You may leave the table to talk with any allied *military* team.



# LIAISON, JSDF-US FORCES



## Background

You are the designated liaison between Joint Operations Command, and US Forces Japan and US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). You are charged with supporting the planning and coordinating of the US Armed Forces and Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) operations.

## Role

As JSDF-US Forces Liaison your responsibilities are to:

- Protect the people and security of Japan.
- Protect the liberal rules-based international order by keeping Taiwan free and independent and pushing back against China.
- Support Commander, Joint Operations Command in managing the JSDF-INDOPACOM relationship to deter the enemy, and if necessary, defeat the enemy on the ground, sea, and air.
- Engage with INDOPACOM to plan and coordinate actions to support the defense of Japan.

You should also make sure that you:

- Ensure that all actions taken by Japan are justified as being in line with international law.
- Ensure that all actions taken by the military can be justified to the population as falling under self-defense.

You are also to avoid outwardly disagreeing with your superiors, Commander, Joint Operations Command, and the Prime Minister.

You may leave the table to talk with any US *military* players.



# CHIEF, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE HEADQUARTERS



## Background

As the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, you sit at the combined nexus of efforts of the military and governmental intelligence efforts of Japan. Your job is to take in all available intelligence and attempt to understand what the enemy will do next and why.

## Role

As Director you have three main activities:

1. To keep the Prime Minister, military, and government informed of the situation.
2. To determine the strategic intent of the enemy.
3. To plan and conduct deception of the enemy as to your own strategic intent.

You do this by:

- Collecting and analyzing intelligence:
  - Talk with other players in your government and allied governments to get a picture of what is going on in their domains, both outside and inside the nation.
  - Collect information from the news and press statements.
  - Decide upon and submit Priority Intelligence Requests to your intelligence apparatus.
- Use that information to determine what the enemy is trying to do and what they will do in the future (determine the strategic intent of the enemy).
- Ask fellow players to take actions or convey information to your enemies to deceive the enemy as to the government's true intentions (plan and undertake active deception).

You may only leave your team table to talk to the US Director of National Intelligence, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, and the Philippines Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency. You may also conduct direct talks with the Chinese Minister for State Security with Foreign Ministry and Prime Ministerial approval.



# **Philippines [4 Pax]**

All players receive their role briefing plus the following:

<b>Role</b>	<b>Additional Role Briefings</b>	<b>Additional Briefings</b>
President of the Philippines		NICA COA Assessment
Secretary of Foreign Affairs	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	NICA COA Assessment
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines		NICA COA Assessment
Director-General, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency		NICA COA Assessment



# PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES



## Background

You are the 17<sup>th</sup> President of the Philippines, head of the executive branch and commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, currently 2 years into your single 6-year term. You are the leader of the nation and are the final and utmost authority in the Philippines.

## Role

As President your responsibilities are to:

- Lead the nation through this crisis!
- Oversee the conduct of the crisis and your subordinates.
- Conduct direct diplomacy with allies and partners (and potentially enemies).
- Ensure that you come out of this crisis looking good politically.

As the Commander-in-Chief your responsibilities are to:

- Oversee the conduct of the military.
- Authorize any high impact cyberattacks.

You are allowed to leave your team table to meet other Heads of State (except Xi Jinping, who you may communicate with by note only).



# SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS



## Overview

You are the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, head of the Department of Foreign Affairs (*Kagawaran ng Ugnayang Panlabas*), tasked with directing and conducting the nation's diplomacy. As the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs, you are the most senior diplomat in the Government.

## Department of Foreign Affairs Organization

Department of Foreign Affairs is organized into 8 policy and geographic offices, and 13 internal offices and units:

- Office of International Economic Relations
- Office of American Affairs
- Office of Asian and Pacific Affairs
- Office of European Affairs
- Office of Middle East and African Affairs
- Office of ASEAN Affairs
- Office of United Nations and International Organizations
- Maritime and Ocean Affairs Office
- Internal Offices

## Role

As the Secretary of Foreign Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Keep the Philippines and the Filipino people safe!
- Ensure the status quo balance of power continues in the Pacific.
- Support the Prime Minister by conducting diplomacy with all nations and keep the Prime Minister updated as to what is going on internationally.
  - Liaise with our allies (most importantly the US) to keep our security guarantees in place.
  - Engage with Chinese diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be and forestall them from moving aggressively against us.
- Ensure that all actions taken by the Philippines are justified as being in line with international law.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES



## Background

You are the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the highest-ranking military officer in the Philippines. You oversee all branches of the armed forces (Army, Air Force, Navy–Marine Corps) and have complete operational control, being responsible for the overall operations of the AFP.

## Role

As the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, your responsibilities are to:

- Protect the People and Security of the Philippines.
- Advise, assist, and keep the President abreast on all military affairs and ensure that the strategy set by the President is carried out.
- Oversee all military forces of the Philippines.
- Engage the US to maintain your security guarantees and support. The Philippines military is not cut out for high intensity combat operations against superior adversaries like China.

Under your command are the following:

- All air, naval, and ground units.
- All cyber assets (though some may require authorization by the President).
- The AFP's special forces.
- All additional military assets.

These can be delegated to others as you see fit.



# DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY



## Background

As the Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, you sit at the combined nexus of efforts of the military and governmental intelligence efforts of the Philippines. Your job is to take in all available intelligence and attempt to understand what the enemy will do next and why.

## Role

As Director-General you have three main activities:

1. To keep the President, government, and military informed of the situation.
2. To determine the strategic intent of the enemy.
3. To plan and conduct deception of the enemy as to your own strategic intent.

You do this by:

- Collecting and analyzing intelligence:
  - Talk with other players in your government and allied governments to get a picture of what is going on in their domains, both outside and inside the nation.
  - Collect information from the news and press statements.
  - Decide upon and submit Priority Intelligence Requests to your intelligence apparatus.
- Use that information to determine what the enemy is trying to do and what they will do in the future (determine the strategic intent of the enemy).
- Ask fellow players to take actions or convey information to your enemies to deceive the enemy as to the government's true intentions (plan and undertake active deception).

You may only leave your team table to talk to the US Director of National Intelligence and the Japanese Defense Intelligence Headquarters. You may also conduct direct talks with the Chinese Minister for State Security with Foreign Ministry and Prime Ministerial approval.




# Australia [4 Pax]

All players receive their role briefing plus the following:

<b>Role</b>	<b>Additional Role Briefings</b>	<b>Additional Briefings</b>
Prime Minister of Australia		ASIS COA Assessment
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Legal Briefing Pack  Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	ASIS COA Assessment
Chief of the Defence Force		ASIS COA Assessment
Australian Secret Intelligence Service		ASIS COA Assessment



# PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA



## Background

You are Prime Minister of Australia, head of the government and commander-in-chief of the Australian Defense Force. You are the leader of the nation and are the final and utmost authority in Australia.

## Role

As the Prime Minister of Australia your responsibilities are to:

- Oversee the conduct of the crisis and your subordinates: consider your strategic aims and work with the military and foreign office to implement them.
- Ensure that you keep Australia and Australians safe!
- Uphold the rules-based international order and keep the US-dominant status quo power balance in the Indo-Pacific.
- Conduct diplomacy with all allies and partners.
- Ensure that you come out of this crisis looking good politically.


As the Commander-in-Chief, your responsibilities are to:

- Oversee the conduct of the military.
- Authorize any high impact cyberattacks.

You are allowed to leave your team table to meet other Heads of State (except Xi Jinping)



# MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS



## Background

You are the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and tasked with directing and conducting the nation's diplomacy. As the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you are one of the most senior members of the Cabinet, and the most senior diplomat in the Australian government.

## Role

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Keep Australia and the Australian people safe.
- Support the Prime Minister by conducting diplomacy with all nations and keep the Prime Minister updated as to what is going on.
  - Liaise with our allies (most importantly the US) to keep them in the loop and coordinate actions with them.
  - Engage with Chinese diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.
- Ensure that all actions taken by Australia are justified as being in line with international law.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE



## Background

You are the Chief of the Defence Force, the highest-ranking military officer in Australia. You oversee all branches of the armed forces (Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army, Royal Australian Air Force) and have complete operational control, being responsible for the overall operations of the Australian Defence Force.

## Role

You are the Chief of the Defense Force of Australia; your responsibilities are to:

- Defend the safety and sovereignty of Australia.
- Keep Taiwan free and independent!
- Oversee all military forces of Australia.
- Coordinate with allied militaries to conduct and plan required operations.

Under your command are the following:

- All Australian ground, air, and naval units.
- All cyber assets (though some may require authorization by the Prime Minister).
- The Special Air Service Regiment.
- All additional military assets.

These can be delegated to others as you see fit.

You may leave your table to talk to the Japanese Joint Operations Command, the UK Chief of the Defense Staff, anyone in US INDOPACOM and the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (but not the US Commander of STRATCOM).



# AUSTRALIAN SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE



## Australian Government

### Australian Secret Intelligence Service

#### Background

As the Director of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, you sit at the combined nexus of efforts of the military and governmental intelligence efforts of Australia. Your job is to take in all available intelligence and attempt to understand what the enemy will do next and why.

#### Role

As Director you have three main activities:

4. To keep the Prime Minister, government, and military informed of the situation.
5. To determine the strategic intent of the enemy.
6. To plan and conduct deception of the enemy as to your own strategic intent.

You do this by:

- Collecting and analyzing intelligence:
  - Talk with other players in your government and allied governments to get a picture of what is going on in their domains, both outside and inside the nation.
  - Collect information from the news and press statements.
  - Decide upon and submit Priority Intelligence Requests to your intelligence apparatus.
- Use that information to determine what the enemy is trying to do and what they will do in the future (determine the strategic intent of the enemy).
- Ask fellow players to take actions or convey information to your enemies to deceive the enemy as to the government's true intentions (plan and undertake active deception).

You may only leave your team table to talk to the US Director of National Intelligence and the Japanese Defense Intelligence Headquarters. You may also conduct direct talks with the Chinese Minister for State Security with Foreign Ministry and Prime Ministerial approval.



# **UK [3 Pax]**

All players receive their role briefing plus the following:

<b>Role</b>	<b>Additional Role Briefings</b>	<b>Additional Briefings</b>
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland		MI6 COA Assessment
Foreign Secretary	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Legal Briefing Pack  Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	MI6 COA Assessment
Chief of the Defense Staff		MI6 COA Assessment



# PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND



## Background

You are the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, leader of His Majesty's Government and exercise executive power over the British Armed Forces. You are the leader of the nation and are the final and utmost authority in the UK.

## Role

As the Prime Minister your responsibilities are to:

- Oversee the conduct of the crisis and your subordinates: consider your strategic aims and work with the military and foreign office to implement them.
- Conduct diplomacy with all allies and partners.
- Authorize any high impact cyberattacks.
- Ensure that you come out of this crisis looking good politically.

You are allowed to leave your team table to meet other Heads of State (except Xi Jinping)



# FOREIGN SECRETARY



## Background

You are the Foreign Secretary, the head of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and are tasked with directing and conducting the nation's diplomacy. As the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you are one of the most senior members of the Cabinet, and the most senior diplomat in the UK government.

## Role

As the Foreign Secretary your responsibilities are to:

- Support the Prime Minister by conducting diplomacy with all nations and keep the Prime Minister updated as to what is going on.
  - Liaise with our allies (most importantly the US) to keep them in the loop and coordinate actions with them.
  - Engage with Chinese diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.
- Ensure that all actions taken by the UK are justified as being in line with international law.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# CHIEF OF THE DEFENSE STAFF



## Background

You are the Chief of the Defence Staff, the highest-ranking military officer in the UK. You oversee all branches of the armed forces (Royal Navy, Royal Marines, British Army, Royal Air Force) and have complete operational control, being responsible for the overall operations of the British Armed Forces.

## Role

As the Chief of the Defense Staff your responsibilities are to:

- Advise and assist the Prime Minister on military affairs.
- Oversee all military forces of the UK in theater.
- Coordinate with allied militaries to conduct and plan operations.

Under your command are the following:

- All ground, air, and naval units.
- All space assets.
- All cyber assets (though some are of such high impact or risk to civilians that they require approval from the Prime Minister).
- All special forces.
- All additional military assets.

These can be delegated to others as you see fit.

You may leave your table to talk to the Japanese Joint Operations Command, the Australian Chief of the Defense Force, the French Chef d'Etat-Major des Armées, the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff, anyone in US INDOPACOM and the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (but not the US Commander of STRATCOM).



# **Canada [3 Pax]**

All players receive their role briefing plus the following:

<b>Role</b>	<b>Additional Role Briefings</b>	<b>Additional Briefings</b>
Prime Minister of Canada		CSIS COA Assessment
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	CSIS COA Assessment
Chief of the Defence Staff		CSIS COA Assessment



# PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA

*Premier ministre du Canada*



## Background

You are the Prime Minister of Canada, leader of the government of Canada and functional commander-in-chief of the Canadian Armed Forces. You are the leader of the nation and are the final and utmost authority in Canada.

## Role

As Prime Minister of Canada your responsibilities are to:

- Keep Canada and Canadians safe!
- Uphold the rules-based international order.
- Oversee the conduct of the crisis and your subordinates: consider your strategic aims and work with the military and diplomats to implement them.
- Conduct diplomacy with all allies and partners.

You are allowed to leave your team table to meet other Heads of State (except Xi Jinping)



# MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*Ministre des Affaires étrangères*



## Background

You are the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the head of Global Affairs Canada and tasked with directing and conducting the nation's diplomacy. As the head of Global Affairs Canada, you are one of the most senior members of the Cabinet, and the most senior diplomat in the Canadian government.

## Role

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Support the Prime Minister by conducting diplomacy with all nations and keep the Prime Minister updated as to what is going on.
  - Liaise with our allies (most importantly the US) to keep them in the loop and coordinate actions with them.
  - Engage with Chinese diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.
- Ensure that all actions taken by Canada are consistent with international law.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

*Chef d'état-major de la Défense*



## Background

You are the Chief of the Defence Force, the highest-ranking military officer in Canada. You oversee all branches of the armed forces (Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Air Force) and have complete operational control, being responsible for the overall operations of the Canadian Armed Forces.

## Role

As the Chief of the Defense Force your responsibilities are to:

- Advise and assist the Prime Minister on military affairs.
- Oversee all military forces of Canada in theater.
- Coordinate with allied militaries to conduct and plan operations.
  - Importantly, you have several aircraft squadrons that require a basing agreement to be able to be flown into the region. Movement of ground forces into the theater would also require a basing agreement, and to support a naval deployment long term the Navy would need port access.

Under your command are the following:

- All ground, air, and naval units.
- All space assets.
- All cyber assets (though some are of such high impact or risk to civilians that they require approval from the Prime Minister).
- All special forces.
- All additional military assets.

These can be delegated to others as you see fit.

You may leave your table to talk to the Japanese Joint Operations Command, the UK Chief of the Defense Staff, French Chef d'État-Major des Armées, anyone in US INDOPACOM and the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (but not the US Commander of STRATCOM).



# **France [3 Pax]**


All players receive their role briefing plus the following:

<b>Role</b>	<b>Additional Role Briefings</b>	<b>Additional Briefings</b>
Président de la République française		DGES COA Assessment
Ministre de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères	Formal Diplomatic Language Guide	DGES COA Assessment
Chef d'État-Major des Armées		DGES COA Assessment



# PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

*(President of the French Republic)*



## Background

You are the President of France, head of the executive branch and commander-in-chief of the French Armed Forces. You are the leader of the nation and are the final and utmost authority in France.

## Role

As President of France, your responsibilities are to:

- Keep France safe!
- Uphold the rules-based international order.
- Oversee the conduct of the crisis and your subordinates: consider your strategic aims and work with the military and diplomats to implement them.
- Conduct diplomacy with all allies and partners.

You are allowed to leave your team table to meet other Heads of State (except Xi Jinping)



# MINISTRE DE L'EUROPE ET DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

*(Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs)*



## MINISTÈRE DE L'EUROPE ET DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

### Background

You are the Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs, the head of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs and tasked with directing and conducting the nation's diplomacy. As the head of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, you are one of the most senior members of the Cabinet, and the most senior diplomat in the French government.

### Role

As the Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs your responsibilities are to:

- Support the President by conducting diplomacy with all nations and keep the President updated as to what is going on.
  - Liaise with our allies to keep them in the loop and coordinate actions with them.
  - Engage with Chinese diplomats and leaders to try to glean what their next move will be.
- Ensure that all actions taken by France are justified as being in line with international law.

You are allowed to leave your team table.



# CHEF D'ÉTAT-MAJOR DES ARMÉES

*(Chief of the Defence Staff)*



## Background

You are the Chef d'État-Major des Armées, the highest-ranking military officer in France. You oversee all branches of the armed forces (French Army, French Navy, French Air and Space Force, National Gendarmerie) and have complete operational control, being responsible for the overall operations of the French Armed Forces.

## Role

As the Chief of the Defense Staff your responsibilities are to:

- Advise and assist the President on military affairs.
- Oversee all military forces of France in theater.
- Coordinate with allied militaries to conduct and plan operations.
  - Importantly, you have several aircraft squadrons that require a basing agreement to be able to be flown into the region. Movement of ground forces into the theater would also require a basing agreement, and to support a naval deployment long term the Navy would need port access.

Under your command are the following:

- All ground, air, and naval units.
- All space assets.
- All cyber assets (though some are of such high impact or risk to civilians that they require approval from the President).
- All special forces.
- All additional military assets.

These can be delegated to others as you see fit.

You may leave your table to talk to the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff, the UK Chief of the Defense Staff, anyone in US INDOPACOM and the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (but not the US Commander of STRATCOM).



# COA Documents



# NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY

## ASSESSMENT: POSSIBLE CHINESE COA's



The following is classified DARKBLUE//DARKBLUE:

It is currently assessed that the following are possible major Chinese courses of action (COA).

The Most Likely COA (MLCOA), and Most Dangerous Enemy COA (MDECOA) at this time are marked for each major possible category of action.

- Blockade COA's
  - Continuation of the blockade at current levels, if nothing is done to counter this then Taiwan will be short of fuel and food in 5-7 months.
  - Attempts to legitimize the blockade through diplomatic support in various international forums by drawing on international allies.
  - [MLCOA] Expansion of the blockade to block Taiwanese access to outlying islands.
  - [MDECOA] Expansion of the blockade to include mining of Taiwanese ports and/or strikes on ports to prevent ships from entering Taiwan.
  - Expansion of the blockade to include dissuasion of potential airlift into Taiwan and/or strikes on airports to prevent their use.
- Expanded Non-Invasion COA's
  - Kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against selected Taiwanese political targets to destabilize or force capitulation of Taiwan.
  - [MLCOA] Kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against Taiwanese CNI and food and fuel stockpiles to force capitulation. Given Taiwan's fuel storage is above ground and is highly centralized this is an extremely dangerous COA for Taiwan.
  - Attacks on Taiwanese political, governmental, and/or economic targets to reduce Taiwanese will to fight and enforce capitulation.
  - Strikes on Taiwanese military units, C2 nodes, and headquarters to degrade the ability of the Taiwanese military to retaliate or attempt to force a blockade.
  - [MDECOA] Preemptive strikes on Taiwanese ally's military to degrade the capability to intervene in a war between China and Taiwan.
- Invasion COA's
  - [MLCOA] Seizure of outlying Taiwanese islands close to the Chinese coast (Kinmen or Matsu). Given the comparatively small garrisons on the islands in relation to the force China is able to bring to bear such actions have a high likelihood of success.
  - [MDECOA] Full or partial mobilization to prepare for a full invasion of mainland Taiwan for when the next invasion window comes.
- Other COA's or variations on the above listed COA's are possible.



# NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU ASSESSMENT: POSSIBLE CHINESE COA's



The following is classified DARKBLUE//DARKBLUE:

It is currently assessed that the following are possible major Chinese courses of action (COA). The Most Likely COA (MLCOA), and Most Dangerous Enemy COA (MDECOA) at this time are marked for each major possible category of action.

- Blockade COA's
  - Continuation of the blockade at current levels, if nothing is done to counter this then Taiwan will be short of fuel and food in 5-7 months.
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  - Expansion of the blockade to include dissuasion of potential airlift into Taiwan and/or strikes on airports to prevent their use.
- Expanded Non-Invasion COA's
  - Kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against selected Taiwanese political targets to destabilize or force capitulation of Taiwan.
  - [MLCOA] Kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against Taiwanese CNI and food and fuel stockpiles to force capitulation. Given Taiwan's fuel storage is above ground and is highly centralized this is an extremely dangerous COA for Taiwan.
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  - [MDECOA] Strikes on Taiwanese military units, C2 nodes, and headquarters to degrade the ability of the Taiwanese military to retaliate or attempt to force a blockade.
  - Preemptive strikes on Taiwanese ally's military to degrade the capability to intervene in a war between China and Taiwan.
- Invasion COA's
  - [MLCOA] Seizure of outlying Taiwanese islands close to the Chinese coast (Kinmen or Matsu). Given the comparatively small garrisons on the islands in relation to the force China is able to bring to bear such actions have a high likelihood of success.
  - [MDECOA] Full or partial mobilization to prepare for a full invasion of mainland Taiwan for when the next invasion window comes.
- Other COA's or variations on the above listed COA's are possible.



# DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE HEADQUARTERS

## ASSESSMENT: POSSIBLE CHINESE COA's



The following is classified DARKBLUE//DARKBLUE:

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- Blockade COA's
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  - Strikes on Taiwanese military units, C2 nodes, and headquarters to degrade the ability of the Taiwanese military to retaliate or attempt to force a blockade.
  - [MDECOA] Preemptive strikes on Taiwanese ally's military to degrade the capability to intervene in a war between China and Taiwan.
- Invasion COA's
  - [MLCOA] Seizure of outlying Taiwanese islands close to the Chinese coast (Kinmen or Matsu). Given the comparatively small garrisons on the islands in relation to the force China is able to bring to bear such actions have a high likelihood of success.
  - [MDECOA] Full or partial mobilization to prepare for a full invasion of mainland Taiwan for when the next invasion window comes.
- Other COA's or variations on the above listed COA's are possible.



# DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT: POSSIBLE CHINESE COA's



The following is classified DARKBLUE//DARKBLUE:

It is currently assessed that the following are possible major Chinese courses of action (COA). The Most Likely COA (MLCOA), and Most Dangerous Enemy COA (MDECOA) at this time are marked for each major possible category of action.

- Blockade COA's
  - Continuation of the blockade at current levels, if nothing is done to counter this then Taiwan will be short of fuel and food in 5-7 months.
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- Expanded Non-Invasion COA's
  - Kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against selected Taiwanese political targets to destabilize or force capitulation of Taiwan.
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  - Strikes on Taiwanese military units, C2 nodes, and headquarters to degrade the ability of the Taiwanese military to retaliate or attempt to force a blockade.
  - [MDECOA] Preemptive strikes on Taiwanese ally's military to degrade the capability to intervene in a war between China and Taiwan.
- Invasion COA's
  - [MLCOA] Seizure of outlying Taiwanese islands close to the Chinese coast (Kinmen or Matsu). Given the comparatively small garrisons on the islands in relation to the force China is able to bring to bear such actions have a high likelihood of success.
  - [MDECOA] Full or partial mobilization to prepare for a full invasion of mainland Taiwan for when the next invasion window comes.
- Other COA's or variations on the above listed COA's are possible.



# AUSTRALIAN SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

## ASSESSMENT: POSSIBLE CHINESE COA's



**Australian Government**

**Australian Secret Intelligence Service**

The following is classified DARKBLUE//DARKBLUE:

It is currently assessed that the following are possible major Chinese courses of action (COA). The Most Likely COA (MLCOA), and Most Dangerous Enemy COA (MDECOA) at this time are marked for each major possible category of action.

- Blockade COA's
  - Continuation of the blockade at current levels, if nothing is done to counter this then Taiwan will be short of fuel and food in 5-7 months.
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  - [MDECOA] Expansion of the blockade to include mining of Taiwanese ports and/or strikes on ports to prevent ships from entering Taiwan.
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- Expanded Non-Invasion COA's
  - [MLCOA] Kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against selected Taiwanese political targets to destabilize or force capitulation of Taiwan.
  - Kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against Taiwanese CNI and food and fuel stockpiles to force capitulation. Given Taiwan's fuel storage is above ground and is highly centralized this is an extremely dangerous COA for Taiwan.
  - Attacks on Taiwanese political, governmental, and/or economic targets to reduce Taiwanese will to fight and enforce capitulation.
  - Strikes on Taiwanese military units, C2 nodes, and headquarters to degrade the ability of the Taiwanese military to retaliate or attempt to force a blockade.
  - [MDECOA] Preemptive strikes on Taiwanese ally's military to degrade the capability to intervene in a war between China and Taiwan.
- Invasion COA's
  - [MLCOA] Seizure of outlying Taiwanese islands close to the Chinese coast (Kinmen or Matsu). Given the comparatively small garrisons on the islands in relation to the force China is able to bring to bear such actions have a high likelihood of success.
  - [MDECOA] Full or partial mobilization to prepare for a full invasion of mainland Taiwan for when the next invasion window comes.
- Other COA's or variations on the above listed COA's are possible.



# SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ASSESSMENT: POSSIBLE CHINESE COA's



## SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MI6

The following is classified DARKBLUE//DARKBLUE:

It is currently assessed that the following are possible major Chinese courses of action (COA). The Most Likely COA (MLCOA), and Most Dangerous Enemy COA (MDECOA) at this time are marked for each major possible category of action.

- Blockade COA's
  - Continuation of the blockade at current levels, if nothing is done to counter this then Taiwan will be short of fuel and food in 5-7 months.
  - Attempts to legitimize the blockade through diplomatic support in various international forums by drawing on international allies.
  - Expansion of the blockade to block Taiwanese access to outlying islands.
  - [MDECOA] Expansion of the blockade to include mining of Taiwanese ports and/or strikes on ports to prevent ships from entering Taiwan.
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- Expanded Non-Invasion COA's
  - [MLCOA] Kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against selected Taiwanese political targets to destabilize or force capitulation of Taiwan.
  - Kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against Taiwanese CNI and food and fuel stockpiles to force capitulation. Given Taiwan's fuel storage is above ground and is highly centralized this is an extremely dangerous COA for Taiwan.
  - Attacks on Taiwanese political, governmental, and/or economic targets to reduce Taiwanese will to fight and enforce capitulation.
  - Strikes on Taiwanese military units, C2 nodes, and headquarters to degrade the ability of the Taiwanese military to retaliate or attempt to force a blockade.
  - [MDECOA] Preemptive strikes on Taiwanese ally's military to degrade the capability to intervene in a war between China and Taiwan.
- Invasion COA's
  - [MLCOA] Seizure of outlying Taiwanese islands close to the Chinese coast (Kinmen or Matsu). Given the comparatively small garrisons on the islands in relation to the force China is able to bring to bear such actions have a high likelihood of success.
  - [MDECOA] Full or partial mobilization to prepare for a full invasion of mainland Taiwan for when the next invasion window comes.
- Other COA's or variations on the above listed COA's are possible.



# DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL SECURITY

## ASSESSMENT: POSSIBLE CHINESE COA's



The following is classified DARKBLUE//DARKBLUE:

It is currently assessed that the following are possible major Chinese courses of action (COA). The Most Likely COA (MLCOA), and Most Dangerous Enemy COA (MDECOA) at this time are marked for each major possible category of action.

- Blockade COA's
  - Continuation of the blockade at current levels, if nothing is done to counter this then Taiwan will be short of fuel and food in 5-7 months.
  - [MLCOA] Attempts to legitimize the blockade through diplomatic support in various international forums by drawing on international allies.
  - Expansion of the blockade to block Taiwanese access to outlying islands.
  - [MDECOA] Expansion of the blockade to include mining of Taiwanese ports and/or strikes on ports to prevent ships from entering Taiwan.
  - Expansion of the blockade to include dissuasion of potential airlift into Taiwan and/or strikes on airports to prevent their use.
- Expanded Non-Invasion COA's
  - Kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against selected Taiwanese political targets to destabilize or force capitulation of Taiwan.
  - [MLCOA] Kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against Taiwanese CNI and food and fuel stockpiles to force capitulation. Given Taiwan's fuel storage is above ground and is highly centralized this is an extremely dangerous COA for Taiwan.
  - Attacks on Taiwanese political, governmental, and/or economic targets to reduce Taiwanese will to fight and enforce capitulation.
  - Strikes on Taiwanese military units, C2 nodes, and headquarters to degrade the ability of the Taiwanese military to retaliate or attempt to force a blockade.
  - [MDECOA] Preemptive strikes on Taiwanese ally's military to degrade the capability to intervene in a war between China and Taiwan.
- Invasion COA's
  - [MLCOA] Seizure of outlying Taiwanese islands close to the Chinese coast (Kinmen or Matsu). Given the comparatively small garrisons on the islands in relation to the force China is able to bring to bear such actions have a high likelihood of success.
  - [MDECOA] Full or partial mobilization to prepare for a full invasion of mainland Taiwan for when the next invasion window comes.
- Other COA's or variations on the above listed COA's are possible.



# CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

## ASSESSMENT: POSSIBLE CHINESE COA's



The following is classified DARKBLUE//DARKBLUE:

It is currently assessed that the following are possible major Chinese courses of action (COA). The Most Likely COA (MLCOA), and Most Dangerous Enemy COA (MDECOA) at this time are marked for each major possible category of action.

- Blockade COA's
  - Continuation of the blockade at current levels, if nothing is done to counter this then Taiwan will be short of fuel and food in 5-7 months.
  - Attempts to legitimize the blockade through diplomatic support in various international forums by drawing on international allies.
  - Expansion of the blockade to block Taiwanese access to outlying islands.
  - [MDECOA] Expansion of the blockade to include mining of Taiwanese ports and/or strikes on ports to prevent ships from entering Taiwan.
  - [MLCOA] Expansion of the blockade to include dissuasion of potential airlift into Taiwan and/or strikes on airports to prevent their use.
- Expanded Non-Invasion COA's
  - [MLCOA] Kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against selected Taiwanese political targets to destabilize or force capitulation of Taiwan.
  - Kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against Taiwanese CNI and food and fuel stockpiles to force capitulation. Given Taiwan's fuel storage is above ground and is highly centralized this is an extremely dangerous COA for Taiwan.
  - Attacks on Taiwanese political, governmental, and/or economic targets to reduce Taiwanese will to fight and enforce capitulation.
  - Strikes on Taiwanese military units, C2 nodes, and headquarters to degrade the ability of the Taiwanese military to retaliate or attempt to force a blockade.
  - [MDECOA] Preemptive strikes on Taiwanese ally's military to degrade the capability to intervene in a war between China and Taiwan.
- Invasion COA's
  - [MLCOA] Seizure of outlying Taiwanese islands close to the Chinese coast (Kinmen or Matsu). Given the comparatively small garrisons on the islands in relation to the force China is able to bring to bear such actions have a high likelihood of success.
  - [MDECOA] Full or partial mobilization to prepare for a full invasion of mainland Taiwan for when the next invasion window comes.
- Other COA's or variations on the above listed COA's are possible.



# CMC ASSESSMENT: POSSIBLE COA's



The following is classified DARKBLUE//DARKBLUE:

It is currently assessed that the following are possible major courses of action (COA) are available to us. Not all COA's are mutually exclusive.

## Blockade COA's

- **Continuation** – Continuation of the blockade at current levels, if nothing is done to remove the blockade or lessen Taiwanese stockpiles, Taiwan will be short of fuel and food in 5-7 months.
- **International Recognition** – Attempt recognition of sovereignty of Taiwan and the legitimacy of the Customs Inspection Zone. This will dissuade others from interfering and thus force Taiwanese capitulation. The success of this COA is believed to be very unlikely, but it is costless to have the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempt to carry out.
- **Port Denial** – Expand the blockade by preventing port usage on Taiwan.
  - **Option 1:** Mining by air or submarine of Taiwanese ports. Attempts by air will be detected and submarines are likely to be detected.
  - **Option 2:** Strikes on ports by aircraft or missiles to destroy infrastructure to prevent ships from using Taiwanese ports.
- **Outlying Island Blockade** – Expand the blockade to block Taiwanese access to outlying islands by interdicting them with Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia.

## Expanded Non-Invasion COA's

- **Destabilization** – Conduct kinetic and/or non-kinetic attacks against selected Taiwanese political targets (symbolic infrastructure or HVT's) to destabilize or force capitulation of Taiwan. May include targeting of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).
- **Reduction of Taiwanese Stockpiles** – Conduct kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against Taiwanese CNI and food and fuel stockpiles to force capitulation. Given Taiwan's fuel storage is above ground and is highly centralized this is an extremely dangerous COA for Taiwan.
- **Large Scale Strikes** – Conduct kinetic and/or non-kinetic attacks on a broader swath of Taiwanese political, governmental, and/or economic targets to reduce Taiwanese will to fight and force capitulation.
- **Joint Firepower Strike** – Conduct kinetic and non-kinetic strikes on Taiwanese headquarters, C2 nodes, military units, and military stocks and infrastructure to degrade the ability of the Taiwanese military to retaliate or attempt to force a blockade.

- **Joint Firepower Strike (Counter Intervention)** – Conduct preemptive kinetic and non-kinetic strikes on Taiwanese ally's military forces and infrastructure to degrade the capability to intervene in a war between China and Taiwan.

### Invasion COA's

- **Seizure of Outlying Islands** – Seizure of outlying Taiwanese islands close to the Chinese coast (Kinmen and/or Matsu Islands). Given relatively weak garrisons on the islands in comparison to PLA forces such actions have a high likelihood of success and would demonstrate the Taiwanese government's weakness. Planning estimates are 2 days minimum to prepare a minimum of 1 (Kinmen) or 2 marine brigades (Matsu Islands). Expected resistance is 1-3 days at minimum at 21 days at most.
- **Invasion of Mainland Taiwan** – Full or partial mobilization to prepare for a full invasion of mainland Taiwan.
  - **Option 1 – Invade North**
    - *Advantages:* The political Center of Gravity is in Taipei, good availability of ports, airfields, and beaches.
    - *Disadvantages:* The terrain is unsuitable for rapid advance and the creation of a large beachhead. The majority of the ROC Army is stationed north and trained to counter this option.
  - **Option 2 – Invade South**
    - *Advantages:* The biggest port in Taiwan is located in Tainan, and good availability of airports and seaports, good initial terrain for beachhead.
    - *Disadvantages:* Far from political center of gravity and given terrain (mountains, rivers, and urban) would force a slow attritional march up the island.

Other COA's or variations on the above listed COA's are possible.

## **Additional Documents**



# MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA NEGOTIATION POSITIONS

The following is classified PURPLECOVERT//PURPLECOVERT:

Work by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has determined that in the event of hostilities a number of possible negotiation positions exist. These are given in order of best to worst both in terms of outcome, but also the ability to avoid political blowback against the Party.

1. *Formal Recognition of Taiwanese Independence:* China formally recognizes Taiwan as an independent country. Chinese troops withdraw from all Taiwanese territory they hold, and a formal cessation of hostilities occurs.
2. *De Facto Recognition of Taiwanese Independence:* China de facto recognizes Taiwan as an independent country and will not block recognition of Taiwan as a country by others (including in the UN or other international bodies). Chinese troops withdraw from all Taiwanese territory they hold, and a formal cessation of hostilities occurs.
3. *PLA Surrender:* PLA troops ashore on mainland Taiwan and outlying islands surrender and become prisoners. Hostilities cease.
4. *Permanent Ceasefire – Conditions Imposed on China:* China will respect certain political and/or military conditions imposed on them in exchange for a permanent ceasefire and (if applicable) withdrawal of PLA troops from mainland Taiwan.
5. *Permanent Ceasefire – PLA Withdrawal:* The United States (and other combatants) allow PLA troops to withdraw from sovereign Taiwanese territory, and any Chinese prisoners of war are returned in stages. A cessation of hostilities occurs.
6. Depending on if a War is going Favorably:
  - a. *(If Favorable) Temporary Ceasefire:* All forces maintain current positions for the duration of the ceasefire. Note if PLA troops are present on mainland Taiwan this could allow consolidation of a PRC beachhead/enclave on Taiwan depending on the length of the ceasefire. Conditions about not allowing reinforcement/resupply of the beachhead/enclave should be considered.
  - b. *(If Unfavorable) Permanent Ceasefire – POW Exchange:* A permanent ceasefire intended to end the conflict (like the Korean War). As above this could allow a PRC enclave on Taiwan. Prisoners of war (POW's) are exchanged through a mutually agreed upon 3<sup>rd</sup> party country.
7. *Recognition of Outlying Islands:* The sovereignty of Taiwanese outlying islands is ceded to the CCP, and a cessation of hostilities occurs.
8. *Permanent Ceasefire – Conditions Imposed on Taiwan:* Favorable conditions are imposed upon the Taiwanese government by the PRC reducing the autonomy and/or freedom of Taiwan in exchange for a cessation of hostilities (enforced neutrality, puppet government, or one country, two systems).
9. *(Invasion Only) Recognition of Chinese Enclave:* The control of territory seized by the Chinese on Taiwan (and outlying islands) is ceded to the CCP creating a Chinese enclave on Taiwan. A cessation of hostilities occurs.
10. *Ceasefire – US Withdrawal:* The United States agrees to withdraw from the conflict if a cessation of hostilities occurs. De facto CCP dominance over the Taiwan and the region will thus occur.
11. *Surrender:* The Government of the Republic of China agrees to a formal surrender of forces engaged in the conflict and cessation of hostilities.

As part of a larger agreement or a separate agreement, exchange of POW's, captured personal, or detained individuals (spies, businessmen, civilians, etc.) may occur. Exchanges may occur in any desired manner and may be publicized or unpublicized as required by the situation. It will be easier to secure the release of women and children than men, sick and wounded easier than healthy, and lower ranks over higher ranks.

These were determined by extensive analysis and work by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but are intended as starting points for actual negotiation work and positions should be tailored as needed.



# DEPARTMENT OF STATE NEGOTIATION POSITIONS



The following is classified PURPLECOVERT//PURPLECOVERT:

Work by the Department of State has determined that in the event of hostilities a number of possible negotiation positions exist. These are given in order of best to worst both in terms of outcome, but also the ability to avoid political blowback against the administration.

1. *PLA Surrender*: PLA troops ashore on mainland Taiwan and outlying islands surrender and become prisoners. China removes personal and facilities from disputed islands in the South China Sea. Hostilities cease.
2. *Permanent Ceasefire – Conditions Imposed on China*: China will respect certain political and/or military conditions imposed on them in exchange for a permanent ceasefire and (if applicable) withdrawal of PLA troops from mainland Taiwan.
3. *Permanent Ceasefire – PLA Withdrawal*: The United States (and other combatants) allow PLA troops to withdraw from sovereign Taiwanese territory, and any Chinese prisoners of war are returned in stages. A cessation of hostilities occurs.
4. Depending on if the War is going Favorably:
  - a. *(If Favorable) Temporary Ceasefire*: All forces maintain current positions for the duration of the ceasefire. Note: if PLA troops are present on mainland Taiwan this could allow consolidation of a PRC-controlled beachhead or enclave on Taiwan depending on the length of the ceasefire. Conditions about not allowing reinforcement of the beachhead/enclave should be considered.


OR
  - b. *(If Unfavorable) Permanent Ceasefire – POW Exchange*: A permanent ceasefire intended to end the conflict (like the Korean War). As above this could allow a PRC enclave on Taiwan. Prisoners of war (POW's) are exchanged through a mutually agreed upon 3<sup>rd</sup> party country.
5. *(Limited Conflict Only) Recognition of Outlying Islands*: The sovereignty of Taiwanese outlying islands is ceded to the CCP, and a cessation of hostilities occurs.
6. *Permanent Ceasefire – Conditions Imposed on Taiwan*: Unfavorable conditions are imposed upon the government of Taiwan by the PRC reducing the autonomy and/or freedom of Taiwan in exchange for a cessation of hostilities.
7. *(Invasion Only) Recognition of Chinese Enclave*: The control of territory seized by the Chinese on Taiwan (and outlying islands) is ceded to the CCP creating a Chinese enclave on Taiwan. A cessation of hostilities occurs.
8. *Ceasefire – US Withdrawal*: The United States agrees to withdraw from the conflict, leading to cessation of hostilities and CCP dominance over the region.
9. *US Surrender*: The United States agrees to a formal surrender of forces engaged in the conflict and cessation of hostilities.

As part of a larger agreement or a separate agreement, exchange of POW's, captured personal, or detained individuals (spies, businessmen, civilians, etc.) may occur. Exchanges may occur in any desired manner and may be publicized or unpublicized as required by the situation. It will be easier to secure the release of women and children than men, sick and wounded easier than healthy, and lower ranks over higher ranks.

These were determined by extensive analysis and work by the Department of State but are intended as starting points for actual negotiation work and positions should be tailored as needed.



# MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA NEGOTIATION POSITIONS



The following is classified PURPLECOVERT//PURPLECOVERT:

Work by the MFA has determined that in the event of hostilities a number of possible negotiation positions exist. These are given in order of best to worst both in terms of outcome, but also the ability to avoid the humiliation of the CCP.

1. *US Surrender*: The United States (and/or other actors) agree to a formal surrender of forces engaged in the conflict, and cessation of hostilities.
2. *Ceasefire – US or Taiwanese Withdrawal*: The United States (and consequently other combatants) or Taiwan agree to withdraw from the conflict, leading to cessation of hostilities and CCP dominance over the region.
3. *(Limited Conflict Only) Recognition of Outlying Islands*: The sovereignty of Taiwanese outlying islands is ceded to the CCP, and a cessation of hostilities occurs.
4. *(Invasion Only) Recognition of Chinese Enclave*: The control of liberated territory on Taiwan (and outlying islands) is ceded to the CCP creating a Chinese enclave on Taiwan. A cessation of hostilities occurs.
5. *Permanent Ceasefire – Conditions Imposed*: The US and/or Taiwan will respect certain political conditions imposed on them in exchange for a permanent ceasefire and (if applicable) withdrawal of PLA troops from mainland Taiwan.
6. Depending on if the War is going Favorably:
  - a. *(If Favorable) Temporary Ceasefire*: All forces maintain current positions for the duration of the ceasefire. If troops are present on mainland Taiwan this would allow consolidation of a PRC-controlled beachhead or enclave on Taiwan depending on the length of the ceasefire.

OR
  - b. *(If Unfavorable) Permanent Ceasefire – POW Exchange*: A permanent ceasefire intended to end the conflict (like the Korean War). As above this would allow a PRC enclave on Taiwan. Prisoners of war (POW's) are exchanged through a mutually agreed upon 3<sup>rd</sup> party country.
7. *Permanent Ceasefire – PLA Phased Withdrawal*: The United States (and other actors) allow PLA troops to withdraw from any liberated ground, and any Chinese prisoners of war are returned in stages. A cessation of hostilities occurs.
8. *PLA Surrender*: PLA troops ashore on liberated ground surrender and become prisoners. Hostilities cease.

As part of a larger agreement or a separate agreement, exchange of POW's, captured personal, or detained individuals (spies, businessmen, civilians, etc.) may occur. Exchanges may occur in any desired manner and may be publicized or unpublicized as required by the situation. It will

be easier to secure the release of women and children than men, sick and wounded easier than healthy, and lower ranks over higher ranks.

These were determined by extensive analysis and work by the MFA but are intended as starting points for actual negotiation work and positions should be tailored as needed.

# TAIWANESE MOBILIZATION BRIEFING



Under the Gu'an (Solid and Secure) OPLANs (Operational Plans), a number of options are available in terms of mobilization of the Taiwanese Armed Forces:

## Mobilization

The President or the Minister of National Defense with approval from the President may issue mobilization orders for the following categories of reservists to be called up.

- *A-Level Reservists* – Reservists to fill in gaps in already manned infantry brigades allowing 9 well equipped brigades to be fully readied for combat.
- *B-Level Reservists* – Reservists who are active duty personal currently in detached duty in the professional military education system allowing for 2 infantry brigades to be readied for combat.
- *C-Level Reservists* – Reservists from local areas who will be mobilized to defend their hometowns in small units. These troops are made of older and less well-trained reservists and will fight as light infantry providing rear area security, immediate response to air landings, and additional combat power and manpower. They cannot be easily moved long distances as they have no organic transport. Total mobilization will be 18 brigades of troops.
- *D-Level Reservists* – Reservists from soldiers of the mobilization structure, e.g., military police and administrative units. If they are called up mobilization of previously unmobilized other units (C-Level especially) will be slower. Total mobilization will be 3 brigades of troops.

Full mobilization also includes a number of ships, transport vehicles, and call ups of reserve firefighting personnel.

## Aircraft Dispersal

The President, or the Minister of National Defense without prior approval from the President may order the dispersal of the Air Force to operate from highways. Doing so will dramatically increase the survivability of the Air Force but will substantially lessen the sortie rate and planes will be able to carry less fuel, missiles, and bombs.

## Naval Dispersal

The President, or the Minister of National Defense without prior approval from the President may order the dispersal of the Navy from ports. Doing so will dramatically increase the survivability of the Navy.

On orders from the President, the Minister of National Defense or the General Staff, if a war is believed imminent within 72 hours, orders may be issued to begin naval mining of likely routes of approach of the enemy and off of beaches, as well as ports.

## Coast Guard

On the orders of the President, the Minister of National Defense or the General Staff with the agreement of the Minister of the Interior, if a State of War is declared, the Coast Guard Administration may come under the authority of the Ministry of National Defense.

On the same authority, the Anping-class coast guard cutters (civilian versions of Tuo Jiang-class corvettes) may enter Zuoying Military Port and be refitted into missile boats taking 10 days.

## **Infrastructure**

On orders from the President, the Minister of National Defense or the General Staff, if a war is believed imminent within 72 hours, orders may be issued to begin preparation to destroy and damage key port, airport, and other military or dual-use infrastructure should it become critical to do so.

# MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR BRIEFING PACK



## Responsibilities and Authorities<sup>34</sup>

As per Chapter 1, Article 3 of Taiwan's Disaster Prevention and Protection Act (amended date May 22, 2019): Prevention, response, and recovery for all types of the disasters, the following agencies shall be the central regulating authorities for the disaster prevention and protection:

1. *Ministry of the Interior*
  - a. Windstorm, earthquake (including soil liquefaction), fire, explosion, and volcanic disaster.
2. *Ministry of Economic Affairs*
  - a. Flooding, drought, mining disasters, industrial pipeline disaster, public gas, fuel pipeline and power transmission line failure
3. *Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan*
  - a. Frost, debris flow, forest fire, animal and plant diseases
4. *Ministry of Transportation and Communications*
  - a. Air crash, shipwreck, and land traffic accidents
5. *Environmental Protection Administration, Executive Yuan*
  - a. Toxic Chemical Materials and suspended particulate disaster
6. *Ministry of Health and Welfare*
  - a. Biological disaster
7. *Atomic Energy Council*
  - a. Radiation disaster
8. Other disasters: the central regulating authorities of Disaster Prevention and Protection business designated by Central Disasters Prevention and Protection Council.

In addition, Article 34 states that the Taiwanese military will assist in disaster relief if needed (the military frequently does so)

## Ministry of The Interior<sup>35</sup>

- Department of Conscription Administration
- National Airborne Service Corps
  - 3 x Brigades (1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade) of Search and Rescue Helicopters
- National Fire Agency (Emergency Relevant Capabilities)
  - The National Fire Agency is the primary agency in charge of disaster planning and response. Notability, the fire agency is also responsible for disaster response and consequently also has those duties.
  - Support Capabilities
    - 1 x Planning Division
    - 1 x Civilian Coordination Division
    - 1 x Central Emergency Operation Center
  - Disaster Response

<sup>34</sup> Taiwan's Disaster Preparedness and Response: Strengths, Shortfalls, and Paths to Improvement, Leo Bosner and I-wei Jennifer Chang, October 2020, <https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/GTI-Taiwans-Disaster-Preparedness-and-Response-Oct-2020-final-1.pdf>, pg. 9-10

<sup>35</sup> For an overview see 2023 Outline of the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of the Interior, November 2023, [https://ws.moi.gov.tw/001/Upload/400/RefFile/0/31/2023-MOI-web/2023ebook\\_en/index.html](https://ws.moi.gov.tw/001/Upload/400/RefFile/0/31/2023-MOI-web/2023ebook_en/index.html)

- 1 x Disaster Management Division
  - 1 x Disaster Rescue Division
- Specialist Capabilities
  - 1 x Hazardous Material Management Division
  - 1 x Special Search and Rescue Team
  - 4 x Harbor Fire Brigades (Keelung, Taichung, Kaohsiung, Hualien)
  - 1 x Emergency Medical Service Division
- Local Fire Services
- National Police Agency (Emergency Relevant Capabilities)
  - Public Relations Office
  - Local Police Forces
    - Local Police, and if in large area (cities), Riot Police.
    - Large cities will have a SWAT team (called a Thunder Team).
    - Each township, village, and city (all 367) have a mobile trucking radio network system.<sup>36</sup>
  - National Highway Police Bureau
  - Railway Police Bureau
  - 1<sup>st</sup> Special Police Corps
    - 2 x Special Operations Groups (SWAT)
    - Regular and Riot Police
  - 2<sup>nd</sup> Special Police Corps<sup>37</sup>
    - Tasked with infrastructure protection.
  - 4<sup>th</sup> Special Police Corps
    - 1 x Special Operation Groups (SWAT)
    - Riot Police
  - 5<sup>th</sup> Special Police Corps
    - 1 x Special Operation Groups (SWAT)
    - Riot Police
  - 6<sup>th</sup> Special Police Corps<sup>38</sup>
    - 4 x Guard Bn's for VIP's and Infrastructure in Taipei
- Coast Guard Administration
  - Cutters and Patrol Boats
    - 4 x 5,000-ton
    - 2 x 3,000-ton
    - 3 x 2,000-ton
    - 11 x 1,000-ton
    - 8 x 600-ton Anping class (for wartime will undergo conversion into missile boats)
    - 4 x 500-ton
    - 206 x under 100-ton boats
  - Other Equipment
    - 20 x medium fixed-wing ISR UAV
  - Helicopters from the Airborne Service Corps are used by the Coast Guard (as opposed to the Coast Guard operating their own helicopters.

## Not Under Control of the Ministry of the Interior, but Relevant

<sup>36</sup> More mobile communication systems a must for resiliency in war: Expert, <https://focustaiwan.tw/sci-tech/202411040029>

<sup>37</sup> *Officials request military police guard key facilities*, Chen Yu-fu, June 4<sup>th</sup>, 2024, <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/06/04/2003818842>

<sup>38</sup><https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%85%A7%E6%94%BF%E9%83%A8%E8%AD%A6%E6%94%BF%E7%BD%B2%E4%BF%9D%E5%AE%89%E8%AD%A6%E5%AF%9F%E7%AC%AC%E5%85%AD%E7%B8%BD%E9%9A%8A>, accessed July 21<sup>st</sup>, 2024

## Premier of the Executive Yuan

There are a handful of elements of government that report directly to the office of the Premier of the Executive Yuan:

- Nuclear Safety Commission
  - Security Response Team<sup>39</sup>
    - Specialist Coordination Capacity
- Central Disaster Prevention and Protection Council
  - National Rescue Command Center

## Ministry of Health and Welfare

Responsibilities (Wartime)

- Oversees health services in Taiwan

Capabilities

- Centers for Disease Control<sup>40</sup>
  - Planning Team
  - Emerging Infectious Disease Preparation Team
  - Quarantine Team
  - Epidemic Center
  - PR Office
  - Central Epidemic Command Center (after Executive Yuan Approves)<sup>41</sup>
- Local Healthcare Systems

## Ministry of Finance

In charge of keeping everything funded and working.

## Ministry of National Defense

- Manpower
- Engineers
- Helicopters
- Trucks
- Mobile Communications
- Military Hospitals

<sup>39</sup>[https://www.nusc.gov.tw/%E9%97%9C%E6%96%BC%E6%9C%AC%E6%9C%83/%E7%B5%84%E7%B9%94%E6%9E%B6%E6%A7%8B/%E7%B5%84%E5%AE%A4%E4%BB%8B%E7%B4%B9%E5%8F%8A%E9%80%A3%E7%B5%A1%E6%96%B9%E5%BC%8F/%E4%BF%9D%E5%AE%89%E6%87%89%E8%AE%8A%E7%85%84--1\\_11\\_62\\_197.html](https://www.nusc.gov.tw/%E9%97%9C%E6%96%BC%E6%9C%AC%E6%9C%83/%E7%B5%84%E7%B9%94%E6%9E%B6%E6%A7%8B/%E7%B5%84%E5%AE%A4%E4%BB%8B%E7%B4%B9%E5%8F%8A%E9%80%A3%E7%B5%A1%E6%96%B9%E5%BC%8F/%E4%BF%9D%E5%AE%89%E6%87%89%E8%AE%8A%E7%85%84--1_11_62_197.html), accessed Aug 14<sup>th</sup>, 2024

<sup>40</sup><https://www.cdc.gov.tw/CdcOrganization/Index/cBX61rWwT5TKpS7BbMzKag> accessed July 26, 2024

<sup>41</sup><https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%B6%E8%A1%9B%E7%94%9F%E6%8C%87%E6%8F%AE%E4%B8%AD%E5%BF%83%E4%B8%AD%E5%A4%AE%E6%B5%81%E8%A1%8C%E7%96%AB%E6%83%85%E6%8C%87%E6%8F%AE%E4%B8%AD%E5%BF%83>



# MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA BRIEFING PACK



## One Act, Three Communiques, and Six Assurances<sup>42</sup>

One Act, Three Communiques, and Six Assurances have laid the foundation for trilateral relations between the US, the PRC, and the ROC (Taiwan).

- One Act is referred to as the Taiwan Relations Act, which is a domestic law of the US and was passed on 10th April 1979.
- Three communiqués are referred to: the Shanghai Communique of 1972, the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of 1979, and the August 17th Communique of 1982.
- The Six Assurances and the Taiwan Relations Act are the important foundations of the US-Taiwan relations. At first, the Six Assurances were written as a set of statements for the US President to respond to the announcement of the August 17th Communique and they were authorized for release by a joint resolution of both the US Senate and the US House of Representatives. The Six Assurances are as follows:
  - The US has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.
  - The US has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan.
  - The US will play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing.
  - The US has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act.
  - The US has not altered its position regarding Taiwan's sovereignty over Taiwan.
  - The US will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

## Non-Negotiable National Sovereignty<sup>43</sup>

The bounds of national sovereignty of Taiwan are as follows:

- Territorial Sea & Contiguous Zone
  - 1 – *Boundaries*: In accordance with Article 3 of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of Republic of China, the territorial sea shall be the sea area between the baseline and the outer limits measuring outwardly 12 nm baseline; As Article 14 states: contiguous zone is the sea area contiguous to the outer limits of its territorial sea and to a distance of 24 nm measured from the baseline.
  - 2 – *Law Enforcement*: As Article 17 states: if the authorities of national defense, police, customs or other authorized agencies of ROC consider that a person or an object which is in the territorial sea of the Republic of China or the contiguous zone is engaged in any activity violating laws and regulations of the

<sup>42</sup> ROC National Defense Report 2023, Translated by Sam LaGrone <https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23973306/taiwan-national.pdf>, pg. 155

<sup>43</sup> ROC National Defense Report 2023, Translated by Sam LaGrone <https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23973306/taiwan-national.pdf>, pg. 45

Republic of China, such authorities may engage in hot pursuit, boarding, inspection, and when necessary, detaining, arresting, or putting in custody such persons or objects.

- Territorial Air
  - In accordance with Article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Aviation), every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
- Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Continental Shelf
  - *1 – Boundaries:* In accordance with Article 2 of the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the Republic of China, the exclusive economic zone denotes the sea area contiguous to the outer limits of the territorial sea and to a distance measuring outwardly 200 nm from the baseline of the territorial sea. The EEZ comprises the water body, the seabed and the subsoil; the continental shelf is the submarine area that extends beyond its territorial sea through the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, which includes the seabed and subsoil.
  - *2 – Rights:* As Article 5 prescribes, the ROC shall, in its exclusive economic zone or on its continental shelf, enjoy and exercise the following rights:
    - 1) Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing the resources, living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil.
    - 2) Jurisdiction over the construction, use, modification, or dismantlement of artificial islands, installations or structures.
    - 3) Jurisdiction over marine scientific research, preservation of marine environment and other rights in accordance with international law.

In accordance with Chicago Aviation and United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, the territory of a state includes its land territory, territorial sea, and the airspace above them (referred to as territorial air), all of which are under the state's sovereignty.

# US DEPARTMENT OF STATE US-CHINA-TAIWANESE RELATIONS LEGAL MANUAL



## One Act, Three Communiques, and Six Assurances<sup>44</sup>

One Act, Three Communiques, and Six Assurances have laid the foundation for trilateral relations between the US, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of China (Taiwan).

- One Act is referred to as the Taiwan Relations Act, which is a domestic law of the US and was passed on 10<sup>th</sup> April 1979.
  - The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) states that “it is the policy of the United States ... to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargos, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan.” In regard to arms sales the TRA states “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”
- Three communiqués are referred to: the Shanghai Communique of 1972, the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of 1979, and the August 17th Communique of 1982.
  - In the 1972 Shanghai Communique, US policy became that of the “One China Principle,” that “the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” This means that the US recognizes that both sides claim the territory and to be the legitimate government of the other but does not recognize the validity of the claims in and of themselves.<sup>45</sup>
  - With the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of 1979 the US formally recognized the People's Republic of China and established official diplomatic relations (while the US ended official diplomatic relations and recognition of Taiwan).
  - The 17 August 1982 US-China Joint Communique contains language concerning drawing down arms transfers and sales to Taiwan but neither side was able come to a complete agreement for the communique. The communique’s language (though intentionally vague) contradicts the TRA. The document pledges that the

<sup>44</sup> ROC National Defense Report 2023, Translated by Sam LaGrone <https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23973306/taiwan-national.pdf>, pg. 155

<sup>45</sup> E.g. “I acknowledge that you think that, but do not explicitly agree or disagree with what you think”

US will not undertake long-term arms sales to Taiwan and will not sell arms exceeding the quality or quantity of arms sold to Taiwan after the US established relations with the PRC (January 1, 1979). It also says that the US will gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan over time.<sup>46</sup> In practice this has not been followed.

- The Six Assurances and the Taiwan Relations Act are the important foundations of the US-Taiwan relations. At first, the Six Assurances were written as a set of statements for the US President to respond to the announcement of the August 17th Communiqué and they were authorized for release by a joint resolution of both the US Senate and the US House of Representatives. The Six Assurances are as follows:
  - The US has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.
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  - The US has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act.
  - The US has not altered its position regarding Taiwan's sovereignty over Taiwan.
  - The US will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

Despite this 'unofficial' recognition policy a procession of US Administrations has implied that they will defend Taiwan but have never openly stated it under the US's policy of strategic ambiguity.

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<sup>46</sup> *The August 17, 1982 US-China Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan* in Milestones: 1981–1988, Office of the Historian, United States Department of State, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/china-communique>

# MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CRISIS MANUAL



## Governmental Stance

Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and has been since the Ming and Qing Dynasties.

## Overview – Managing Crises<sup>47</sup>

While not an end-all-be-all a Mao Zedong-era maxim regarding behavior in warfare is a good method for understanding a political-military crisis:

“On just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint” (有理有利有节)

This means the following:<sup>48</sup>

1. The Chinese position is morally correct. The PRC is a peaceful, non-antagonistic nation, US actions in the internal affairs of the PRC (which often rise to those of a bullying hegemon) are to blame for escalation. For example, the US intentionally bombed the Belgrade Embassy in 1999, and if the US military were not operating within the first island chain, there would not be an issue (or risk of ship or air collisions).
2. Symmetrical responses to an adversary's behavior should be pursued.
3. Decisionmakers should be given a sense to "know when to stop."
4. Force should only be used in response to an opponent's use of force.

*US Military Actions* – US military activities concurrent with allied activities are encouraging US allies in their actions. A larger action taken close to the time of the ally's action are indicative of promotion of the ally's behavior. In some cases, crises occurring in the vicinity of disputed territory or near Taiwan might have been deliberately created or escalated by the United States.<sup>49</sup>

*US Signaling Paths* – Signals sent through the US media are to be suspect (though they can be true). Privately delivered statements from government officials are the most credible as opposed to any type of public communication, but there is no surety in which US government voice(s) are the most authoritative.<sup>50</sup>

*US Military Signaling* – Movements of US military forces are among the most intentional and credible signals from the US side.<sup>51</sup>

*Distinguishing Between Military and Paramilitary Assets* – There is a symbolic distinction between the use of military and nonmilitary/paramilitary assets in a crisis. For example, a distinction between military “gray hulls” naval forces and paramilitary (e.g. coast guard, etc.) “white hulls.” A threat to white hulls, from an opposing gray hull - even from a weak opponent is highly escalatory.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Based on *Avoiding the Abyss: An Urgent Need for Sino-US Crisis Management*, Quincy Paper #16, Michael D. Swaine, September 27, 2024, <https://quincyinst.org/research/avoiding-the-abyss-an-urgent-need-for-sino-u-s-crisis-management/#h-introduction>. For a shorter overview see the same in China Leadership Monitor, Jun 4, 2023, <https://www.prcleader.org/post/crisis-management-and-the-taiwan-situation-chinese-views-and-conflict-avoidance>, or in podcast form, *US-China Crisis Management and Crisis Prevention*, with Michael Swain, Sinica Podcast, Nov 21, 2024, <https://www.sinicapodcast.com/p/us-china-crisis-management-and-crisis>

<sup>48</sup> *Avoiding the Abyss: An Urgent Need for Sino-US Crisis Management*, pg. 32

<sup>49</sup> *Avoiding the Abyss: An Urgent Need for Sino-US Crisis Management*, pg. 38

<sup>50</sup> *Avoiding the Abyss: An Urgent Need for Sino-US Crisis Management*, pg. 39

<sup>51</sup> *Avoiding the Abyss: An Urgent Need for Sino-US Crisis Management*, pg. 39

<sup>52</sup> *Avoiding the Abyss: An Urgent Need for Sino-US Crisis Management*, pg. 40

## Diplomatic Language Guide<sup>53</sup>

The following are important concepts that differ from classical western understandings of the concept. Each has a short description and the Party's position upon the concept.

### Human Rights (人权)

Human rights are rights intrinsic to all human beings. For political reasons, the rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) were divided into two separate covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The People's Republic of China has ratified the ICESCR, but not the ICCPR, and the Party maintains that sovereignty and non-interference trump the notion of universal human rights. Instead, the Party considers human rights to be a country's "internal affairs" rather than a concern of the international community. The Party's view of human rights is a state-centric and relativist conception of human rights "with Chinese characteristics" according to which stability, harmony, subsistence and economic development take precedence over such rights, especially civil and political rights.

### International Law (国际法)

International law is the body of rules and principles regulating relations between states and international actors. Based on treaties and customary law, it is an evolving concept that can be traced back some 400 years. Since the adoption of the UN charter in 1945, international law has expanded to prohibit the use of force against another state and to encompass human rights, humanitarian law, and accountability for international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity). Fundamentally, international law requires respect for the sovereign equality of states, which means that states generally have the discretion to accept or reject proposed new international laws.

For the PRC, the core principles of international law are state sovereignty, non-aggression, and non-interference. The liberal, post-World War II model of international law that has been dominant since the 1990's is a tool of Western hegemony and interventionism. Since 2015, the PRC has put forward the concept of "a community with a shared future for mankind" (人类命运共同体), emphasizing "common" rather than universal values. This is a more inclusive, democratic, and fair model than the current international system.

### Nation (国家)

'Nation' tends to be understood as a community of people living in a particular area or country, characterized by having their own government, language, history, and traditions. The Chinese language makes no distinction between nation, country and state, using them interchangeably to translate the word *guojia* (国家). In its narrow sense, the term 'Chinese nation' refers either to the PRC, or to the historical empires which controlled various parts of the territory that is today governed or claimed by the PRC. In its broad sense, it embodies the notion of a Chinese super-ethnicity, *Zhonghua minzu* (中华民族) – the Party's shorthand for all PRC nationals plus the Chinese diaspora.

The Chinese terms used to translate 'nation' (*guojia*, 国家) are linked to notions of ethnicity and civilization. As the Chinese nation is inseparable from the CCP, patriotism – loving your nation (爱国) – includes loving the Party and being loyal to the party-controlled state.

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<sup>53</sup> All the following are heavily based upon *Decoding China Dictionary (Second Edition)*, edd. Malin Oud and Katja Drinhausen, 2023, <https://decodingchina.eu/>

## Peace (和平)

The CCP's rhetoric often emphasizes the "peaceful" nature of the Party. Xi Jinping has repeatedly asserted "the love for peace is in the DNA of the Chinese people." Speaking in Berlin in March 2014, Xi said that the pursuit of peace, amity, and harmony was "an integral part of the Chinese character, which runs deep in the blood of the Chinese people", and that it represents "the peace-loving cultural tradition of the Chinese nation over the past several thousand years". In Xi's rhetoric, China's fondness for peace is explained with reference to factors related to Chinese ethnicity, tradition and history.

The Party's subjects are harmonious, non-violent, and benevolent by nature, and the party is (consequently) always morally correct. The UN charter does not explicitly define the term "peace," it is generally understood as a state where war, non-state conflicts, and violence are absent.<sup>54</sup> The PRC's notion of peace involves social stability, development, "harmony," cooperation, and mutual benefit but also the absence of interventionism and colonialism. As China is peaceful by definition and the Chinese nationality (or people) is genetically peace-loving, the PRC's defense policy is also purely defensive in nature.

## Security (安全)

National security and state security are synonyms (both are translated as **国家安全**), meaning that the two English terms can be used interchangeably. State security refers to the consolidation of the CCP's ruling position and to its protection from domestic and foreign threats. *Threats to state security are existential threats.* State security covers political, homeland, military, economic, cultural, and information security, and social stability, any of which could threaten the CCP's continued rule of China. Any threats to state security are threats to Party rule and the individual's security cannot be safeguarded if the CCP is not secure. Furthermore, those who act in line with the interests of the PRC should enjoy safety.

An overarching threat in peacetime is the ideological infiltration of "Western hostile forces", including foreign NGOs and international media. In wartime or crisis other threats become more imperative.

## Sovereignty (主权, 国权)

The concept of state sovereignty can be defined as the exclusive right of states to govern within their own territory. In the PRC, sovereignty should be understood as absolute and perpetual state power, where the state is rightly governed by the CCP. Moreover, the concept of sovereignty is intimately linked to the PRC's emphasis on mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, as outlined in the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (1954). China is a principled defender of a strong normative understanding of sovereignty and includes state sovereignty as one of its non-negotiable "national core interests."

For the CCP sovereignty includes the exclusive right of the government of a sovereign nation to exercise control over issues within its own borders, including its political, economic, cultural, and technological activities. The CCP includes all territory within China's borders (even those not recognized by the international community). As such Taiwan and parts of the South China Sea (for example) set the outer geographic bounds of state sovereignty.

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<sup>54</sup> The opposite of war is not peace (no ongoing state of war) but rather the absence of violence.



# PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY CRISIS MANUAL

## Framework for Conceptualization and Management of Crisis<sup>55</sup>

The following is the Effective Control crisis framework – a flexible, graduated tool designed to guide political and military actions during times of tension.



### Effectively Shape the Situation

During this stage active manipulation of the peacetime environment is done to prevent crises and to prevent them from escalating while maximizing leverage over external conditions. This includes comprehensive planning for a wide range of contingencies during peacetime and using military and nonmilitary tools to establish advantageous strategic conditions conducive to internal and external stability. Tools of manipulation include information operations, strategic deterrence signaling, diplomatic messaging, public statements, and peacetime mobilization efforts. The concept of “momentum” is vital to this phase. Maintaining positive momentum can lead to victory without having to resort to military force. The ultimate goal of shaping the situation is to minimize risk and prevent crises while also preparing the domestic population and military for a crisis should one break out.

### Controlling a Crisis

During this stage the aim is to minimize risk and achieve limited strategic objectives by leveraging all elements of national power, including deterrence and non-war military activities. All tools of national power should be utilized to prevent a crisis from evolving into a kinetic conflict. This involves the use of diplomatic, political, informational, and economic tools to manage escalation while mobilizing the military for potential conflict and enhancing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities. Heightened military exercises and training activities, as well as prepositioning mobile assets may also commence. Tight control of forces is of extreme importance at this stage.

### Curb the War

This stage occurs when a crisis has evolved past a state of peacetime tension and kinetic activity has begun. Here more military measures should be employed, including lethal force, in an effort to bring an end to hostilities and limit the scope of conflict. This is the most difficult stage. You must ensure that military goals support political goals while striving for a favorable situation on the battlefield that does not expand the political goals and escalate the war. War should only be started once completely prepared but you must also ensure that you seize the initiative early in a conflict as without battlefield initiative, war situation control will be very difficult to carry out, and victory will not be a reliable guarantee.

To achieve this, it may become necessary for the PLA to quickly and decisively attack an opponent's strategic strongpoints. Rapid, quick, and violent attack is key to catch the enemy unaware, seize control of the battlefield initiative, completely destroy the enemy's operational system, and intimidate the enemy's will to wage war. It is possible that attacking enemy C2 through cyber and space neutralization will provide “escalation dominance” short of full-out war.


<sup>55</sup> *China's Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States*, Lyle J. Morris, January 22, 2025, <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/chinas-views-escalation-and-crisis-management-and-implications-united-states>

## Win the War

At this stage war planners must shift their focus to achieving victory on the battlefield while limiting escalation in the nuclear domain and ensuring alignment with overall political objectives. This includes setting the terms of war termination, mobilizing the population, and ensuring the survival and legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party during the postwar phase.

When necessary, adoption of appropriate brinkmanship operations, and through this adoption of limited-yet-effective warning shot kinetic attacks and information attacks, compel the adversary to retreat-to-avoid-defeat, to see the danger and halt as was effective in the 1958 artillery bombardment of Jinmen. As Mao Zedong noted, “They’re on the brink of war, and we’re also on the brink of war. We use our ‘brink of war’ to counter their ‘brink of war’ — as a result, they don’t dare to advance, just leave it at the brink of war.”

# MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN LEGAL BRIEFING PACK



Japan's Constitution places checks on the allowable use of force. While originally intended to prevent any use of force, this has been reinterpreted over time, most notably in 2014<sup>56</sup> to allow for the use of force in specific situations.

## Internal Constitutional Checks<sup>57</sup>

Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution States:

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

## Armed Attack and Request for Assistance

Japan has repeatedly supported the International Court of Justice's decision in *Nicaragua v. United States* which holds that the declaration of an armed attack and request for assistance by an attacked state are necessary preconditions for collective self-defense (on top of the requirements for the right to individual self-defense).

## Three Criteria for Collective Self-Defense

There are 3 domestic legal requirements that constrain Japan in collective self-defense.

### *Existential-Crisis Situation*

First, the situation must pose an existential crisis to Japan. Article 2 of the Armed Attack and Existential Crisis Situations Act (modified in 2015) defines the standard as: “an armed attack against a foreign state that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, and, as a result, threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its nationals' right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.” The foreign state is expected to be “a country which shares a common interest in responding to an armed attack from outside as a common danger and expresses intention to do so jointly with Japan.” This requirement is intended to ensure consistent reinterpretation of the Constitution with the “basic logic of the interpretation of

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<sup>56</sup> This revision avoided directly changing Article 9, instead opting to reinterpret the principle of “minimum necessary force” to avoid having to go through constitutional amendment.

<sup>57</sup> This brief is heavily based upon *Japan's Evolving Position on the Use of Force in Collective Self-Defense*, Masahiro Kurosaki, Lawfare, August 23, 2018, <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/japans-evolving-position-use-force-collective-self-defense>

Article 9”—or, that Japan’s use of force is constitutional solely when it is employed for the purpose of protecting its citizens’ right to live in peace.

Japanese government guidance further illustrates that an existential crisis could comprise “the situation in which a clear danger of the occurrence of armed attack [on Japan] is imminent” or “the tense situation in which armed attack [on Japan] is anticipated.”<sup>58</sup> Government-given examples include armed attack against: US vessels transporting Japanese nationals; US warships conducting ballistic missile surveillance in the vicinity of Japan; or Japanese forces shooting down inbound missiles to Guam (where US military bases critical for Japan’s security are located). The legislation also allows for exceptional cases in which an attack is neither imminent nor anticipated but could still constitute an existential crisis. A blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical energy lifeline to Japan, is a cited example.

Under the law, whether an existential crisis exists shall be determined “in an objective and reasonable manner” based on the assessment of the Japanese Cabinet (whose decision is then subject to prior or subsequent approval by the legislature, depending on circumstances).<sup>59</sup> However, this does not allow Japan to assist in anticipatory self-defense against an imminent threat of armed attack; Japan has rejected that doctrine as a matter of international law.

#### *Minimum Necessary Force and Geographical Limitations*

The second condition is that there must be no other appropriate means available to repel the armed attack on Japan’s ally, to ensure Japan’s survival, and/or to protect Japan’s people. This condition is not substantially controversial and has not been a source of much debate. Article 9 of the Constitution authorizes the use force only to the minimum extent necessary for its purpose. This third condition matters particularly in the context of geographical limitations on overseas deployment of Japan’s Self-Defense Force (SDF). The government’s position has been that Japan’s use of force in any territory of another state exceeds the minimum-force restriction, even if the state consents. The government has emphasized that it maintains this stance, but has given two possible theoretical examples of exceptions:

- 1) *Minesweeping in the Strait of Hormuz* – This would be conducted in the sovereign territory of Oman or Iran, but it would fall within the permissible scope of minimum necessary force as an activity dedicated to securing safe navigation.
- 2) *Alternative to Boots on the Ground* – A surgical missile strike on an enemy base overseas could be lawful if the alternative would be “boots on the ground.”

It is important to note that the geographical limitations do not limit Japan’s use of force in collective self-defense in areas with no sovereign (e.g. failed states, high seas (but not areas within an exclusive economic zone), etc.).

### **Given Positions**

Japan has many allies in Asia who conduct operations in areas where Japan has interests (for example freedom of navigation operations). Should an armed attack on those countries occur, one cannot rule out the possibility that it would rise to the level of an existential crisis. The rule of law at sea and freedom of navigation are not merely vital global interests but also ones essential to Japan’s security. While Japan has not directly stated it (but has occasionally alluded), LDP<sup>60</sup> policy has moved further and further towards considering a free and independent Taiwan as part of its global interests and it is quite possible that an armed attack on Taiwan would be treated as an existential crisis. In cyberspace the Japanese government has made it clear that “a cyberattack carried out as part of an armed attack” could constitute an armed attack itself and trigger an existential crisis but has not taken a definitive stance on other cases of cyberattacks (including cyber-only armed attacks).

<sup>58</sup> Article 2(2) and (3) of the armed-attack law.

<sup>59</sup> Article 9(4)(6)(7) of the armed-attack law; Para. 2 of the Resolution Supplement to the Peace and Security Bills.

<sup>60</sup> Liberal Democratic Party: the long-running governing party in Japan.

## US Treaties

Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan states “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.” In the event of a military conflict, the United States may also request permission from the Government of Japan to use JSDF bases and facilities under Article VI of the Treaty.<sup>61</sup>

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) sets terms for US military basing and use in Japan but also allows for the use of Japanese facilities for “limited periods of time,” as agreed by the government of Japan (Article II, Section 4b).<sup>62</sup> Note however that as the SOFA is a government to government agreement it is not necessarily binding for local governments. “Therefore, the legal prerogatives of local governments in administering these facilities in accordance with Japanese law must be respected when negotiating for their use.”<sup>63</sup> The Government of Japan “only has the legal authority to grant those permissions if it has declared an armed attack to be imminent or to have already taken place.”<sup>64</sup>

## UK-Japan, and Australia-Japan Reciprocal Access Agreements

The two Reciprocal Access Agreements are almost identical in text, both holding several key provisions. Article IV(1) of the agreement states that the agreement “shall [not] be construed as providing a basis for the Force of a Party to conduct activities in the territory of the other Party without its consent.” Article V(1) and Article VIII(1)(2) cover requests to bring in forces into the other country, noting that the receiving state has final decision on the bringing in of forces, basing/facilities that the forces can use, and the conditions of access, and that the basing/facilities remain under the control of the receiving state. Article XXVII deals with methods of consultation, stating “A Joint Committee shall be established as a means for consultation between the Parties on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of this Agreement.” Note however that neither Agreement covers the conduct of military operations from either states territory, the agreements dealing with solely peacetime operations.

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<sup>61</sup> Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States, signed 1960, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>.

<sup>62</sup> Government of Japan, Ministry of Defense, “Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan” (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense), <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/2.htm>

<sup>63</sup> *Bolstering the Fortresses of Regional Stability: The Changing Indo-Pacific Security Environment and Military Bases in Japan*, Shawn D. Harding, 2024 [https://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Shawn\\_D.\\_Harding\\_Bolstering-the-Fortresses-of-Regional-Stability\\_07.03.24.pdf](https://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Shawn_D._Harding_Bolstering-the-Fortresses-of-Regional-Stability_07.03.24.pdf), pg. 24

<sup>64</sup> *Cratering Effects Chinese Missile Threats to US Air Bases in the Indo-Pacific*, Kelly A. Grieco, Hunter Slingbaum, and Jonathan M. Walker, December 2024, [https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Cratering-Effects-Report-Dec-6\\_WEB.pdf](https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Cratering-Effects-Report-Dec-6_WEB.pdf), pg. 30



# NUCLEAR POLICY

## China: No-First Use

China's nuclear policy and lexicon, despite an ongoing nuclear rearmament program, remains ostensibly unchanged, anchored to a no-first-use retaliatory policy under which China stipulates it will not be the first to employ nuclear weapons in conflict but will respond in kind if attacked. At the same time, however, China's nuclear modernization has significantly enhanced its military capabilities, potentially enabling it to execute a wider range of nuclear strategies. It has been argued that the no-first-use policy may no longer hold or may not hold in the case of Taiwan. China does not currently maintain a launch on warning posture, but is moving towards one.<sup>65</sup>

## United States: Use of Nuclear Weapons in Extreme Circumstances

The United States Declaratory Policy is thus: "As long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. The U.S. would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners."<sup>66</sup> The United States does not currently maintain a launch on warning posture.

# NUCLEAR TARGETING

Targeting<sup>67</sup> is not solely just a technical judgment of connecting weapons with aim points. In peacetime, targeting plans drive nuclear force mix (nuclear weapons and delivery platforms). In wartime, targeting determines the course of conflict, the number of civilian casualties, and effects on other countries. While more strategic target sets were retained after the end of the Cold War, many tactical target sets were put aside. For example, the United States no longer has any nuclear weapons designed to target ships, aircraft, or missiles in flight. China never had any.

Three major types of target sets can be struck with current US and Chinese nuclear arsenals: cities/population (countervalue), nuclear forces (counterforce), and operational conventional forces.

## Targeting Options

### Population and Civil Infrastructure (Countervalue)

The aim of countervalue use is to cause pain by killing the enemy's population. The primary effect is not just in the material damage of destroying large cities,<sup>68</sup> but in the promise of more pain to come if the enemy does not comply. A countervalue targeting strategy would not accomplish its goal if it destroyed all of an enemy's urban centers, as there would then be nothing left to hold at risk. The most sophisticated formulations of countervalue targeting call

<sup>65</sup> *Chinese Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications*, Peter Wood, Alex Stone, and Thomas Corbett, March 11, 2024, China Aerospace Studies Institute, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/3688852/chinese-nuclear-command-control-and-communications/>

<sup>66</sup> 2022 *Nuclear Posture Review Fact Sheet*, US Department of Defense, 2022, <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Spotlight/2022/NDS/NUCLEAR%20STRATEGY%20AND%20POLICY%20-%20NPR%20Factsheet.pdf>

<sup>67</sup> Unless otherwise cited, this brief is (extremely heavily) based upon *Confronting Armageddon Wargaming Nuclear Deterrence and Its Failures in a U.S.–China Conflict over Taiwan*, Mark Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham, CSIS and the MIT Wargaming Lab, December 2024, [https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-12/241213\\_Cancian\\_Confronting\\_Armageddon.pdf?VersionId=WyqddCThZRiniczNwXHKcQHgOmUP8CH8](https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-12/241213_Cancian_Confronting_Armageddon.pdf?VersionId=WyqddCThZRiniczNwXHKcQHgOmUP8CH8)

<sup>68</sup> E.g. loss of military sites and production capability.

for a menu of infrastructure targets, ranging from remote sites causing few civilians deaths to society-destroying target sets.

Type	Examples	Estimated Civilian Deaths (from Airburst of Given Size)							
		1 kt	3 kt	10 kt	30 kt	100 kt	300 kt	1 Mt	3 Mt
Large City	Taipei	31,177	64,778	114,509	301,039	675,242	1,394,598	3,136,388	6,501,012
Medium City	Keelung, Taoyuan	8,660	8,868	40,141	83,622	187,567	387,388	871,219	1,805,837
Small City	Taichung, Penghu, Tainan, Kaohsiung	3,464	7,198	16,057	33,449	75,027	154,955	348,488	722,335
Rural Area	—	1,039	2,159	4,817	10,035	22,508	46,487	104,546	216,700
Mountain Area	—	346	720	1,606	3,345	7,503	15,496	16,451	34,849

### Enemy Nuclear Forces (Counterforce)

The aim of counterforce attacks is to destroy the enemy's ability to employ their nuclear weapons, in the best case effectively disarming the enemy's nuclear forces, or at least rendering them ineffective if used for a counterblow. China's current nuclear forces are not sufficient for a disarming counterforce attack against the United States. Similarly, the growth of Chinese nuclear forces means that a US disarming attack against China is not possible, but a counterforce attack could destroy many Chinese ICBM silos (leaving bombers, sub-launch, and road mobile missiles intact for a second strike).

### Operational Conventional Targets

The aim of attacking conventional targets is to destroy the enemy's conventional warfighting ability. A number of possible options exist:

*Ports and Airfields:* Targeting of ports and airfields for destruction offers significant benefits in a conventional fight, as one nuclear weapon could achieve the effect of many conventional weapons. Not only does this render the port or airfield unusable for basing, repair, maintenance, and rearming, but also destroys any forces currently based there.<sup>69</sup>

*Ground Forces:* Targeting enemy ground forces with nuclear weapons can provide significant operational benefits while limiting the likelihood of enemy retaliation. A single 10 kt weapon used accurately against a brigade in the open can render it combat ineffective in a single blow. An air burst also limits the amount of radiation and may allow maneuver around the enemy soon after the weapon has been used. Battlefield use also has less effect on civilians than strategic attacks on cities. However, even limited effects can be devastating on civilian populations in highly developed areas like Taiwan, and fallout patterns can cause long term damage.

Nuclear Weapon Effect (% of Unit Casualties by Type for Brigade) <sup>70</sup>						
	Weapon Within 1 km			Weapon Within 2 km		
	1 kt	10 kt	100 kt	1 kt	10 kt	100 kt

<sup>69</sup> Note that aircraft in Hardened Aircraft Shelters may survive but are likely to be unable to fly until radiological cleanup and runway repair has been conducted (as well as replacement of lost personnel from units), which will take an extremely long time (if it is even done).

<sup>70</sup> From *Nuclear Weapons Effects Wargaming Flipbook, Volume 1: Effects and impacts on or over land*, by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Research and Development Directorate (RD) Nuclear Technologies Assessment Division (NTA), Version 1.2, September 16, 2022

In Open	KIA	3%	68%	Brigade Destroyed	1%	11%	Brigade Destroyed
	WIA	23%	15%		7%	30%	
In Shelter	KIA	1%	1%		1%	1%	65%
	WIA	1%	43%		2%	7%	18%

*Ships at Sea:* Targeting ships at sea is appealing because it offers the potential to communicate resolve by attacking a strictly military target while avoiding a homeland attack that might provoke a general nuclear conflict and has a low risk of additional casualties. As both the US and China lack terminal guidance on nuclear missiles, mounting this sort of attack is nearly impossible without using a pattern of detonations.

Number of Nuclear Weapons Needed to Sink a Task Group at Sea		
Warhead	Time of Arrival to Target: 30 Minutes	Time of Arrival to Target: 60 Minutes
100 kt	89 warheads required	178 warheads required
300 kt	22 warheads required	45 warheads required

Note that these calculations do not assume that the ships engage any incoming missiles, this is merely the number required for a high Pk pattern.

Alternatively, the United States could use nuclear weapons against Chinese amphibious ships off invasion beaches. Such attacks would not suffer from these same difficulties as attacks against ships at sea. During a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, many amphibious vessels must be accommodated off narrow beaches. These vessels cannot spread out as much as ships at sea and need to stay relatively stationary while off-loading. This eases detection of the targets and being stationary and bunched up, these ships would be targetable by coordinates. One nuclear weapon might neutralize multiple ships (especially as many are built to civilian standards, and thus much easier to damage) and a detonation offshore would also be less damaging to Taiwan and its population than one ashore (though it would still cause a significant blast effect and radiation pattern).

### Special Case: High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)

HEMP occurs when a specially designed nuclear weapon detonates high in the atmosphere. The resulting electronic pulses disrupt electronics and communications. It is attractive because the disruption provides a military advantage without causing kinetic or thermal damage to civilians or military forces. However, it still carries the risk of being misidentified as part of, or prelude to a larger attack, and is still crossing the nuclear threshold.

### Special Case: Targeting Nonnuclear Allies

Although not a distinct target type, the special nature of nonnuclear allies must be addressed. Extended nuclear deterrence refers to the provision of deterrent guarantees, backed by the threat of response, by one country to another. In the nuclear context, extended deterrence is provided by a nuclear state to protect a nonnuclear partner or ally by use of nuclear force if so required.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the United States deemphasized nuclear weapons in its national security strategy and removed them from warships. However, the growth of Chinese military power prompted concerns of Asian allies. In 2010, the United States began an Extended Deterrence Dialogue with Japan and established an Extended Deterrence Policy Committee with South Korea. In the context of a Taiwan invasion, it has been suggested that China could attack Japan with nuclear weapons to compel its withdrawal from the war. Losing Japanese access, basing, and overflight would severely hamper a U.S. conventional campaign. This could include targeting US bases in Okinawa, US or Japanese bases elsewhere in Japan, one or more of the smaller inhabited islands in the Ryukyus in a limited countervalue strike, a major countervalue strike on a large prefectural capitol or city of symbolic nuclear value (Hiroshima,

Nagasaki), or signaling by striking an uninhabited island in the Ryukyus or conducting a HEMP strike.

### Special Case: Taiwan's Command Bunkers

Taiwanese command bunkers could be struck by surface burst nuclear weapons to transmit ground shock (like an earthquake) and destroy the bunkers. This would be attractive for decapitation of the Taiwanese Armed Forces or Government but leads to many of the same problems of civilian causalities given the locations of the bunkers.

Facility	Role	Location	Civ Pop Density
Heng Shan (Tri-Service) Military Command Center (Command Center) + Yuanshan Command Center (National Political + Military Command Center) (Collocated)	The HSMCC is able to hold thousands of military personnel and is intended as the central nerve center of the military for wartime. In the same bunker complex is the NPMCC which provides space for governmental agencies to operate in wartime, including offices for the President and the Cabinet.	Dazhi, Zhongshan District, Taipei	Very High
“Toad Mountain” Air Operations Center	Joint Air Operations Center for the Taiwanese military.	South of Taipei near National Taiwan University	Very High
Chiashan Air Base (buried inside a mountain)	Reserve Air Operations Center for the Taiwanese military.	Northeast of Hualien City	High
Shihzishan or “Stone Mountain” complex at Chihhang Air Base	Reserve Air Operations Center for the Taiwanese military.	Northeast of Taitung City	High
Naval Command Headquarters Bunker	Oversees naval operations.	Zuoying District, Kaohsiung	Very High
3 <sup>rd</sup> Combat Theater Command	Overseas command of forces in the North of Taiwan.	Zhongli District, Taoyuan	High
4 <sup>th</sup> Combat Theater Command	Overseas command of forces in the South of Taiwan.	Qishan District, Kaohsiung	Low
5 <sup>th</sup> Combat Theater Command	Overseas command of forces in the West of Taiwan.	Xinshe District, Taichung	Low

### Special Case: Taiwan's Outlying Islands

Nuclear weapons could be employed against outlying Taiwanese islands in a countervalue role. Kinmen island is too close to the Chinese mainland, being only 10 kilometers away from Xiamen and risking serious Chinese civilian casualties. However, the Matsu Islands or Wuqiu group could be targeted by a lower yield weapon (given the distance to mainland China), or Penghu could be targeted by a higher yield weapon (due to its proximity to Taiwan). Such use would also mean that landing operations against the targeted island would no longer be necessary, but would lose the ability to use them as stepping stones and propaganda victories.

### Special Case: US Island Bases

Nuclear weapons could be employed against US or allied bases on Guam or Diego Garcia. In the case of Guam, its location and facilities as a vital lynchpin to flow in and support forces in the Indo-Pacific make it an attractive target, as well as it being a US Island Territory

(and therefore not *technically* the US homeland). There would however be a large number of civilian casualties. Targeting the US-UK base on Diego Garcia atoll would carry little risk to civilians (as there are none other than military contractors) but would have less of an effect on the ability to move and support troops in theater, as well as it being a British Island Territory, thus potentially expanding the conflict.

### **Special Case: Signaling Use**

Nuclear weapons could be used in signaling roles instead of for direct attack. In this case conducting a nuclear test either of launcher capabilities or of a warhead could be used to demonstrate nuclear resolve without having to use a nuclear weapon in anger. A nuclear weapon could also be employed against a nowhere spot in the ocean, far from any population center again to demonstrate nuclear resolve without having to cause casualties. Similarly, a nuclear weapon could be employed in space for the same reason, though it would cause mass disruption and/or destruction of satellites in orbit. However, in both cases active use of a nuclear weapon for signaling still carries risk of being misidentified as part of, or prelude to a larger attack (especially if the satellites taken out are critical to warfighting functions), and is still crossing the nuclear threshold.

### **Non-Nuclear Signaling Options**

There are a number of nuclear signaling options that do not require the use of a nuclear weapon.

#### **A Nuclear Exercise**

A nuclear exercise of specific parts of the force (one branch, the whole force) for various scenarios (conventional war, limited tactical exchange, tactical exchange, limited strategic exchange, strategic exchange) can all be conducted to emphasize the ability of the nuclear deterrent to carry out its final mission if so required.

#### **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and Test Fire**

The US last conducted a test fire of a nuclear weapon in 1992, and China in 1996, both switching over fully to computer simulation after signing onto the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Leaving the treaty and/or the test firing (declared or undeclared) of a nuclear weapon underground would carry a strong nuclear signal.

#### **Forward Basing of Nuclear Capable Bombers and/or Nuclear Weapons (US)**

The United States can forward base nuclear capable bombers (in Guam, Japan, Diego Garcia, or the Philippines) and/or nuclear weapons (in Guam) to signal capability to use (and/or intent to use if required) nuclear weapons.

#### **Increase in Standing Warheads (US)**

The US maintains a stockpile of warheads that are not fitted to delivery systems. To signal nuclear resolve the US could declare and begin the long (months) process of increasing the number of warheads on missiles. The US has 400 nuclear weapons in storage it can add onto ICBM's MIRV's (bringing the total deployed on missiles from 400 warheads to 800). Furthermore, the US has 50 silos that are not loaded with missiles but could be filled with stored missiles. Ohio SSBN's Trident's carry 4-5 warheads but can be fitted with up to 8.<sup>71</sup>

### **Additional Considerations**

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<sup>71</sup> *United States Nuclear Weapons, 2025*, Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 13, 2025, <https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-01/united-states-nuclear-weapons-2025/>

## Escalation Asymmetries

In a war scenario the U.S. has the incentive to attack China's conventionally armed ballistic missile forces. However, China's conventional and nuclear missile forces are difficult to distinguish from one another to a certain degree. Some DF-21 brigades are equipped with conventionally armed warheads, while in other brigades' similar missiles are equipped with nuclear warheads. With DF-26 brigades, the warheads on individual missiles may be either nuclear or conventional, and the two may be exchanged as requirements demand. Hence, the United States might destroy nuclear-armed missiles incidental to the campaign in a strike against conventional missiles, and thus accidentally decreasing Chinese second-strike capability.

Similar issues surround potential attacks on command-and-control systems by either side (particularly in the Chinese case), which may use the same systems for nuclear and conventional forces. Chinese attacks on U.S. early warning satellites would carry similar risks. U.S. officials have warned Chinese counterparts that attacks on space-based early warning systems, such as U.S. Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) constellations, would constitute a red line. Chinese strategists counter that since those satellites would also be used to cue attacks against conventional targets, they are legitimate targets.

On the US side there has been a continual discussion on whether or not conventional strikes should be allowed inside mainland China in wartime. While China possesses some conventional ability to attack the U.S. homeland, the United States has much greater ability to attack the Chinese mainland. Some have argued that restricting such attacks would prolong the conflict and lead to a long, drawn-out war by granting sanctuary status to high-leverage targets, though alternatively such strikes should be geographically limited to the areas near the conflict site to minimize escalation risks. Critics argue that attacking the Chinese mainland could provoke escalation, including a nuclear response.

In any case, targeting of enemy dual-use nuclear forces and command and control, and especially targeting in mainland China will likely be a major decision during a war and will need clear communication to the other side.

## A Carve Out Over Taiwan?

While China maintains a no-first-use policy, there is uncertainty as to whether and how China's no-first-use policy might affect actions during a war. Chinese strategists disagree on this topic. Famously, in 2005, Major General Zhu Chenghu warned that China would use nuclear weapons if the United States targeted the mainland during a Taiwan conflict. Shen Dingli of Fudan University has also said that China would likely resort to nuclear weapons if its conventional forces were devastated and Taiwan moved toward independence.<sup>72</sup> However, Chinese officials quickly disavowed Zhu's comments in 2005, and individuals within China's strategic community continue to assert that Chinese policy has not changed.

## The Nuclear Taboo and Public Opinion<sup>73</sup>

The use of a nuclear weapon would be a breaking of the nuclear taboo that has held since 1945. Breaking it would certainly entail backlash, though the exact effects would be bound to the specific instance in which a nuclear weapon(s) was used. Isolated nuclear use that is intended for demonstrative purposes, such as at sea or in space, or is targeted against frontline

<sup>72</sup> Another interesting incident occurred in January 1996 around the 3<sup>rd</sup> Taiwan Strait Crisis. Deputy Chief of PLA General Staff Xiong Guangkai in discussion with former US assistant secretary of Defense said "In the 1950s, you three times threatened nuclear strikes on China, and you could do that because we couldn't hit back. Now we can. So, you are not going to threaten us again because, in the end, you care a lot more about Los Angeles than Taipei." Note however that this threat was not made officially at any point and required reconstruction as to just who on the Chinese said had said it. See *Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis*, Andrew Scobell, January 1999, <https://www.theasiadialogue.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Scobell.pdf>, pg. 14

<sup>73</sup> This section is based on *Breaking the Nuclear Taboo*, Jeffrey H. Michaels, December 15, 2022, <https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/breaking-the-nuclear-taboo/>

military forces, will evoke a very different level of outrage than if one or more population centers are targeted.

Several immediate<sup>74</sup> international reactions are conceivable:

*Condemnation, Tarnishing of the National Reputation, and Popular Opinion* – It is likely that the image of the nuclear user will be tarnished, and that country's foreign policy and political leadership are likely to receive some amount of backlash, though, depending on the circumstances of the nuclear use, the user's allies may actually be supportive of the action rather than critical. Depending upon the specific conditions it could severely undermine popular support for the war at home and could massively undermine alliance support<sup>75</sup> or world popular opinion.

*International Pressure* – In specific circumstances where nuclear use was seen as incorrect, withdrawal of support and/or pressure from allies and the international community could well be applied to the state that used nuclear weapons to terminate hostilities to prevent a larger nuclear conflagration.

*Sanctions* – Depending on conditions and level of condemnation, sanctions in the nuclear sector, or in broader swaths (as seen with Iran), or fully (as seen with North Korea) could be applied to the state that used nuclear weapons.

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<sup>74</sup> There are a larger number of longer-term impacts that are not covered here as they are not relevant to the timeframe that the game takes place in (weeks as opposed to months or years).

<sup>75</sup> For example, the Japanese population has great reticence around nuclear weapons, and no matter how justified a case of nuclear use was by the US, it would likely lead to large protests against US bases in Okinawa.



# CHINA COAST GUARD PEACETIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR ENCOUNTERS WITH FOREIGN VESSELS AT SEA



## Part A: Overview of Right of Self Defense

1. Purpose: This part of the Peacetime Rules of Engagement promulgates rules for exercising the right of self-defense against a foreign force or person.
2. The right of self-defense may be invoked against:
  - a. Any action by foreign military or subversive forces which intentionally poses a clear and present danger to the security of the People's Republic of China or any of its forces, territory, or possessions, OR
  - b. Any action which presents a threat of imminent death or serious injury to Coast Guard personnel or persons under the protection of the Coast Guard Actions which fall within the first category are known as "hostile acts." They include, when committed outside the territory, air, space, or territorial waters of a foreign country:
    - i. An attempt or action to release bombs, launch missiles, or fire guns, rockets, torpedoes, or other weapons at any forces of the Coast Guard.
    - ii. Actions which place Chinese craft, installations, or personnel in jeopardy, including
      1. The positioning, of foreign forces with respect to Chinese forces in a manner which threatens the safety of the Chinese forces; AND
      2. Execution of a bombing or strafing approach or an interception pass where weapons are brought to bear.
3. Situations Involving "Hostile Acts" by Foreign Military Forces.
  - a. Recognition of Hostility: The senior military commander on scene, including the commanding officer of a single ship or the aircraft commander of a single aircraft, may recognize an act as hostile without a declaration from higher authority.
  - b. Guidance in Recognizing an Act as Hostile:
    - i. The responsibility for recognizing acts as hostile is of grave importance. Acts shall not be recognized as hostile unless all pertinent circumstances clearly show that the act does in fact involve a clear and present danger to the security of Chinese forces, or vessels, aircraft or persons under the protection of Chinese forces. It is critical in these situations to distinguish between intent to harm and intent to harass. Incidents of interception without actual attack may be harassment, but whether performed for training, bluff, or identification purposes, the elements of hostile intent and clear and present danger do not exist, and restraint is in order.

ii. However, should these harassing forces engage in even a sporadic or isolated attack, if positive information that they have been ordered to attack is received, the hostile intent is established, and, if a clear and present danger exists, the Coast Guard commanding officer/aircraft commander should recognize the act as hostile and take action in accordance with these Rules of Engagement:

4. Engagement:

- a. Foreign vessels or aircraft committing hostile acts shall be counter-attacked immediately by all means available to the extent necessary to effect control of the situation. This may include pursuit if necessary to ensure the safety of Chinese forces or territory. Coast Guard units shall not conduct prolonged pursuit deep into hostile areas or neutral territory and shall not organize or dispatch a pursuing force solely to effect reprisal.
- b. A Coast Guard commander faced with a threat of a hostile act by foreign military forces shall call for assistance from People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces. Specific methods and procedures for requesting such assistance will be promulgated by standard Coast Guard Area, District, or specific Mission Operation Orders. Specific rules of engagement for PLA forces acting in response to a request for assistance from a Coast Guard unit are promulgated by Central Military Commission (CMC) or by Theater Command, and generally provide for the immediate dispatch of PLA forces to the scene to provide protection to the threatened forces as appropriate.
- c. Coast Guard ships and aircraft shall use available photographic and electronic recording equipment to document a hostile act or threat of a hostile act.
- d. All incidents involving hostile acts shall be reported by FLASH precedence message, followed by timely situation reports, direct to the Commander, Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), Commander, People's Armed Police (PAP), the Central Military Commission, or Theater Command (as appropriate), The Commander CCG or Commander PAP will readdress the reports to, or otherwise notify, other commands and offices as necessary.

5. Situations not Involving Foreign Military Forces.

- a. Any Coast Guard Commander shall when confronted with a threat of imminent death or serious injury, either to themselves or to persons under their protection, invoke the right of self-defense.
- b. The force used in these situations shall be the minimum necessary to counter the threat involved.
- c. For purposes of invoking the right of self-defense, Coast Guard personnel, when engaged in law enforcement duties, are responsible for protection of all persons subject to their jurisdiction.

**Part B: Peacetime Rules of Engagement for Coast Guard Units Engaged in Missions Involving Foreign Vessels, Aircraft, or Nationals**

1. This part of the peacetime Rules of Engagement provides guidance for Coast Guard forces which become involved in a confrontation with foreign vessels or aircraft.
2. The authority and responsibility of the Coast Guard to enforce Chinese laws, against foreign vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China shall be carried out in a deliberate and controlled manner. Force shall not be used in cases involving foreign vessels without the specific authorization of the Commander, CCG, or Commander, PAP in each instance, except:
  - a. In accordance with the provisions of Part A of this document, a Coast Guard Commander may invoke the right of self-defense; AND

- b. After receiving Commandant's statement of "no objection" to seizure, a unit commander may use such nondeadly force as is necessary to effect the seizure and maintain control of the vessel and persons on board, Nondeadly force including all force other than deadly force. Deadly force is any force applied with the intent of causing, or which a reasonable person should know would cause, death or serious bodily harm.
- 3. Approach: When approaching a foreign vessel with intent to stop and board or take any other law enforcement action:
  - a. Ensure that People's Republic of China and Coast Guard ensigns and other identifying insignia are displayed.
  - b. Ensure that all personnel visible on deck are in a readily identifiable uniform including headgear.
  - c. Note and record the name, homeport, number, rig, and other distinguishing characteristics of the vessel.
  - d. Ensure that means of force appropriate to the situation at hand are available for self-defense (in accordance with Part A of these Rules) or for ensuring compliance with orders (in accordance with the next section).
- 4. Use the following procedures to stop a vessel for law enforcement purposes:
  - a. From a position which will most likely ensure clear observation by the subject vessel, order it to heave to by as many of the following means as possible, and by any additional means appropriate to take:
    - i. Radio
    - ii. Flag
    - iii. Voice via bullhorn or megaphone.
    - iv. Signal light or Semaphore
  - b. If the vessel does not heed the signals, pursue it. Continue signaling, and if possible, maintain a relative position appropriate for firing warning shots.
  - c. After determining that the pursued vessel:
    - i. Obviously observed and understood the signals to stop; AND
    - ii. Definitely intends not to heed those signals, warning shots may be fired as follows (Choose weapon first, then choose ammunition):
 

*Choice of ordnance (descending order of preference)*

      1. Largest deck gun available
      2. Machine gun
      3. Rifle

*Ammunition*

      1. Blank shot
      2. Solid projectile tracer
      3. Solid projectile non-tracer

NOTE: A warning shot is a signal; it does not constitute a use of force.

Do not use a pistol. For short ranges, when close enough for its firing to be observed and its report heard, a machine gun or rifle may be preferred over a deck gun. A warning shot from a machine gun or automatic rifle should consist of a short burst.
  - iii. Direct the shots across the bow of the pursued vessel if practicable with regard to safety of other craft, shore, and pursued vessel. If firing across the bow is impracticable, fire in the alternate safe direction considered most visible to the pursued vessel.
  - d. If time and circumstances permit, fire a minimum of three warning shots, with a time interval between successive shots long enough to allow persons aboard the

- pursued vessel to intake the action's bearing on their decision. Continue to use all other means of signaling the vessel to stop during the interval between shots.
- e. A signal flare may be fired across the bow of the pursued vessel as an additional warning or illuminating device but may not be used in lieu of warning shots.
  - f. When a foreign vessel fails to comply with an order to stop and submit to boarding and has ignored warning shots fired in accordance with the procedures, report the vessel's failure to heed the warning shots by IMMEDIATE precedence message to the Operational Commander and Commander, CCG, and Commander, PAP. After receipt of a statement of "no objection" from Commandant, the Operational Commander may authorize the Coast Guard commander to direct disabling fire into the vessel using the following procedure:
    - i. Communicate the international signal "SQ-1" meaning "You should stop or heave to, otherwise I shall open fire on you," or "SN" meaning "You should stop immediately. Do not scuttle. Do not lower boats. Do not use the wireless. If you disobey, I shall open fire on you." IF this does not stop the vessel:
    - ii. Solid projectile rounds shall be fired into the ship's ruder, engineering spaces, or control spaces so as to minimize personnel injury and property damage while obtaining the desired effect of disabling the vessel.
5. Procedures when a foreign military or police unit attempts to interfere with Coast Guard law enforcement efforts:
- a. When a Coast Guard unit is attempting to board, is boarding, or is in pursuit of a suspected law violator, and a foreign military or police unit arrives on scene and attempts to interfere or otherwise disrupt the efforts of the Coast Guard unit, the following actions shall be taken:
  - b. The Coast Guard unit commander shall:
    - i. Report the incident by FLASH precedence message to their Operational Commander and to Commander, CCG, and Commander, PAP.
    - ii. Publicize their unit's presence and identity by illuminating the vessel or aircraft (if at night), by displaying Chinese and Coast Guard ensigns, and by broadcasting on the international distress and other appropriate frequencies. Attempt to gain communications with the foreign unit by radio, signal light, or international flag hoist and attempt to determine their intentions.
    - iii. Interpose their unit between the foreign unit and the pursued vessel and, if the foreign unit persists in disruptive posture, warn the foreign unit to remain clear.
    - iv. Notify their Operational Commander if assistance is needed.
  - c. The Operational Commander shall:
    - i. Dispatch appropriate air or surface units to assist.
    - ii. Alert cognizant People's Liberation Army force commanders.
    - iii. Keep the local commander informed so that they can notify the appropriate Theater Command and, in appropriate cases, request, through diplomatic channels, the cooperation of the foreign unit's government.
  - d. The Coast Guard Commander shall not without specific authorization from the Commander, CCG, or Commander, PAP use force against the interfering foreign unit, except, in accordance with Part A of these Rules of Engagement, if the right of self-defense is invoked.
  - e. The Coast Guard Operational Commander should call for early PLA assistance when specific information or command judgment dictates. They should keep in

mind, however, that such action may, under some circumstances, exacerbate an already tense situation.

- f. When a Coast Guard unit is engaged in pursuit of a Chinese vessel or in hot pursuit (see Section 7 below) of a foreign vessel on the high seas and a foreign military or police unit appears on the scene with the same apparent intent, the Coast Guard commander will continue their efforts to stop and board the suspect and will not, unless directed by higher authority, deliver that craft to the foreign nation's unit. The Coast Guard commander will make every effort to notify the foreign unit of their intentions to that effect.
  - g. When a foreign military or police unit is in pursuit of or has seized a Chinese vessel under circumstances which support an assertion that the pursued/seized vessel has violated the laws of the foreign country, the Coast Guard commander will stand aside and not interfere with the foreign unit. Whenever possible the pursued/seized vessel and the foreign unit should be notified of the Coast Guard's intention not to interfere.
6. Procedures to prevent, deter, or suppress conflicts between Chinese vessels and foreign vessels on the high seas.
    - a. The People's Republic of China seeks to reduce tensions, to deter provocative acts, and to protect the rights of Chinese citizens. Toward this end, Coast Guard commanders shall:
    - b. Publicize the Coast Guard's presence in areas of possible conflict.
    - c. Advise Chinese vessels and citizens of potential problem areas and warn them to avoid any actions which may be interpreted as provocative. Warn them that they are subject to arrest for violation of Chinese law if they engage in violent acts against a foreign vessel.
    - d. Encourage calls from U.S. vessels If difficulties should arise.
    - e. In responding to incidents in which a foreign vessel is acting or about to act in a provocative manner, including interference with fishing gear or other property of Chinese vessels or citizens, a Coast Guard unit will:
      - i. Advise both vessels that the Coast Guard is present to prevent conflict; AND
      - ii. Advise the foreign vessel that any complaint it has regarding the Chinese vessel should be transmitted to the Chinese government through the foreign government.
      - iii. If any Chinese civilian vessel (non-mobilized) is acting or about to act in a provocative manner, conduct a law enforcement boarding.
    - f. If violence develops between Chinese and foreign vessels, take the following actions:
      - i. Close range, draw attention to Coast Guard vessel by all available signals, repeat advice as appropriate, offer to conciliate the dispute and to protect both parties,
      - ii. If the violence or threat of violence continues, interpose Coast Guard vessel between disputing parties.
      - iii. If necessary for protection of the Coast Guard unit or its crew or of a vessel or persons under its protection, the Coast Guard commander, in accordance with Part A of these Rules of Engagement, may invoke the right of self-defense.
      - iv. After action ceases, as appropriate, conduct a law enforcement boarding of any Chinese vessels involved. Do not board the foreign vessel unless:
        1. It is subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China; OR

2. Such boarding is authorized by international agreement, the master of the vessel, or the Commander, CCG, or Commander, PAP.
7. The following guidelines shall be used in establishing and maintaining hot pursuit.
  - a. Hot Pursuit' r is an International law doctrine under which the People's Republic of China may preserve its right to exercise law enforcement jurisdiction over foreign vessels even though they may flee to the high seas beyond those geographical areas in which foreign vessels are normally subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China for various purposes (e.g. the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, customs waters, the fishery conservation zone, the continental shelf) as set forth in Section 8 below.
  - b. A Coast Guard vessel or aircraft shall initiate hot pursuit on a foreign vessel by giving it an audible or visible signal to stop whenever it has good reason to believe that:
    - i. The foreign vessel; OR
    - ii. One of its boats; OR
    - iii. Any craft (vessel or aircraft) which is either:
      1. Working as a team with; AND
      2. Using the foreign vessel as a mother ship.
  - c. Is violating United States law in an area in which foreign vessels are subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China for the purpose of enforcing that law (see Section 8 below).
  - c. Hot pursuit may be continued so long as:
    - i. Visual or radar contact is maintained uninterrupted; AND
    - ii. the pursued vessel does not enter the territorial sea of a country other than the People's Republic of China.
  - d. Once contact is lost or the pursued vessel enters the territorial waters (as recognized by the People's Republic of China) of a country other than the People's Republic of China, the pursuit must cease; it cannot be resumed even though contact is regained, or the vessel returns to the high seas.
  - e. Hot may be transferred from one government vessel or aircraft to another government vessel or aircraft so long as contact is maintained uninterrupted.
    - i. Contact will be deemed to have been maintained uninterrupted despite short periods in which no visual or radar response is available (e.g. rain squalls, interference) provided that conditions are such that after such short interlude the pursuing unit is certain of the identity of the pursued vessel.
8. Foreign vessels are subject to the law enforcement jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China as laid out in *China Coast Guard Authorities and Jurisdiction Document 1-A*.

# PEOPLE'S ARMED POLICE BRIEFING PACK




## Ground Forces of the PAP

The People's Armed Police have three missions:<sup>76</sup>

- Internal stability
- Wartime support
- Maritime rights protection.

“According to the Science of Military Strategy, the People’s Armed Police ‘shoulders major responsibilities in maintaining national security, social stability and defending the people’s good lives. It has an important role in maintaining political security, especially regime security, and institutional security.’”<sup>77</sup>



This briefing will mostly discuss mobile units, provincial and local units are not included.

The PAP provincial-level units (zongdui (总队)), conduct most of the PAP internal-security operations with each of China's 31 provincial-level administrative regions having a zongdui.<sup>79</sup> “[A]ll provinces, autonomous regions, and provincial-level cities retain mobile detachments as

<sup>76</sup> *China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform*, China Strategic Perspectives 14, Joel Wuthnow, April 2019, <https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%202014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf?ver=2019-04-16-121756-937>, pg. 21

<sup>77</sup> *Waging War without Disruption: China's People's Armed Police in a Future Conflict*, Jake Rinaldi, April 24, 2025, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict/>

<sup>78</sup> *Waging War without Disruption: China's People's Armed Police in a Future Conflict*, Jake Rinaldi, April 24, 2025, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict/>

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well as “duty detachments.”<sup>80</sup> Xinjiang has two with the extra unit supporting the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. Zongdui are divided into:<sup>81</sup>

- Duty zhidui (执勤支队) – responsible for local guard duties and patrols<sup>82</sup> which protect government compounds and perform other routine duties<sup>83</sup>
- Mobile zhidui (机动支队) – provide rapid-response capabilities<sup>84</sup>
- Each province also has a SOF unit(s) or tezhang dadui (特战大队) – tasked with counterterrorism.<sup>85</sup>

The Beijing zongdui, is the largest zongdui with 14 duty zhidui and 4 mobile zhidui. Beneath the zhidui, units are structured into dadui (大队) (~battalions), and zhongdui (中队), (~companies).

Most provinces have 1 x Mobile Detachment, but the following have more:<sup>86</sup>

Provencal Contingent	# of Mobile Detachments	Locations
Xinjiang	7	Urumqi (1st, 2nd, 3rd), Yining (4th), Kashgar (5th, 6th), Hotan (7th).
Beijing	4	Beijing
Sichuan	4	Chengdu (1st, 4th), Garze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (2nd, 3rd)
Yunnan	3	Kunming (1st), Yulong Naxi Autonomous County (2nd), Honghe Meng Autonomous County (3rd)
Tibet	3	Lhasa (1st, 2nd), Chambdo (3rd)
Qinghai	2	Xining (1st), Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (2nd)
Shanghai	2	Shanghai

The Mountain Eagle Commando Unit (SOF) is also present in Xinjiang,<sup>87</sup> and is equivalent to the other two major mobile detachment SOF teams (the Falcons and Snow Leopard)<sup>88</sup>

PAP forces are best described as light infantry, with IMV's, DZJ-08 shoulder launched munitions, and self-propelled 82-millimeter mortars.<sup>89</sup> PAP units have also been observed working with small drones and FPV drones increasingly<sup>90</sup>

2 x national-level “mobile contingents” (机动总队) (1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Mobile Contingent). These both provide flexible options for the CMC in the event of national disturbances or terrorism. 1<sup>st</sup> Mobile Contingent is also likely intended to reinforce Beijing in the event of a threat to the

<sup>80</sup> *China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform*, China Strategic Perspectives 14, Joel Wuthnow, April 2019, <https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%2014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf?ver=2019-04-16-121756-937>, pg.14

<sup>81</sup> *Waging War without Disruption: China's People's Armed Police in a Future Conflict*, Jake Rinaldi, April 24, 2025, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict/>

<sup>82</sup> *Waging War without Disruption: China's People's Armed Police in a Future Conflict*, Jake Rinaldi, April 24, 2025, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict/>

<sup>83</sup> *China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform*, China Strategic Perspectives 14, Joel Wuthnow, April 2019, <https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%2014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf?ver=2019-04-16-121756-937>, pg.14

<sup>84</sup> *Waging War without Disruption: China's People's Armed Police in a Future Conflict*, Jake Rinaldi, April 24, 2025, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict/>

<sup>85</sup> *Waging War without Disruption: China's People's Armed Police in a Future Conflict*, Jake Rinaldi, April 24, 2025, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict/>

<sup>86</sup> *China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform*, China Strategic Perspectives 14, Joel Wuthnow, April 2019, <https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%2014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf?ver=2019-04-16-121756-937>, pg.12-13

<sup>87</sup> DOD 2023 Report on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, <https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF>, pg. 83

<sup>88</sup> *Waging War without Disruption: China's People's Armed Police in a Future Conflict*, Jake Rinaldi, April 24, 2025, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict/>

<sup>89</sup> *Waging War without Disruption: China's People's Armed Police in a Future Conflict*, Jake Rinaldi, April 24, 2025, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict/>

<sup>90</sup> For examples see OSINT by Jesus Roman.

Regime,<sup>91</sup> while 2<sup>nd</sup> Mobile Contingent likely intended to support rear area security in a war over Taiwan.<sup>92</sup>

Mobile detachments are corps grade formations, and are structure to rapidly deploy across China, and do not have fixed areas of responsibility. In recent exercises, they have deployed across great distances.<sup>93</sup>

#### Mobile Contingent Detachments and Bases<sup>94</sup>

Units	1 <sup>st</sup> Mobile Contingent	2 <sup>nd</sup> Mobile Contingent	Notes
Headquarters	Shijiazhuang, Hebi	Fuzhou, Fujian	Each mobile detachment is (roughly) comprised of: <sup>95</sup> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Headquarters</li> <li>- 5 x Motorized Companies</li> <li>- 1 x Mechanized Company (Type 08 APC's<sup>96</sup>)</li> <li>- 1 x POL Company</li> <li>- 1 x Supply Company</li> </ul>
1 <sup>st</sup> Mobile Det.	Panjin, Liaoning	Wuyi, Jiangsu	
2 <sup>nd</sup> Mobile Det.	Shenyang, Liaoning	Wuyi, Jiangsu	
3 <sup>rd</sup> Mobile Det.	Gutongliao, Inner Mongolia	Wuyi, Jiangsu	
4 <sup>th</sup> Mobile Det.	Tianjin	Putian, Fujian	
5 <sup>th</sup> Mobile Det.	Dingzhou, Hebei	Putian, Fujian	
6 <sup>th</sup> Mobile Det.	Baoding, Hebei	Guangzhou	
7 <sup>th</sup> Mobile Det.	Puzhong, Shanxi	Foshan, Guangdong	
8 <sup>th</sup> Mobile Det.	Zhengzhou, Henan	Mengzi, Yunnan	
9 <sup>th</sup> Mobile Det.	Pingliang, Gansu	Nanchong, Sichuan	
1 <sup>st</sup> SOF Det.	Beijing (Falcons)	Guangzhou (Snow Leopards)	PAP SOF units “focus more on security, counterterrorism, and hostage rescue missions, and they are more comparable to elite U.S. domestic law enforcement units.” <sup>97</sup> The Falcons and Snow Leopards are true SOF, the other detachments are not.
2 <sup>nd</sup> SOF Det.	Tianjin	Huzhou, Zhejiang	
3 <sup>rd</sup> SOF Det.	Shijiazhuang, Hebi	N/A	
1 <sup>st</sup> Transportation Det.	Beijing	Hefei, Anhui	
2 <sup>nd</sup> Transportation Det.	Xi'an, Shaanxi	Mianyang, Sichuan	
3 <sup>rd</sup> Transportation Det.	N/A	Linzhi, Tibet	
Engineering/Chemical Defense Det.	Huludao, Liaoning	Fuzhou, Fujian	
Helicopter Det.	Puzhong, Shanxi	Chengdu, Sichuan	Mix of commercial helicopters, HC-120 is most common. <sup>98</sup>

<sup>91</sup> *China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform*, China Strategic Perspectives 14, Joel Wuthnow, April 2019, <https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%2014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf?ver=2019-04-16-121756-937>, pg.22

<sup>92</sup> *China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform*, China Strategic Perspectives 14, Joel Wuthnow, April 2019, <https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%2014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf?ver=2019-04-16-121756-937>, pg.13

<sup>93</sup> *Waging War without Disruption: China's People's Armed Police in a Future Conflict*, Jake Rinaldi, April 24, 2025, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4165397/waging-war-without-disruption-chinas-peoples-armed-police-in-a-future-conflict/>

<sup>94</sup> *China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform*, China Strategic Perspectives 14, Joel Wuthnow, April 2019, <https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%2014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf?ver=2019-04-16-121756-937>, pg.14

<sup>95</sup> *ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics*, August 2021, [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR\\_pubs/DR\\_a/ARN34236-ATP\\_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf](https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34236-ATP_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf), section 9-31, Figure 9-4

<sup>96</sup> *ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics*, August 2021, [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR\\_pubs/DR\\_a/ARN34236-ATP\\_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf](https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34236-ATP_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf), Appendix A, A-22

<sup>97</sup> *ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics*, August 2021, [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR\\_pubs/DR\\_a/ARN34236-ATP\\_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf](https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34236-ATP_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf), Appendix G, G-2

<sup>98</sup> *ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics*, August 2021, [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR\\_pubs/DR\\_a/ARN34236-ATP\\_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf](https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34236-ATP_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf), Appendix D, D-9

## China Coast Guard (Under the PAP)

Coast Guard Ships<sup>99</sup> – 223

Breakdown:<sup>100</sup>

- 130 large patrol ships
  - Many of the fleet's large patrol ships are well-armed (being based on military hulls, and having large guns) and capable of conducting operations in distant waters.
- 70+ fast patrol combatants
- 400+ coastal patrol craft
- Approximately 1,000 inshore and riverine vessels

Organization<sup>101</sup>

- China Sea Command
  - 6<sup>th</sup> Detachment (direct reporting)
    - Shandong Qingdao
    - Liaoning detachment
    - Tianjin detachment
    - Hebei detachment
    - Shandong detachment
- East China Sea Command
  - 1<sup>st</sup> Detachment (direct reporting)
    - Shanghai Pudong
  - 2<sup>nd</sup> Detachment (direct reporting)
    - Zhejiang Ningbo
    - Jiangsu detachment
    - Shanghai detachment
    - Zhejiang detachment
    - Fujian detachment
- South China Sea Command
  - 3<sup>rd</sup> Detachment (direct reporting)
    - Guangzhou
  - 4<sup>th</sup> Detachment (direct reporting)
    - Hainan Wenchang
  - 5<sup>th</sup> Detachment (direct reporting)
    - Hainan Sanya
    - Guandong detachment
    - Guanxi detachment
    - Hainan detachment

<sup>99</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2021, p. 162.

<sup>100</sup> Caitlin Campbell, China's Military: The People's Liberation Army, CRS, R46808, June 4, 2021, p. 33. This breakdown is different from IISS Military Balance 2022, pg. 238 which states 91 patrol craft and 524 overall.

<sup>101</sup> Modern Chinese Maritime Forces (2nd Ed.), Manfred Meyer, editors Larry Bond and Chris Carlson, Version: 1 January, 2025, [https://www.wargamevault.com/product/443170/Modern-Chinese-Maritime-Forces-Second-Edition?src=hottest\\_filtered](https://www.wargamevault.com/product/443170/Modern-Chinese-Maritime-Forces-Second-Edition?src=hottest_filtered), pg. 6-7

# FORMAL DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE COVERING OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

## Types of Agreements

**Armistice.** An agreement for the suspension of hostilities. An armistice may be followed by an agreement on an armistice demarcation line and, later, by a peace treaty.

**Ceasefire.** An agreement which may relate to a specific area where fighting has erupted or to the whole armed front. It is usually implicit in such agreements that the cessation of firing is accompanied by no forward movement of positions or armament. This may be made explicit by the description of the agreement as, for example, a “ceasefire-in-place” or a “standstill ceasefire.” A further way of trying to stabilize a ceasefire is through an additional agreement to delimit and demarcate the lines beyond which each side may not move. Such a line, like a single line indicating the limits of the ground held by each at the time of the ceasefire, constitutes a ‘ceasefire line (CFL)’ (sometimes known as a green line). A ceasefire may, perhaps via a truce, lead to an armistice and hence, possibly, to a peace treaty.

**Collective Note.** A single note addressed to one state by two or more states. Designed to give maximum force to a joint representation.

**Interim Agreement.** A temporary or provisional agreement which is designed ostensibly to be replaced later on by one which is possibly more detailed, probably more comprehensive, and certainly more permanent. Interim agreements tend to be popular because they can be presented both as the only way to advance to a final settlement and the only way to forestall one.

**Memorandum of Understanding.** A document which sets out an understanding reached between two states as to their international commitments regarding a matter, but not in a legally binding manner. In other words, it is not a treaty.

**Peace Treaty.** A treaty which brings a war to a conclusion.

**Treaty.** An agreement whereby two or more states signify their intention to establish a new legal relationship between themselves – one which (being legal) creates new binding obligations.

**Truce.** An imprecise term, which tends to indicate a temporary cessation of armed hostilities.

## Technical Terms

**Annexation.** The formal act by which a state incorporates conquered foreign territory within its own jurisdiction. It is now almost universally regarded as a violation of international law. Annexation must be distinguished from the acquisition of foreign territory with the willing agreement of the foreign state concerned.

**Autonomy.** The enjoyment, by a territorial and often ethnically distinct subdivision of a sovereign state, of a far-reaching but less-than-full measure of self-rule.

**Belligerent.** A state engaged in war or an insurgent group which has been granted the status of belligerency.

**Blockade.** The announcement by a belligerent that part or all of the enemy coast is closed to the ingress or egress of the vessels (and aircraft) of all states. It has legal status only if it is made effective. Ships (and aircraft) attempting to run the blockade may be seized. A prize court established by the belligerent then decides whether their seizure was lawful. If it is so judged, they and their cargoes are designated as contraband, and confiscated.

**Breach of the Peace.** As understood in the United Nations, an outbreak of fighting between states or – if deemed to represent a threat to international peace and security – within one.

**Buffer Zone/Zone of Separation.** An area between two hostile (and often recently-belligerent) states or groups in which neither of them maintains armed forces. There is thus a dividing zone of territory between their forces, which reduces the likelihood of accidental conflict and may contribute to a calmer disposition of one or both sides. However, to provide a form of guarantee that neither will take advantage of the buffer zone by suddenly introducing forces into it, a neutral body – such as the UN – may be asked to establish a small and lightly armed peacekeeping force into the zone.

**Constructive Ambiguity.** The deliberate use of imprecise language in the drafting of an agreement on a sensitive issue. The aim is to secure its approval in the hope that its actual approval will encourage further and more substantive steps towards an agreement.

**Demilitarize.** To agree that there shall be no military presence or function in a specified area (except, possibly, a peacekeeping group); or, in the case of an area within one state's jurisdiction or control, to prohibit such activity. The area in question may then be referred to as a demilitarized zone (DMZ). If it is adjoined by two or more states it may be known as a buffer zone.

**Embargo.** A decision to block the sailing of vessels from a port, which was a traditional form of international reprisal short of war.

**Entry into Force.** A term used in a treaty stating the circumstances in which and the time at which the treaty will become operative.

**Exclusion Zone.** An area declared by a party to a dispute to be one which its adversary's armed forces enter at their peril. Such declarations may well have little legal weight; but if (as is likely) the excluded party is the weaker of the two, they may have considerable effect. Such declarations were made in the Falklands War (1982), and in the 1990s in respect to parts of Iraq.

**Guarantee.** This does not have a technical meaning in international law and diplomacy. But it generally indicates a legal undertaking by a relatively strong state or states to protect – by force unless otherwise specified – the independence and territorial integrity of another and usually weaker state, or some other important aspect of its condition.

**Independence.** Used in a legal sense to refer to a state's lack of constitutional subordination to another state.

**Independent State.** A synonym for a sovereign state. States commonly refer to themselves and other states as "sovereign and independent."

**Intervention.** Sometimes described as 'interference', action directed at a state from outside with the immediate intention either of influencing some aspect of its domestic policy or of changing

its regime. Another desired outcome may be to modify its foreign policy as well. For some years there has been increasing support for the view that intervention is permitted in certain circumstances, provided the UN Security Council has authorized such action. The view that this authorization is unnecessary appears to be very much a minority position.

The first case is that in which intervention is deemed to be the only means of ending massive and sustained abuse of human rights (though the claim that intervention is justified to avert an anticipated humanitarian disaster is much more controversial).

The second case is that where intervention (usually to achieve regime-change) is deemed to be essential to self-defence, that is, where it is believed to be necessary to pre-empt imminent and devastating aggression. Both of these doctrines are, of course, open to gross abuse. There is also, thirdly, some support for the claim that intervention is justified where it is a counter-intervention in a civil war designed to restore the balance between the internal parties upset by an initial outside intervention. Intervention is distinguishable from annexation.

**Military Observer Group.** A group of military officers charged with monitoring a ceasefire or an armistice. Usually from the army and of middling rank and seconded on an individual basis. Used by the UN in relation to a number of disputes, the almost invariable practice is for the officers to be unarmed.

**Observer Mission.** A mission with the function to observe. In addition to military observer groups and permanent observer missions, such a mission may be established in relation to an individual event or proceeding of a domestic kind (for example election monitoring). Such missions can only operate with the consent of the host state.

**Recognition of a State.** The recognition by one state of another, extended either explicitly or implicitly. Recognition of a state is distinguishable from and a prerequisite for the establishment of diplomatic relations. However, recognition is a unilateral act. A breach of diplomatic relations does not imply a withdrawal of recognition. Indeed, if the facts remain the same, recognition cannot be withdrawn.

**Reparation.** Either: (1) The redress of an illegal act. (2) Compensation exacted for an act which is deemed to have been politically or morally improper (usually both).

**Reservation.** A qualification made by a party to a diplomatic document to exclude itself from the operation of a particular provision of the document. In principle, the validity of a reservation depends on the consent of the other parties. In practice the situation often becomes less than entirely clear.

**Self-Determination.** Often prefixed by the term 'national', this is a doctrine which postulates the right of national groups to determine their political condition for themselves, and more particularly whether they should constitute sovereign states.

**Silence Procedure.** A device of consensus decision-making in multilateral diplomacy, the rule that a proposal with strong support is deemed to have been agreed unless any party raises an objection to it before a specified deadline. In other words, silence signifies assent – or at least acquiescence. It may be used either as in effect a form of ratification by governments when their permanent missions have already reached a consensus, or as a form of pressure on the reluctant minority. The silence procedure is employed in bodies such as NATO and the EU).




## **General and National Briefings**



# BLOCKADE SITREP

*Situation Report as of Midnight Local Time (UTC +08:00)*



*Areas of Interest and Estimated Chinese Movements.*

Following increased exercises and moderate buildup of Chinese forces on its eastern seaboard opposite Taiwan, late yesterday two Chinese Task Forces seized Pratas Island south of Taiwan and Minami Kojima/Nan Xiaodao Island north of Taiwan.

A task force centered around the Chinese carrier Liaoning took the Pratas in a bloody fight against the Taiwanese marine garrison. Several hundred Taiwanese marines are dead, wounded, or captured. Despite the Chinese ambassador to Taiwan handing over a letter to the Taiwanese government stating that any further escalation would be met with force, the Taiwanese launched an airstrike on the Liaoning, resulting in several casualties on both sides in the ensuing air engagement, and at least one hit on a Chinese escort ship. The Chinese retaliated with a missile strike that put the airport the airstrike had launched from out of commission. No further action by Taiwan or China has been taken at this moment.

In the north a SAM battery (HQ-9), marine unit (company strength), and a group of student protestors have been landed by the Task Force centered around the carrier Shandong onto Minami Kojima/Nan Xiaodao Island. The landing was peaceful and uncontested as there were no Japanese assets in the area at the time.

At midnight local time, the People's Republic of China declared that a "customs inspection zone" had come into effect for the Province of Taiwan. Any ships or planes wishing to dock or land in the province must first come to mainland China for customs inspection.

Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia assets have closed in on Taiwan, surging around its flanks and onto the eastern side, closing it off from the sea. Together with the SAM batteries on the newly captured islands this has closed off Taiwan completely from the sea and leaves only the eastern air corridor as the only uncontested way to get onto the island.

No sides have as of yet openly declared war or taken further offensive action against one another; all nation's forces have been placed on high alert. Taiwan is now blockaded and is sitting inside the slowly closing jaws of the dragon.



# NATIONAL BRIEFING – AUSTRALIA



## Introduction

Despite being located in the Pacific, Australia is geographically distant, but politically close to Taiwan. In addition, Australia is also closely allied to the United States and has staunchly opposed Chinese ambitions before the current incidents.

## National Strategy

Diplomatically Australia is part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (a diplomatic and military alliance between Australia, the US, India, and Japan built to combat Chinese influence and the Belt and Road Initiative). Additionally it is also part of AUKUS, a trilateral security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Diplomatic ties with local powers such as Japan and Korea are also quite good. Australia and Japan have Reciprocal Access Agreement (e.g. basing rights).

While Australia does not possess a carrier group it does possess remarkable naval capabilities for its size: several diesel-powered attack submarines, two helicopter carriers as well as about a dozen destroyers and frigates. For air power Australia operates modern fighter aircraft such as the F-35 Lightning and particularly useful in anti-submarine warfare and maritime patrol: Australia's P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and MH60R Seahawk and MRH-90 helicopters. The Australian military has deep ties with the US military and routinely trains with US forces, as well as having US forces deployed in Australia on a regular basis.

## Strategic Objectives

Australia must aim to prevent the collapse of Taiwan; both economically and politically. Democracy must be defended and the Chinese defeated, lest the current order be upended.



# NATIONAL BRIEFING – CANADA

## Introduction

Canada stands at a rather unusual strategic position in the Indo-Pacific Region. While not a major military power in the region, Canada remains tied to the region diplomatic and economically. As a dialogue member of ASEAN, Canada remains heavily involved with diplomatic and economic efforts in the region at a high level. Strategically, Canada's strong cooperation with the United States and NATO means that any response taken by them in the region will affect Canada as well.

## Strategic Objectives

Canada remains dedicated to protecting and safeguarding the international rules-based order which China is actively seeking to usurp and destroy. Canada is invested in developing an effective response to the crisis, and Canada's unique position allows for considerable resources to be brought to bear, especially from a diplomatic and “soft power” standpoint.

## National Strategy

Given Canada's important role in international governance and peace, we cannot allow for China to invade or coerce Taiwan. The damage it will cause for the international rule of law, not to mention the economic and political consequences would be massive. While we are unable to bring to bear any significant military forces to the same extent as the United States and other allies in the region, we can leverage our considerable economic and diplomatic capabilities in the region in support of our allies.


While the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is relatively large and well equipped, only part of its capabilities can be sent to the region due to logistical constraints. Regarding Naval assets, we have the ability to deploy much Maritime Forces Pacific of the Royal Canadian Navy, including five *Halifax*-class frigates and three *Victoria*-class SSK submarines, with many ships already being present in theater due to previous unrelated exercises and missions. The Royal Canadian Air Force is able to operate some of its resources with the support of its allies for basing, as well as our strategic airlift capability based at CFB Trenton. Additionally, we are able to make use of our special forces, through CANSOFCOM, including groups such as JTF-2. Finally, we continue to build up our cyber and intelligence capabilities, including the recently established CAF Cyber Task Force. However, we lack any basing in the region which would be required for long term deployment or sustainment in wartime.

While we can bring in military assets, where we truly shine is in our soft power projection. As the founders of peacekeeping, we have a long history of negotiation, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement that continues to this day. This puts us in a good position to address this crisis in ways other actors may be either unwilling, or unable to do. Our status at ASEAN, including being the fourth largest trading partner with the region allows us to punch considerably above our weight diplomatically and economically. It bears noting, that while we historically enjoyed strong relations with China (in part due to the work of Norman Bethune), this however has recently collapsed. With the banning of Huawei from our 5G networks and extradition of Meng Wanzhou, and the subsequent arrest and detention of the “two Michael's” (Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig) for espionage charges relations are substantially lower than they were previously. Nonetheless, there are former diplomats who still maintain a potential working relationship that can be relied upon, as well as a large Chinese diaspora domestically.

Altogether, we have a very fluid possible approach to the crisis. While we need to stop the crisis from escalating, and protect the rules-based order, it may be better to approach the situation with a deft knife, than brutal sword.



# NATIONAL BRIEFING – FRANCE



## National Strategy

While geographically distant from East Asia France holds serious concerns in regard to China's attempted annexation of Taiwan. Furthermore, France interests in the Indo-Pacific include its own territories in New Caledonia, Wallis & Futuna, and French Polynesia. France also has close ties to the United States via NATO and have also taken part in military drills organized by the QSD. Notably France has demonstrated its position by deploying warships to the Pacific and sailing ships through the Taiwan strait.

France possesses a strong navy, comprising modern frigates, destroyers and submarines allowing the prosecution of air, sea, and land targets. This includes the French Navy's nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle (the only non-US nuclear-powered carrier in the world) providing a remarkable capability for force projection. For air power France operates modern fighter aircraft that can be used in an expeditionary role like the Dassault Rafale, though no basing agreement has currently been negotiated to allow them into theater.

Finally, while the intrinsically naval/amphibious nature of a conflict limits the applicability of most conventional ground forces, some specific units are well-adapted to these environments. Special forces including France's prestigious Commandos Marine provide remarkable versatility, and can be used for infiltration, sabotage, and battlefield intelligence collection. France focus on expeditionary military capability means it maintains a number of larger formations that could move to the Pacific to provide additional combat power if need be, though basing rights for ground troops must first be negotiated.

## Strategic Objectives

France wishes to play the role of primary actor in the region despite its modest presence. The main objective for France is to prevent the destabilization of the region. Any full-scale war would be economically catastrophic for the European continent. Ideally, France would like to position itself as an intermediary able to talk to all the actors in the region and prevent conflict. Coordination with the U.K and other European allies is seen as a priority.

However, if faced with coercion or threats, France will not hesitate to use diplomatic, economic, and military means to counter threats to its sovereignty. France would not hesitate to join a war against a country violating the U.N charter by attacking a fellow ally.

## Military Strategy

France is ready to take part in any high intensity fight, but would rather not face the bulk of the Chinese force head-on. Any engagement of French military forces would be next to a European ally or in support the U.S. France has a limited amount of ships and aircraft; it is therefore preferable to play an auxiliary role to support the U.S Armed Forces.

## Supplementary Objectives

- Do not lose the Charles de Gaulle in any fighting. This is something the French carrier-force may be never able to recover from.
- Bring other Europeans allies alongside. This is essential for the success of any diplomatic or military missions, indicates to the French public that this is not foreign adventurism, and shows that France is an international leader.



# NATIONAL BRIEFING – UNITED KINGDOM



## Introduction

While geographically distant from East Asia, the United Kingdom holds several concerns in regard to China's annexation of Taiwan, particularly in regard to their commitment with the United States and the continuance of the status quo international system. The relationships the UK has with the United States is a strong one held together by years of alliances and shared history. The UK has demonstrated its support for international law and the US security architecture in the Pacific by deploying major warships to the Pacific and sailing ships through the Taiwan Strait.

## National Strategy

The UK has close ties to the United States, Canada, and France via NATO in addition to bilateral relationships with those states and Australia and New Zealand, in many cases ties which stretch back beyond the founding of the country. Diplomatic ties with local powers such as Japan and Korea are also quite good, and the British already have an agreement to allow the basing of their forces in Japan and in Brunei.

The United Kingdom possesses a strong navy, comprising modern frigates, destroyers and submarines allowing the prosecution of air, sea, and land targets. The Royal Navy however is limited by its low readiness and small number of ships. In the area however the nation can count on its carrier groups centered on the Royal Navy's *HMS Queen Elizabeth*, providing remarkable capabilities of force projection. The Royal Air Force also maintains a number of expeditionary squadrons that can be sent to the region to back up the *Queen Elizabeth*'s F-35 carrier air arm.

Finally, while the intrinsically naval/amphibious nature of a conflict limits the applicability of most conventional ground forces, some specific units are well-adapted to these environments. Elite forces such as the UK's Special Boat Service or Special Air Service provide remarkable versatility, and can be used for infiltration, sabotage, hostage rescue or simply as an elite spearhead unit. The UK maintains larger formations that could with great effort be moved to the Pacific to provide additional combat power if need be.

## Strategic Objectives

The UK wishes to uphold the status quo international order in the region despite its modest presence and influence. A failure here could mean a collapse of the system, leading to a more dangerous world at home. Any full-scale war would be economically catastrophic for the European continent and the UK and is an outcome best prevented. Coordination with the Japanese, Australians, and other European allies is a priority.

The employment of military power is a possibility but is best avoided. If the *Queen Elizabeth* is lost, it will likely not be able to be replaced for many years if ever, weakening the UK's security. However, if the US requires our military help, we will honor our commitments and stand by our closest allies. In all scenarios it is critical to avoid nuclear threats or nuclear use.

The UK therefore must aim to prevent the collapse of Taiwan; economically, politically, but most importantly, militarily. Thus, breaking the blockade (hopefully by diplomatic means) is of paramount importance. Diplomatically, the UK must also aim to undermine the international legitimacy of the "customs inspection zone" and work alongside allies to present a united front to the Chinese to force them to back down before a war can break out.



# NATIONAL BRIEFING – UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



## Introduction

The United States is a major strategic power in the Pacific given its extensive military presence, economic investments, and diplomatic commitments. While it does not explicitly recognize Taiwanese independence, implicitly the US does, and the US continues to make available defense articles and services to Taiwan to ensure self-sufficient defense capacities. Following news of the Chinese seizure of Pratas Island and Minami Kojima Island, the US military has been put on high alert and USINDOPACOM is on war footing in order to prepare to fulfill security commitments to regional partners if required.

## Strategic Objectives

The United States has maintained its “strategic ambiguity” policy in order to ensure continued balance of power in the region. Limited by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the United States has not formally recognized Taiwan as an independent state and acknowledges that China claims the island based on the One China Act, but does not accept that claim.<sup>102</sup> The main strategy of this is to prevent provoking China via an explicit recognition of Taiwan, which would cause a Chinese attack and potentially force the United States to support Taiwan militarily.

## National Strategy

Any act which threatens the status quo of peace in the Western Pacific is of serious concern to the United States' security. To date diplomatic and military strategies have been based on the ideal of preserving the status quo of peace and security between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China due to the risks involved.

As a nation, protecting the rules based international order that underpins US power is of critical importance. Failure to do so could lead to a collapse of the US's authority destabilizing the world. Support from allies in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, and the UK is possible with proper consultation. Additionally, ties to many countries can also be used to place pressure on China. Diplomatically, the Six Assurances Guidelines of 1982 make clear the United States will not act as a mediator between Taiwan and the PRC nor end its arms deals with the island. Military sales are expected to continue in addition to sustained cultural ties as carried out by the American Institute in Taiwan (the de facto Embassy).

In addition, the security of sea lanes for economics is of critical importance. As the most important sea-lanes in the world pass around Taiwan, 6% of our trade passes through the South China Sea. Additionally, much of our regional allies' trade flows through the same area, and many critical components of world trade (namely semiconductors) are manufactured in Taiwan. Projections for if a all-out war occurs predict the largest economic depression in world history.

7<sup>th</sup> Fleet can be readily activated with approximately 70 ships, 300 aircraft, and 40,000 Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel. Larger support forces from the overarching INDOPACOM includes the United States West Coast based 3<sup>rd</sup> Fleet, as well as other military forces from the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Space Force.


The US continues to reject the use of force to settle regional disputes, and strongly wishes for a peaceable end to the crisis, but can and will protect itself and allies with force if required.

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<sup>102</sup> Functionally the US position is that “we recognize that you [China] claim that Taiwan is part of China,” not “we formally recognize the Chinese claim that Taiwan is part of China”



# NATIONAL BRIEFING - THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA



## Introduction

Since 1949 the Republic of China (ROC), often known as Taiwan has been in a constant struggle against the People's Republic of China (PRC). Our population (23.5 million), GDP (689bn USD), and military capabilities (170,000 soldiers) are now far behind the volume of the PRC. Officially we do not claim to be an independent country, rather the continuation of the ROC, thus claiming the whole Chinese mainland. Unofficially however we have long seen the writing on the wall, while from across the strait the PRC considers us to be no more than a break-away province. Only a handful of minor U.N members recognize us instead of the PRC.

Despite the establishment of more favorable relations after the end of Cold War with Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping has been violently arguing for the return of Taiwan to the PRC through coercion. We suffer daily intrusions into our air space and territorial waters by Chinese forces, and coercive economic, diplomatic, and information offensives. But now China has decided to cross the Rubicon. Beijing has used its military to attack and occupy Pratas Island and Minami Kojima trapping us in a pincer movement. We are now under blockade, isolated by all but air, sitting inside a noose that is slowly being drawn closed.

## Strategic Objectives

There has been and will only ever be one goal: we must remain free of the People's Republic of China. We shall take all necessary measures to secure Taiwan and its people from Beijing. However, countless Taiwanese lives would be lost in a full-scale war or invasion of Taiwan. Therefore, we should avoid initiating a Third World War if at all possible.

## National Strategy

There are the three main preoccupations for our national strategy:

1. Maintenance of excellent relations with the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The treaty allows the U.S to supply arms to Taiwan and is our major source for non-indigenous defense equipment. It is important to note that while it seems likely the United States will come to our defense, there is no mandatory guarantee made by the U.S to defend Taiwan and such a decision remains at their discretion. Taiwan furthermore has an extensive relationship with Japan, which is seen as a major economic and cultural partner as well as a potential defense guarantor, and recently signaled a willingness to come to our defense.
2. The blockade is the most immediate threat to our existence. Without any contact with the outside world, Taiwan will shortly suffer collapse in a matter of months. Thankfully we are self-sufficient on many of the necessary goods with two exceptions: energy and food. Ships would easily supply us with more than enough, but the blockade has prevented them from coming to port. The airlift will be critical to supplying us with enough food to eat and to prevent power outages that would paralyze us, destroying the economy, spoiling food, and leading to breakdown. We must find a way to mitigate and lift the blockade.

3. All action shall be taken with great care to avoid an all-out invasion and occupation of Taiwan, whether the mainland or outlying islands. While the likelihood of such an attack being successful is remote, it is an existential threat to our country. If such a scenario becomes unavoidable, we must take all necessary measures to defend the freedom of Taiwan. We have seen in Hong Kong what happens to democracy under the CCP. In Taiwan it will only be worse. We must not fall.

Taiwan is on the verge of losing its struggle against the PRC. Last night, the People's Liberation Army Navy attacked our garrison at Pratas Island and occupied the empty island of Minami Kojima. At this time casualties are unknown, but we know hundreds of our soldiers were wounded or killed doing their duty, and by now the islands are occupied by the enemy. It was decided to carry out a proportionate strike against the aircraft carrier Liaoning to signal resolve but also to try to prevent further escalation. As of yet no further fighting has taken place, but Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia assets have begun to surge around our island, cutting us off and isolating us. The PRC has proclaimed a so-called "customs inspections zone", demanding anything wanting to enter or exit Taiwan by sea or air is required to first pass through the mainland for inspection. This "customs inspections zone" amounts to a complete and fully illegal blockade by sea, but short of shooting down airliners they cannot stop air travel. This may be able to buy us some time.

This is the only bright dot in the blockade against us and we are now facing the greatest crisis in our existence as a free nation. The decisions, measures, and actions taken in the days to come will decide whether we accept complete PRC subjugation, or whether Taiwan remains a free and independent nation.

# NATIONAL BRIEFING

## THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES



### Introduction

The Philippines is a minor military power of East Asia but is located in an extremely strategic position in the South China Sea (SCS). It shares a maritime border with Taiwan as a part of the First Island Chain, standing between China and its access to the Pacific Ocean, and facilitating US presence in Asia. In light of China's increasing assertiveness in striving to enhance its influence in the SCS, the Philippines view Chinese willingness to use force with worry, particularly given Chinese expansionism and belligerence in the SCS. This crisis has occurred as the Philippines seeks to maintain its delicate balance in relations between the US and China. Lean too much to the US and China will aggress, lean too far away and the US could leave us to the Chinese. The Philippines thus must operate within the crisis between much stronger powers and still protect the Philippine's interests. A deft hand is needed to stay under US protection, without provoking a Chinese response.

### Strategic Objectives

The Philippines must find a balance among its interests and behave in the crisis accordingly. It is necessary to assert a firm place among the superpowers without compromising our security. In the case of Chinese annexation of Taiwan and subsequent militarisation of the island, Filipino security would be severely compromised, and China would push claims (or even seize) what territory of ours they have not already taken. Preventing such Chinese expansionism and keeping our remaining claims in the SCS requires the backing of the US, upon whom our whole security relies on and without which we will likely have to give in to any Chinese aggression. At the same time, the Philippines does not wish to be drawn into a conflict that will lead to the suffering of its people. Thus, it is important to maintain relations with all powers and re-establish peace and order in the area with all possible speed.

### National Strategy

The Philippines is balancing its foreign relations between its traditional alliance with the US (based around security), and with China (which might offer economic opportunities).

The Philippines traditionally has had a strong relationship with the US, spreading over several spheres but critically in security, upon whom it is dependent. This alliance is embodied by several agreements. The 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) ensures US aid in case of an attack on the Philippines. The 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) increased the military cooperation and allowed the US to station military personnel in the Philippines and to conduct joint exercises. Further, the 2014 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) declared an understanding the US will not establish permanent military bases or presence in the Philippines but confirmed the US may rotate troops and operate facilities on Philippine bases. In 2022, the bases available for US use under EDCA was further expanded by the Philippines, with a focus on bases near Taiwan.

The Duterte government made a shift in foreign policy away from the US towards China in 2016, when, at the beginning of his presidency Duterte declared the Philippines will follow a "independent foreign policy". This approach aimed to protect Philippines sovereignty and avoid foreign interference in Filipino affairs, with a pivot away from the US towards China. This enabled the Philippines to obtain economic benefits – China increased development assistance. However, the engagement with China was criticised for the lack of specific commitments and the small number of realised projects, all while China continued to increase its presence in Filipino waters the SCS. Furthermore, at no point did the general sentiment of the population change from pro-Taiwan to

pro-China and the nation continues to hold strong anti-China sentiments which are especially prone to flare up when China takes aggressive moves (and thus produces gale-force political headwinds on any large pro-China policy, which must thusly be handled extremely carefully).



The SCS is a place of continuous disputes due to overlapping claims of various states, including the Philippines. The area has a great strategic and economic importance for the Philippines (fishing especially). Under the so-called “nine-dash line”, China claims 85% of the area, and thus has a dispute with the Philippines over the exclusive economic zone of the nation, the Spratly Islands, and most importantly Scarborough Shoal. This puts a heavy strain on relations which further deteriorated in incidents including the Scarborough Shoal standoff (2012), the Whitsun Reef incident (2021), and a series of serious incidents caused by China at Second Thomas Shoal (2024). After the Philippines made a submission in 2013, the Permanent Court of Arbitration initiated a trial investigating the Chinese claims in the SCS. In 2016, it ruled in favour of the Philippines and declared the Chinese claim unlawful. China rejected the ruling.

After the Duterte government (who's faction lost re-election in part due to their pro-China tendencies), the Philippines have begun to strengthen the relationship with the US again. While under Duterte the government decided to terminate the VFA this was reversed and the termination cancelled. As a result, the US reaffirmed its MDT obligations and declared Chinese claims unlawful. In 2021 the VFA was formally brought back to force and relations have continued to improve.

The Philippines does not formally recognise Taiwan as a state and supports the “One China policy,” but maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan via de facto embassies. The Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines and the Manila Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei support some 150,000 Filipinos who live on Taiwan. Moreover, the majority of Filipinos support Taiwanese independence. In 2016 Taiwan rejected the PCA ruling just as China did (as Taiwan also claims the 9-dash line), and in 2013 and 2015, there were fisheries incidents between Taiwan and the Philippines, but while the two states have disputes they have caused little friction in the relationship.

The Philippines has close relations with Japan and Vietnam, which have been strengthened due to tensions over the SCS dispute. Japan is a major aid donor and there were talks of a defence treaty in 2016, but the plans were scrapped under Duterte's pro-China realignment. Nevertheless, good relations continue. Vietnam has a claim on the Spratly Islands overlapping with the Philippines and both nations disagree with China's 9-dash line, thus maintaining a good relationship. Vietnam supports the PCA ruling of 2016, and the Philippines in turn partially backs Vietnamese claims on the Paracel Islands.

As the Philippines maintain good diplomatic relations with all engaged states, a mediating role in negotiations is a possibility, and the crisis might be used to advance Philippine interests. However, China is now clearly seeking de facto control on its territorial claims over Taiwan and its holdings in the South China Sea may be next, risking our security and stability. At the same time the US may wish to secure its presence in the region helped by the Philippines. Thus, the crisis may be an opportunity for the Philippines, but long-term consequences and Philippine interests and security must be born in mind, and all options carefully weighed. Such is the nature of a middle power.

# NATIONAL BRIEFING - THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA



## Introduction

China is the largest local actor in the Southern and Eastern Pacific, holding strong economic ties with many countries in Asia. As China further successfully develops its economy and enhances its capabilities on many fronts, China is no longer a rising player on the world stage but is now established and has the power to make bold moves. Following decades of patience with interference in our domestic affairs and judging an assault against mainland Taiwan to be a risky endeavor, we have finally launched military actions on the Dongsha and Nan Xiaodao Islands to support the imposition of a blockade with the hope of successfully reclaiming the breakaway province of Taiwan. Should we succeed the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will never be questioned again, and national rejuvenation will have been achieved!

## Strategic Objectives

China has long desired to become the regional leader of the Pacific as part of its journey to the highest echelon of the international stage after the Century of Humiliation. As part of this ambition, it only makes sense that Taiwan finally be territorially reunified with China, closing the last open wound of the Civil War, and allowing our country to tread the path to the Chinese Dream unimpeded. Thus, the all-important stability of the CCP will be assured and any lingering questions or doubts about the legitimacy of the CCP will be destroyed forever.

## National Strategy

The time has come for China to take Taiwan back into the fold and secure control of the Dongsha Islands. The US and others will likely attempt to intervene, and so we must remind them that they are, and shall only be, spectators. To this end, we will show them that warfare is not just kinetic, but begins (and if all goes to plan, ends) before the shooting starts with the utilization of every tool of state using diplomatic, economic, cyber, and (if necessary) military capabilities.

We have developed our military capabilities at a rapid pace, in line with President Xi's demand for China to be a "world-class military power" by 2049. Our advances in missile technology and rapid naval expansion leave the West in awe. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is now the world's largest fighting force with more than two million active personnel. We have the largest navy and largest air force in the Pacific. In addition, we are continually introducing the most cutting-edge technology, as with our new DF-17 hypersonic missiles, cutting-edge electronic warfare systems, and J-20 5<sup>th</sup> generation fighters. However, the PLA exhibits much weakness: a poor-quality officer corps, limited (though improving) nuclear stockpiles, a lack of jointness, and limited amphibious lift to name but a few problems. Thus, we should not overstretch and expose ourselves and should avoid an all-out war if at all possible: winning without fighting is always preferable.

This means that when others begin to respond to our movements, we will first make use of the other tools in our arsenal. Our offensive cyber operations have long allowed us to steal intellectual property, exert political influence, and carry out espionage. Western militaries overly

rely on networked digital systems and satellite infrastructure.. We must misdirect and confuse, making use of our diplomatic statecraft – our leverage in international institutions such as the UN with our Security Council veto, our influence over Western social media, and the extensive use of lawfare.

Our economic leverage serves to be our greatest weapon. Any country that intends on getting in our way can be reminded how much they stand to lose if we feel like severing economic ties. Most suspectable are Australia and New Zealand, as we are their largest trading partner. However, we are also vital to Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, as well as hosts of developing countries around the world.

The days ahead will be long and arduous, and one must always remember that the most effective solution comes from blending our tools together. However, as China seeks to rectify the historical mistake across the strait and dispose of the splittist regime in Tapei, the old imperialists must be kept at bay: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan along with any other country that seeks to keep us from returning Taiwan to its rightful place. The mantle of history is upon us, as is the legitimacy of the Party, and thus our success will determine if China leads the world or falls into ruin. We must not fail.

# NATIONAL BRIEFING – JAPAN



## Introduction

Japan is a major strategic power in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific, in a long-standing formal defense alliance with the United States. Historically, Japan's regional military role has been constrained by its post-war 'peace constitution' and domestic political constraints. However, during the last 10 years, the domestic political debate has shifted, focusing more on Japan's security needs, not least with respect to the increasingly fraught US-China relationship and the problem of Taiwan.

While Japan does not recognize Taiwan diplomatically, it has a long history of friendship and close unofficial cooperation across multiple domains (commerce, trade, investment, education, health, culture, etc.). In recent polls, 67% of Japanese respondents described Taiwan as a "trustworthy ally," while 74% supported active Japanese engagement towards "stability in the Taiwan Strait." In 2021, this sentiment was reflected in several surprisingly pro-Taiwan statements by senior LDP politicians (the extremely dominant political party). However, Japan's official position on Taiwan has not changed: its government has never made an explicit commitment to defend the island or to necessarily assist a possible United States military response if a cross-strait conflict occurs. However, in 2022 Japan declared in a thinly veiled statement that it would be willing to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack.

This will be put to the test following news of the Chinese seizure of Pratas Island (owned by Taiwan) and Minami Kojima (owned by Japan, and claimed by Taiwan and China). The Japan Self-Defense Forces have been put on high alert and the Diet is meeting to discuss what should be done.

## Strategic Objectives

Broadly speaking, Japan has four major strategic objectives when it comes to a potential cross-strait conflict around Taiwan:

1. *Peaceful Resolution by Diplomatic Means*
  - a. When it comes to authorizing use of military force and participation in conflicts outside Japan, the government faces a higher threshold than other regional actors due to domestic political constraints. War is generally considered the absolute last resort in times of "existential threat."
2. *Maintaining Strength and Credibility of US-Japan Military Alliance*
  - a. Japan cannot afford to have China prevail as it could result in a strategic retreat by the United States and the need for Japan to rethink its entire foreign policy, military doctrine, and posture at great cost.
3. *Keeping Taiwan Aligned with the Free and Democratic Nations of the Indo-Pacific*
  - a. This is dictated by both national security and economic considerations. By taking Taiwan, China will break out of the so-called First Island Chain, potentially threatening Japan's territory and maritime security. It may also reorient much of Taiwan's current trade and investment flows away from Japan. If China controls Taiwan it will also control the vast majority of shipping lanes used by the Japanese economy.

#### 4. *Cementing Japan's Role as a Leader in the Rules-Based International Order*

- a. Japan believes that the best way to secure its long-term national interests is by integrating itself into and becoming a responsible stakeholder within a regional and global system of alliances, connecting free and democratic nations with market economies and the rule of law.

#### **National Strategy**

Japan has many assets it can meaningfully deploy to achieve its strategic objectives. On the diplomatic front, it commands respect and influence amongst ASEAN countries in South-East Asia, including Vietnam and the Philippines. It is also an influential member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which includes the US, Japan, Australia, and India. Finally, Japan has strong diplomatic and military ties to NATO and the European Union, and of course Japan has Reciprocal Access Agreement's with the UK, Australia, and the US. As the Taiwan issue becomes "internationalized" (for example seen in the diplomatic incident between China and Lithuania), Japan is well positioned to rally the fraternity of free and democratic nations around Taiwan's cause.

The lynchpin of Japan's defense and national security is its long-standing alliance with the United States which has 50,000 troops permanently stationed across naval and air force bases in the country. Japan's large, well-equipped, and well-trained army, navy, and air force well trained and motivated and can be deployed to support the United States in any potential crisis over Taiwan. The only issue is political: Article 9 of Japan's pacifist constitution prevents it from fighting wars overseas, *unless* the situation is deemed an "existential threat" (though this does not prevent the use of force to defend Japanese territory). Also, Japan's government must engage with the United States in consultations prior to approving the use of its territory and facilities for the United States to wage war in the region. The other major check is a population suspicious of war and the use of force, who must be brought onside before military action can be done at an acceptable price politically.

Being the world's fourth largest economy, Japan has massive economic and financial clout, especially in Asia. It can project economic and financial power via "check-book diplomacy." On the other hand, it also means that Japan is vulnerable to disruptions in supply chains, international trade, and investment flows. Japan imports most of its energy and natural resources and needs reliable access to maritime routes. Over 70% of its trade flows through the South China Sea and through the Taiwan Strait. Its long-standing dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, coupled with its concerns over China's territorial claims over islands in the South China Sea, only add to anxieties over the possible crisis around Taiwan and its potential impact on Japan's economy.

The ideal outcome is to ensure that Taiwan does not fall into China's hands, while avoiding a hot war, proving Japan's worth in the US-Japan alliance, and burnishing Japan's credentials as a champion of the liberal, rules-based international order. To do so will require careful use of diplomacy and our alliances, management of public opinion, and the threat or use of military force.

# **Press**



# XINHUA NEWS AGENCY



## Background

Xinhua is an official press agency of the People's Republic of China (being directly part of the government) and focuses on mainland China news. It takes a highly favorable view of the government, almost never covers any stories of dissent, and whitewashes bad news even when such issues are well known within China. It often gets exclusive interviews with high level government officials (including Xi Jinping himself). It is highly critical of the US, India, and other non-Chinese influence in the Pacific.

## Role

As Xinhua your job is to help disseminate the news about China, as the Chinese government says.

1. Tell people the truth about China – people need to be informed.
2. Ensure that China is viewed favorably!

You are allowed to leave the press table to talk to anyone.



# ASSOCIATED PRESS



## Background

Associated Press (often known simply as AP) is a highly regarded non-profit American news agency. They are known for unbiased reporting and are the publishers of the AP Stylebook, the definitive stylebook for American journalists. They cover the full range of topics both inside and outside the US, and are known to be a reliable, trustworthy news source.

## Role

Your job is simple: you are to tell interesting factual news about what is going on.

1. Tell people the truth about what is going on – people need to be informed.
2. Build your contact list of people you can call on in the future to get tips and leaks from.
3. Ferret out the most interesting stories.

You must follow journalistic standards:

- Do not lie for the sake of a scoop
- Do not report something that was said off-record
- Do not squash a story simply because it is uncomfortable for the powerful

Any journalistic method (including things like publishing leaks) is fair game to get the news out to the people, but don't forget that asking people directly and appealing to their egos is often just as good and much easier (and crossing people will close you off to later access). You can also work with other journalists to extend your reach and cross check stories or information you have.

You are allowed to leave the press table to talk to anyone.



# BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION



## Background

The British Broadcasting Corporation is the leading national broadcaster of the UK. It is generally seen as the world's leading source on non-American English language news. It covers UK, Commonwealth, and foreign topics in a large range of languages and is well respected across the world.

## Role

Your job is simple: you are to tell interesting factual news about what is going on.

1. Tell people the truth about what is going on – people need to be informed.
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# TAIPEI TIMES

## TAIPEI 台北 TIMES

### Background

The Taipei Times is the last remaining major English-language print newspaper in Taiwan. Originally formed in 1999, it is owned by the Liberty Times Group (the Liberty Times is one of the four major national Taiwanese newspapers). The Liberty Times (and thusly the Taipei Times) takes a Pan-Green pro-independence political stance in its reporting.

### Role

Your job is simple: you are to report on the most critical events ever to happen in the modern history of Taiwan.

1. Tell people the truth about what is going on – the international community needs to be informed!
2. Ensure that China is called out for its aggression!
3. Make sure that any disloyalty or gross incompetence by the Taiwanese government is called out so it can be rectified!

You must follow journalistic standards:

- Do not lie for the sake of a scoop
- Do not report something that was said off-record
- Do not squash a story simply because it is uncomfortable for the powerful

Any journalistic method (including things like publishing leaks) is fair game, but don't forget that asking people directly and appealing to their egos is often just as good and much easier (and crossing people will close you off to later access). You can also work with other journalists to extend your reach and cross check stories or information you have.

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# PHILIPPINES DAILY INQUIRER



## Background

The English-language Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), (more simply: the Inquirer), is the Philippines newspaper of record. Founded in 1985, it was one of the first private newspapers established under the Marcos regime. It is the most awarded newspaper in the Philippines, trusted by some 68% of Filipinos and has a reach of 54 million people across its platforms, with 28% of the population reading it at least once a week (and 13% reading it at least 3 days a week), making it the most read newspaper in the country.

## Role

Your job is simple: you are to tell factual news about what is going on.

1. Tell people the truth about what is going on – people need to be informed.
2. Build your contact list of people you can call on in the future to get tips and leaks from.
3. Ferret out the most interesting stories.

You must follow journalistic standards:

- Do not lie for the sake of a scoop
- Do not report something that was said off-record
- Do not squash a story simply because it is uncomfortable for the powerful

Any methods (eavesdropping, leaks, and taking photos of documents left lying around) are all fair game to get the news out to the people, but don't forget that asking people directly and appealing to their egos is often just as good and much easier (and crossing people will close you off to later access). You can also work with other journalists to extend your reach and cross check stories or information you have.

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